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Summary
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) security relies on the hardness of solving the ellip-
tic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) but the security of cryptosystems does not
only depend on the mathematical properties; an adversary can attack the implementation
rather than algorithmic specification. In many practical applications of ECC the secret
key is stored inside a tamper-resistant device, i.e., a smartcard, where differential fault
attacks (DFA) can be used to enforce bit errors into the decryption (or signing) process
which is performed inside the smartcard, so that information on the secret key can leak
out. In order to prevent fault attacks hardware countermeasures can be applied, or new
algorithms can be developed.
In this doctoral thesis the focus of our research is development of algorithmic coun-
termeasures against active side-channel attacks, in particular fault attacks. Our aim is to
protect elliptic curve computation in a tamper-resistant device, i.e., a smartcard, by pro-
tecting the computation in the finite binary extension field GF (2k) against these attacks.
The following are the main problems addressed of the thesis:
1. Evaluation of fault attacks through the following fault models: Random Fault Model,
Arbitrary Fault Model, and Single Bit Fault Model. These fault models are justified
by the physical attacks.
2. Proposal of new schemes for fault tolerant computation in the elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems, i.e., Chinese Remainder Theorem based fault tolerant computation (FTC),
as well as Lagrange interpolation based FTC, both based on embedding the field in
larger rings.
3. Construction of new algorithmic countermeasures based on the proposed schemes,
i.e., fault tolerant residue representation modular multiplication algorithm and fault
tolerant Lagrange representation modular multiplication algorithm, which are im-
mune against the error propagation of the proposed fault models;
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4. Evaluation and characterization of possible error correcting algorithms, i.e., Euclid’s
decoding algorithm and Welch-Berlekamp decoding algorithm.
5. Analysis of possible masked errors in elliptic curve point addition.
The main results of this thesis are:
1. New schemes for FTC are developed. Based on these schemes new algorithmic
countermeasure against fault attacks are developed.
2. New algorithmic countermeasures provide protection of the elliptic curve computa-
tion in a tamper proof device by protection of the finite field computation against
active side channel attacks, i.e., fault attacks. Our method where field elements are
represented by the redundant residue representation/redundant Lagrange represen-
tation enables us to overcome the problem if one, or both coordinates x, y ∈ GF (2k)
of the point P ∈ E/F2k are corrupted.
3. Computation of the field elements is decomposed into parallel, mutually indepen-
dent, modular/identical channels, so that in case of fault at one channel, errors will
not distribute to others.
4. Different fault models can be used on different channels.
5. We give proof that our algorithmic countermeasures work against fault attacks, and
that the attacker can not break a system and recover secret key. However, arbitrarily
powerful adversaries can simply create faults in enough channels and overwhelm the
system proposed. It is part of the design process to decide on how much security is
enough, since all security (i.e. extra channels) has a cost.
6. If faults effects are detected, they can be corrected by applying error correction
algorithms, i.e., Euclid’s decoding algorithm/Welch-Berlekamp decoding algorithm
at the output vector of the corresponding computation.
7. Our proposed algorithms can have masked errors and will not be immune against
attacks which can create such errors, but it is a difficult problem to counter masked
errors since any anti-fault attack scheme will have some masked errors.
2
The work performed in this thesis has resulted in the following publications:
1. Our scheme for fault tolerant computation in public key cryptosystems based on
the Lagrange interpolation and evaluation of fault attacks through fault models has
been published:
S. Medosˇ and S. Boztas¸, “Fault-Tolerant Finite Field Computation in the Public
Key Cryptosystems”, 17th International Symposium on Applied Algebra, Algebraic
Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes, AAECC-17, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Vol. 4851, pp. 120–129, December 2007, India.
2. Our new algorithmic countermeasure, i.e., fault tolerant Lagrange representation
modular multiplication algorithm has been published:
S. Medosˇ and S. Boztas¸, “Fault-Tolerant Lagrange Representation Multiplication
in the Finite Field GF (2k)”, Proceedings of Information Security and Cryptology
Conference, Ankara, Turkey, pp. 90–95, December 2007.
3. Our fault tolerant residue representation modular multiplication algorithm has been
published:
S. Medosˇ and S. Boztas¸, “Montgomery Residue Representation Fault-Tolerant Com-
putation in GF (2k)”, Proceedings of the 13th Australasian Conference on Informa-
tion Security and Privacy (ACISP 2008), LNCS Vol. 5107, pp. 419–432, 2008.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context of the Research and Thesis Outline
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) recently has started to receive commercial acceptance
and has been included in numerous standards. Its security relies on the hardness of solving
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), but the security of cryptosystems
does not only depend on the mathematical properties; an adversary can attack the im-
plementation rather than algorithmic specification. Cryptosystems are used in the real
world where cryptographic protocols are implemented in software or hardware, obeying
laws of physics. The circuits used leak information, e.g., power and timing information,
over side-channels. Thus, one has a gray box, where an adversary has access to several
side-channels.
In many practical applications of ECC the secret key is stored inside a tamper-resistant
device, i.e., a smartcard. If an adversary can inflict some sort of physical stress on the
smartcard, he can induce faults into the circuitry or memory. These faults become man-
ifest in the computation as errors. If an error occurs, a faulty final result is computed.
If the computation depends on some secret key, a comparison between correct data and
faulty data may allow one to conclude facts about the secret key.
Operations on elliptic curves relies on computation in very large finite fields (with more
that 2160 elements), where a single fault in computation can yield an erroneous output,
which can then be used by an adversary to break cryptosystem. In order to prevent fault
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attacks, either hardware countermeasures can be applied, or new algorithms can be de-
velop. Usually countermeasures against one side-channel attack does not protect against
other side-channel attacks. Until now, the scientific community has not been able to
developed a theoretical framework to allow general security proofs for algorithms secure
against fault attacks. To prevent passive side channel attacks it is important that the
available information to the adversary running a side channel attack is independent of the
secret key. There have been attempts to develop algorithmic countermeasures, but none
are really satisfying. Therefore, there is a need to develop algorithmic countermeasures
against fault attacks which are used in real world. Countermeasures against such attacks
form the main focus of this thesis.
The focus of our research are algorithm countermeasures against active side-channel
attacks, in particular fault attacks. Our aim is to protect elliptic curve computation in a
tamper-resistant device, i.e., a smartcard, by protecting computation in the finite binary
extension field GF (2k).
Organization of the Thesis. Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter, where we
provide an overview of the cryptography including number theoretic problems and security
of cryptosystems. In Chapter 2, we discuss the algebraic, cryptographic and mathematical
background of elliptic curves that is required to understand the discussion of fault attacks
and countermeasures. In Chapter 3 we provide the mathematical aspect of fault attacks
through characterization of the fault models, i.e., Random Fault Model, Arbitrary Fault
Model and Single bit Fault Model, that model physical behavior of attacked device. In
Chapter 4, by investigating each variable used in the affine addition formula of a non-
supersingular elliptic curve over GF (2k) we derive conditions that the inflicted error needs
to have in order to yield an undetectable faulty point on the curve. In Chapter 5, we
propose two countermeasures schemes; Chinese Remainder Theorem based fault tolerant
computation, and Lagrange Interpolation based fault tolerant computation. In Chapter
6, we develop new algorithmic countermeasures that protect elliptic curve computation
by protecting computation of the finite binary extension field, against fault attacks. In
5
Chapter 7, we conclude with the results of our research.
1.2 Cryptography
Cryptography has a long and fascinating history. Initial and limited use was by the
Egyptians some 4000 years ago, and it played a crucial role in the outcome of both
world wars. Cryptography was used mainly by those associated with the military, the
diplomatic service and government in general. It was used as a tool to protect national
secrets and strategies. The development of computers and communications systems in the
1960s brought with it a demand from the private sector for means to protect information
in digital form and to provide security services. In 1976 Diffie and Hellman published
New Directions in Cryptography [29]. This paper introduced the revolutionary concept
of public-key cryptography and also provided a new method for key exchange, the secu-
rity of which is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem. In 1978
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [82] discovered the first practical public-key encryption and
signature scheme, known as RSA. The RSA scheme is based on the intractability of fac-
toring large integers. This application of a hard mathematical problem to cryptography
revitalized efforts to find more efficient methods to factor integers. The 1980s saw major
advances in this area but none which rendered the RSA system insecure. Another class
of powerful and practical public-key schemes was found by ElGamal in 1985, which are
based on the discrete logarithm problem. In 1985 Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller pro-
posed the use of elliptic curves for public key cryptosystems. Today, cryptography is in
the core of every day life, securing almost all its aspects, i.e., e-commerce, online banking,
communication via internet.
Definition 1.2.1 ([68]). Cryptography is about design and analysis of mathematical tech-
niques that enable secure communications in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information
security such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and data origin au-
thentication. Cryptography is not the only means of providing information security, but
rather one set of techniques.
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The objectives of secure communications are (A and B are authorized parties, E is
unauthorized):
1. Confidentiality - keeping data secret from all but those authorized to see it, i.e., a
message sent by A to B should not be readable by E;
2. Data Integrity - ensuring that data has not been altered by unauthorized means,
i.e., B should be able to detect when the data sent by A has been modified by E;
3. Data origin authentication - corroborating the source of data, i.e., B should be able
to verify that the data sent by A indeed originated from A;
4. Entity authentication - corroborating the identity of an entity, i.e., B should be
convinced of the identity of the other communicating entity;
5. Non-repudiation - preventing an entity from denying previous commitments, or
actions, i.e., when B receives a message purportedly from A, not only is B convinced
that the message originated from A, but B can convince a neutral third party of
this, so that A can not deny having sent the message to B.
A fundamental goal of cryptography is to adequately address these four areas in both
theory and practice. Cryptography is about the prevention and detection of cheating and
other malicious activities.
One-way and trapdoor one-way functions are the basis for public-key cryptography.
Definition 1.2.2 ([68]). A function f : X → Y is called a one-way function if f(x) is easy
to compute for all x ∈ X, but for essentially all elements y ∈ Im(f) it is computationally
infeasible to find any x ∈ X such that f(x) = y.
Definition 1.2.3 ([68]). A trapdoor one-way function is a one-way function f: X →
Y with the additional property that given some extra information (called the trapdoor
information) it becomes feasible to find for any given y ∈ Im(f), an x ∈ X such that
f(x) = y.
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Computing a one-way function corresponds to encrypting a message, while inverting the
function corresponds to decrypting a ciphertext. The secret key serves as “helper” infor-
mation which helps invert a one-way function easily. The existence of one-way functions
and trapdoor one-way functions is still unclear, but there are a number of good candidates
for one-way and trapdoor one-way functions.
Cryptographic techniques are divided into two types: symmetric-key and public-key.
1.2.1 Symmetric-key Cryptography
Definition 1.2.4 ([68]). Consider an encryption scheme consisting of the sets of encryp-
tion and decryption transformations {Ee : ek ∈ K} and {Dd : dk ∈ K}, respectively,
where K is the key space. The encryption scheme is said to be symmetric-key if for each
associated encryption/decryption key pair (ek; dk), it is computationally easy to deter-
mine dk knowing only ek, and to determine ek from dk. Since ek = dk in most practical
symmetric-key encryption schemes, the term symmetric key becomes appropriate.
In symmetric encryption, the encryption key ek and decryption key dk are the same, or
one can be easily deduced from the other. Popular symmetric encryption methods include
the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). One
of the major issues with symmetric-key systems is to find an efficient method to agree
upon and exchange keys securely. This problem is referred to as the key distribution
problem. In symmetric-key encryption, key ek must be kept secret, as dk can be deduced
from ek. There are two classes of symmetric-key encryption schemes: block ciphers and
stream ciphers.
Advantages of symmetric-key cryptography include:
1. Symmetric-key ciphers can be designed to have high rates of data throughput.
2. Keys for symmetric-key ciphers are relatively short.
3. Symmetric-key ciphers can be employed as primitives to construct various crypto-
graphic mechanisms, i.e., pseudorandom number generators, hash functions, com-
putationally efficient digital signature schemes.
8
4. Symmetric-key ciphers can be composed to produce stronger ciphers.
5. Symmetric-key encryption is perceived to have an extensive history.
Disadvantages of symmetric-key cryptography include:
1. In a two-party communication, the key must remain secret at both ends.
2. In a large network, there are many key pairs to be managed.
3. In a two-party communication between entities A and B, key have to be changed
frequently, and perhaps for each communication session.
4. Digital signature mechanisms arising from symmetric-key encryption typically re-
quire either large keys for the public verification function or the use of a trusted
third party (TTP).
1.2.2 Public-key Cryptography
Definition 1.2.5 ([68]). Consider an encryption scheme consisting of the sets of encryp-
tion and decryption transformations {Ee : e ∈ K} and {Dd : d ∈ K}, respectively. The
encryption method is said to be a public-key encryption scheme, or asymmetric encryption
if for each associated encryption/decryption pair (ek; dk), one key ek (the public key) is
made publicly available, while the other dk (the private key) is kept secret. For the scheme
to be secure, it must be computationally infeasible to compute dk from ek.
The encryption transformation Ee is being viewed here as a trapdoor one-way function,
where dk is the trapdoor information necessary to compute the inverse function and hence
allow decryption. The main objective of public-key encryption is to provide privacy or
confidentiality. Advantages of public-key cryptography include:
1. Only the private key must be kept secret (authenticity of the public key must,
however, be guaranteed).
2. The administration of keys on a network requires the presence of only a functionally
trusted TTP as opposed to an unconditionally trusted TTP. Depending on the mode
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of usage, the TTP might only be required in an off-line manner, as opposed to in
real time.
3. Depending on the mode of usage, a private key/public key pair may remain un-
changed for considerable periods of time, e.g., many sessions (even several years).
4. Many public-key schemes yield relatively efficient digital signature mechanisms.
5. The key used to describe the public verification function is typically much smaller
than for the symmetric-key counterpart. In a large network, the number of keys
necessary may be considerably smaller than in the symmetric-key scenario.
Disadvantages of public-key encryption include:
1. Data throughput rates for the most popular public-key encryption methods are
several orders of magnitude slower than the best known symmetric-key schemes.
2. Key sizes are typically much larger than those required for symmetric-key encryp-
tion, and the size of public-key signatures is larger than that of tags providing data
origin authentication from symmetric-key techniques.
3. No public-key scheme has been proven to be secure (the same can be said for block
ciphers). The most effective public-key encryption schemes found to date have
their security based on the presumed difficulty of a small set of number-theoretic
problems.
4. Public-key cryptography does not have as extensive a history as symmetric-key
encryption.
1.2.3 Symmetric key cryptosystem vs. private key cryptosys-
tem
Public-key encryption techniques may be used to establish a key for a symmetric-key. In
practice public-key cryptography facilitates efficient signatures, i.e., non-repudiation, and
key management, while symmetric-key cryptography is efficient for encryption and some
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data integrity applications. Private keys in public-key systems are larger (e.g., 1024 bits
for RSA) than secret keys in symmetric-key systems (e.g., 64 or 128 bits). For equivalent
security, symmetric keys have bit lengths smaller than that of private keys in public-key
systems, e.g., by a factor of 10 or more. For a detailed discussion on the issue of key
length, see Lenstra, et. al [58].
1.3 Number Theoretic Problems
The security of many public-key cryptosystems relies on the intractability of the relevant
computational problems. The true computational complexities of these problems are not
known, i.e., it is widely believed that they are intractable, although no proof of this is
known. Before listing computational problems, we will briefly overview computational
complexity.
1.3.1 Computational Complexity
Definition 1.3.1. An algorithm to perform a computation is said to be a polynomial time
algorithm if there exists an integer d such that the number of bit operations required to
perform the algorithm on integers of total length at most k is O(kd).
The class of exponential time algorithms are very far from polynomial time. These
have time estimate of O(eck), where c is a constant, k is the total binary length of the
integers to which the algorithm is being applied. Subexponential time algorithms have
time estimate of the form O(ef(k)), where k is the input length and f(k) = o(k), i.e.,
limk→∞
f(k)
k
= 0.
1.3.2 Integer Factorization Problem
The security of many cryptographic techniques depends on the intractability of the integer
factorization problem, i.e., the RSA public-key encryption scheme, the RSA signature
scheme, and the Rabin public-key encryption scheme.
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Definition 1.3.2 ([68]). The integer factorization problem is the following: given a posi-
tive integer n, find its prime factorization, that is, write n = pe11 p
e2
2 · . . . · pekk where the pi
are pairwise distinct primes and each ei ≥ 1.
The special-purpose factoring algorithms are tailored to perform better when the in-
teger n being factored is of a special form, examples include: trial division, Pollard’s rho
algorithm, Pollard’s p− 1 algorithm, the elliptic curve algorithm, and the special number
field sieve. The running time of these algorithms depends on the certain properties of the
factors of n.
The general purpose factoring algorithms include the quadratic sieve and the general
number field sieve. The running time of these algorithms depends on the size of the n.
1.3.3 The RSA problem (RSAP)
The intractability of the RSA problem forms the basis for the security of the RSA public-
key encryption scheme and the RSA signature scheme.
Definition 1.3.3 ([68]). The RSA problem (RSAP) is the following: given a positive
integer n that is a product of two distinct large odd primes p and q, a positive integer
e such that gcd (e, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1, and an integer c, find an integer m such that
me ≡ c (modn).
If the factors of n are known then the RSA problem can be easily solved. There is no
proof that the RSA and the integer factorization problems are computationally equivalent,
but this is strongly believed to be the case.
1.3.4 Discrete Logarithm Problem
The security of many cryptographic techniques depends on the intractability of the dis-
crete logarithm problem, i.e., Diffie-Hellman key agreement and its derivatives, ElGamal
encryption, and the ElGamal signature scheme and its variants.
Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n with generator α. It is convenient to think of
G as the multiplicative group Z∗p of order p − 1, where the group operation is simply
multiplication modulo p.
12
Definition 1.3.4 ([68]). Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n. Let α be a generator of
G, and let β ∈ G. The discrete logarithm of β to the base α, denoted logαβ, is the unique
integer x, 0 ≤ x ≤ n− 1, such that β = αx.
Definition 1.3.5 ([68]). The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is the following: given a
prime p, a generator α of Z∗p, and an element β ∈ Z∗p, find the integer x, 0 ≤ x ≤ p− 2,
such that β ≡ αx (mod p).
Definition 1.3.6 ([68]). The generalized discrete logarithm problem (GDLP) is the fol-
lowing: given a finite cyclic group G of order n, a generator α of G, and an element
β ∈ G, find the integer x, 0 ≤ x ≤ n− 1, such that β = αx.
The known algorithms for the DLP can be categorized as follows:
1. Algorithms that work in arbitrary groups, e.g., exhaustive search, the baby step giant
step algorithm, Pollard’s rho algorithm;
2. Algorithms that work in arbitrary groups, but are especially efficient if the order of
the group has only small prime factors, e.g., Pohlig-Hellman algorithm; and
3. The index-calculus algorithms which are efficient only in certain groups.
1.3.5 The Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP)
The security of many cryptographic schemes depends on the intractability of the Diffie-
Hellman problem, i.e., Diffie-Hellman key agreement and its derivatives, and ElGamal
public-key encryption. The DHP reduces to the DLP in polynomial time.
Definition 1.3.7 ([68]). The Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP) is the following: given a
prime p, a generator α of Z∗p, and elements α
amod p and αbmod p, find αabmod p.
Definition 1.3.8 ([68]). The generalized Diffie-Hellman problem (GDHP) is the follow-
ing: given a finite cyclic group G, a generator α of G, and group elements αa and αb,
find αab.
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1.3.6 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
The hardness of the ECDLP is essential for the security of all elliptic curve cryptography
schemes.
Definition 1.3.9 ([41]). The ECDLP is the following: given an elliptic curve E(Fq)
defined over a finite field Fq, a point P ∈ E(Fq) of order n, and a point Q ∈< P >, find
the integer l ∈ [0, n− 1] such that Q = lP . The integer l is called the discrete logarithm
of Q to the base P , denoted l = logP Q.
There is no mathematical proof that the ECDLP is intractable. Also there is no the-
oretical evidence that the ECDLP is intractable. The best known attack on ECDLP uses
a combination of the Pohlig-Hellman and Pollard’s rho algorithms, whose time O(
√
p) is
fully exponential, where p is the largest prime divisor of n, while the most naive algorithm
is exhaustive search. Subexponential-time attacks for some versions of the ECDLP are:
isomorphism attacks, Weil and Tate pairing attacks, attacks on the prime-field anomalous
curves, and Weil descent.
1.3.7 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECDHP)
Definition 1.3.10 ([41]). The computational ECDHP is the folowing: given an elliptic
curve E(Fq) defined over a finite field Fq, a point P ∈ E(Fq) of order n, and points
A = aP,B = bP ∈< P >, find the point C = abP .
The ECDLP is no harder than the ECDHP, since if the ECDLP can be solved in < P >,
by first finding a from (P,A) and then computing C = aB. It is not known if the ECDLP
is equally as hard as the ECDHP.
1.3.8 Elliptic Curve Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECD-
DHP)
Definition 1.3.11 ([41]). The ECDDHP is the following: given an elliptic curve E(Fq)
defined over a finite field Fq, a point P ∈ E(Fq) of order n, and points A = aP,B =
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bP, C = cP ∈< P >, determine whether C = abP , or equivalently, whether c ≡
ab (modn).
The ECDDHP is no harder then the ECDHP, since if the ECDHP in < P > can be
solved then the ECDDHP in < P > can be efficiently solved by finding C ′ = abP from
(P,A,B), and then comparing C ′ with C.
1.4 Security of Public Key Cryptosystems
To quantify the security of public key cryptosystems, the concept of computational secu-
rity is widely used. Here an adversary is assumed to have limited computation time and
memory available (polynomial in the input parameters). The security of the cryptosys-
tem is then based on the fact that the problem of breaking the system is reducible to
solving a problem that is strongly believed to be computationally hard, such as factoring
a product of two large random primes and taking discrete logarithms in a large finite field.
A cryptographic method is said to be provably secure if the difficulty of defeating it
can be shown to be essentially as difficult as solving a well-known and supposedly difficult
(typically number-theoretic) problem, such as integer factorization or the computation of
discrete logarithms.
Ad hoc security consists of any variety of convincing arguments that every successful
attack requires a resource level (e.g., time and space) greater than the fixed resources of a
perceived adversary. Cryptographic primitives and protocols which survive such analysis
are said to have heuristic security, with security here typically in the computational sense.
Such claims of security generally remain questionable and unforeseen attacks remain
a threat. As a rule, one assumes that an adversary always has access to all data being
transmitted by two communicating parties and exact knowledge of every aspect of the
used cryptographic scheme, except for the secret key. This is referred to as the Kerchoff’s
Principle. Moreover, an adversary can request encryptions of polynomially many (in the
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size of the input parameters) chosen messages to achieve his objective. This scenario is
usually referred to as a black-box assumption, since it allows purely theoretical proofs on
paper.
However, cryptosystems are used in the real world where cryptographic protocols are
implemented in software or hardware, obeying laws of physics. The circuits used leak
information, e.g., power and timing information, over side channels. Thus, one has a
gray box, where an adversary has access to several side-channels. Security in the real
world depends on some assumptions on which cryptographers silently agree on, i.e., it
is assumed that all parties play by the rules and follow specifications (which may be
reasonable assumption). Furthermore, it is assumed that a cryptosystem running on
some device can not be attacked by other means than described by the black box model.
This is not a realistic assumption, since the major problem for security in the real world
is the environment in which the cryptographic algorithm is executed. An adversary can
attack an implementation instead of the algorithmic specification. Thus there are a lot of
ways to break a “provably secure” cryptosystem. The device running an algorithm and
operating system has to be secure from unwanted influences, otherwise the cryptographic
protocol cannot be secure.
1.4.1 Smartcards
Smartcards can be used to securely store secret keys and perform the cryptographic op-
erations, which require the secret key, namely signing and decryption. They are designed
for purpose of a specific security related task. The most important characteristic of a
smartcard is that it contains a computer with a CPU and a memory. Today’s smart cards
have approximately the same computing power as the first IBM PC. Even cryptographic
schemes that involve a significant amount of arithmetic operations such as elliptic curve
cryptosystems can be run on them. The key characteristics of smartcards in today’s world
are security, ease of use, mobility, and multi-functionality. One of the most important
advantages of smart cards consists of the fact that their stored data can be protected
against unauthorized access and tampering. Smartcards are tamper-resistant but not
tamper-proof. The chip of a smart card consists of a microprocessor, ROM (Read Only
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Memory), EEPROM (Electrical Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory), and RAM
(Random Access Memory), as seen in Figure 1.1. By performing signature and decryption
operations on the card itself, the user’s private key never needs to leave the secure storage
of the card. The information stored in the ROM is written during production. It con-
tains the card operating system and might also contain some applications. The operating
system is provided by the manufacturer including the hardware. The EEPROM is used
for permanent storage of data. Even if the smartcard is unpowered, the EEPROM still
keeps the data. Some smartcards also allow the storage of additional application code, or
application specific commands in the EEPROM. The RAM is the transient memory of the
card and keeps the data only as long as the card is powered. More details on smartcards
can be found in [78].
        
    CPU
RAM
          EPROM
- FILESYSTEM
- PROGRAM FILES
- KEYS
- PASSWORDS
- APPLICATIONS
- OPERATING SYSTEM
- COMMUNICATION
- SECURITY
ROM
Figure 1.1: Example of a smartcard.
Side-Channel Attacks
Smartcards are electronic devices which obey the laws of physics. To compute a result,
they require a certain amount of time, and energy, while electronic circuits emit a certain
amount of radiation, energy, and sound, which can all be affected by their environment.
Smartcards are not equipped with their own power source, or their own signal generator,
so they have to be connected to the smartcard reader. This reader can measure time
and power consumption of the smartcard. If this data is correlated to secret data, then
17
an adversary can obtain additional information. These additional sources of information
are referred to as a side-channels. It has been proven that large number of side-channels
provide information which reveals important and compromising details about secret data.
These details, can be used as a new trapdoors to invert a trapdoor one-way function
without the secret key. Side-channel attacks can be:
• Passive - an adversary just listens to some side channel without interfering with
the computation, e.g., power consumption and power profile, timing measurements,
electromagnetic emissions, sound, cache memory behavior, presence and abuse of
testing circuitry, data gathered by probing circuitry, or bus lines .
• Active - an adversary tampers with an attacked device in order to create faults, i.e.,
induces faults into the device while it executes a known program, and observes the
reaction, i.e., fault attacks.
In this thesis we will concentrate on the active side-channel attacks , i.e., fault attacks.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have provided context of our research and thesis outline, as well as
an overview of the cryptography including number theoretic problems and security of
cryptosystems.
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Chapter 2
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was discovered independently by Neal Koblitz and
Victor Miller in 1985. Elliptic curve cryptographic schemes provide the same functionality
as RSA schemes. Their security is based on the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP). Currently the best algorithms known to solve the ECDLP
have fully exponential running time, in contrast to the subexponential-time algorithms
known for the integer factorization problem. Therefore, a desired security level can be
attained with significantly smaller keys in elliptic curve cryptosystems than with their
RSA counterparts. A 160-bit elliptic curve key provides the same level of security as a
1024-bit RSA key. The advantages that can be gained from smaller key sizes include
speed, efficient use of power, bandwidth, and storage.
In this chapter, in Section 2.2 we provide an overview of elliptic curves by describing
the group operations of addition and doubling, and projective coordinate representation
of non-supersingular elliptic curves. Since elliptic curve operations are performed using
arithmetic operations in the underlying field, and the points of elliptic curve together with
addition operation form an abelian group, we provide short overview of groups, rings and
fields in Section 2.1. Moreover, we will mention attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems
in Section 2.3, as well as some elliptic curve cryptographic schemes in Section 2.5.
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2.1 Abstract Algebra
Here we provide standard definitions of algebraic structures which will be needed in the
rest of the thesis. Please see [59], or [87] for more details.
Definition 2.1.1. A binary operation ∗ on a set S is a mapping from S × S to S. That
is, ∗ is a rule which assigns to each ordered pair of elements from S an element of S.
2.1.1 Groups
Definition 2.1.2. A group (G, ∗) consists of a set G with a binary operation ∗ on G
satisfying the following three axioms:
(i) The group operation is associative. That is, a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c for all a, b, c ∈ G.
(ii) There is an element e ∈ G, called the identity element, such that a ∗ e = e ∗ a = a
for all a ∈ G.
(iii) For each a ∈ G there exists an element a′ ∈ G, called the inverse of a, such that
a ∗ a′ = a′ ∗ a = 1.
A group G is abelian (or commutative) if, furthermore,
(iv) a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all a, b ∈ G.
Definition 2.1.3. A group G is finite if |G| is finite. The number of elements in a finite
group is called its order.
Definition 2.1.4. A non-empty subset H of a group G is a subgroup of G if H is itself
a group with respect to the operation of G. If H is a subgroup of G and H 6= G, then H
is called a proper subgroup of G.
Definition 2.1.5. A group G is cyclic if there is an element α ∈ G such that for each
b ∈ G there is an integer i with b = αi. Such an element α is called a generator of G.
Theorem 2.1.6. If G is a group and a ∈ G, then the set of all powers of a forms a cyclic
subgroup of G, called the subgroup generated by a, and is denoted by < a >.
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Definition 2.1.7. Let G be a group and a ∈ G. The order of a is defined to be the least
positive integer t such that at = 1, provided that such an integer exists. If such a t does
not exist, then the order of a is defined to be ∞.
Theorem 2.1.8. Let G be a group, and let a ∈ G be an element of finite order t. Then
| < a > |, the size of the subgroup generated by a, is equal to t.
Theorem 2.1.9 (Lagrange’s theorem). If G is a finite group and H is a subgroup of G,
then |H| divides |G|. Hence, if a ∈ G, the order of a divides |G|.
Theorem 2.1.10. Every subgroup of a cyclic group G is also cyclic. In fact, if G is
a cyclic group of order n, then for each positive divisor d of n, G contains exactly one
subgroup of order d.
2.1.2 Rings and Fields
Definition 2.1.11. A ring (R,+, ·) is a set R, together with two binary operations, de-
noted by + and ·, such that:
1. R is an abelian group with respect to +.
2. · is associative; that is, (a · b) · c = a · (b · c) for all a, b, c ∈ R.
3. The distributive laws hold; that is for all a, b, c ∈ R we have a · (b+ c) = a · b+ a · c
and (b+ c) · a = b · a+ c · a.
Definition 2.1.12. Let R be a ring:
1. A ring is called a ring with identity if the ring has a multiplicative identity; that is
if there is an element e such that ae = ea = a for all a ∈ R.
2. A ring is called commutative if · is commutative.
3. A ring is called an integral domain if it is a commutative ring with identity e 6= 0
in which ab = 0 implies a = 0, or b = 0.
4. A ring is called a division ring (or skew field) if the nonzero elements of R form a
group under ·.
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5. A commutative division ring is called a field.
Definition 2.1.13. A subset S of a ring R is called a subring of R provided S is closed
under + and · and forms a ring under these operations.
Definition 2.1.14. A subset J of a ring R is called an ideal provided J is a subring of
R and for all a ∈ J and r ∈ R we have ar ∈ J and ra ∈ J .
Ideals are normal subgroups of the additive group of a ring, therefore an ideal J of the ring
R defines a partition of R into disjoint cosets called residue classes modulo J . Elements
a, b ∈ R are called congruent modulo J , written a ≡ b (mod J), if they are in the same
residue class modulo J , or equivalently, if a− b ∈ J . The set of residue classes of a ring R
modulo an ideal J forms a ring which is called residue class ring of R modulo J , denoted
R/J , with respect to the operations
(a + J) + (b + J) = (a+ b) + J,
(a+ J)(b + J) = ab+ J.
Definition 2.1.15. Let R be an arbitrary ring. The ring formed by polynomials over R
with operations
f(x) + g(x) =
n∑
i=0
(ai + bi)x
i, f(x) =
n∑
i=0
aix
i, g(x) =
n∑
i=0
bix
i,
f(x)g(x) =
n+m∑
k=0
ckx
k, ck =
∑
i+j=k
0≤i≤n
0≤j≤m
aibj, f(x) =
n∑
i=0
aix
i, g(x) =
m∑
j=0
bjx
j
is called the polynomial ring over R and denoted R[x].
Theorem 2.1.16. Let R be a ring. Then:
1. R[x] is commutative if and only if R is commutative.
2. R[x] is a ring with identity if and only if R has an identity.
3. R[x] is an integral domain if and only if R is an integral domain.
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Theorem 2.1.17 (Division Algorithm). Let g 6= 0 be a polynomial in F[x]. Then for any
f ∈ F[x] there exist polynomials q, r ∈ F[x] such that f = qg + r, where deg(r) < deg(g).
Theorem 2.1.18. For f ∈ F[x], the residue class ring F[x]/ < f > is a field if and only
if f is irreducible over F.
Definition 2.1.19. An element b ∈ F is a root of the polynomial f ∈ F[x] if and only if
x− b divides f(x).
Theorem 2.1.20. Let F be a finite field. Then F has pn elements, where the prime p is
the characteristic of F and n is the degree of F over its prime subfield.
Lemma 2.1.21. If F is a finite field with q elements, then every a ∈ F satisfies aq = a.
Lemma 2.1.22. If F is a finite field with q elements and K is a subfield of F, then the
polynomial xq − x in K[x] factors in F[x] as xq − x = ∏a∈F (x − a) and F is a splitting
field of xq − x over K.
Theorem 2.1.23 (Existence and Uniqueness of Finite Fields). For every prime p and
every positive integer n there exist a finite field with pn elements. Any finite field with
q = pn elements is isomorphic to the splitting field of xq − x over Fp.
Theorem 2.1.24 (Subfield Criterion). Let Fq be the finite field with q = p
n elements.
Then every subfield Fq has order p
m, where m is a positive divisor of n. Conversely, if m
is a positive divisor of n, then there is exactly one subfield of Fq with p
m elements.
Theorem 2.1.25. For every finite field Fq the multiplicative group F
∗
q of nonzero elements
of Fq is cyclic.
Definition 2.1.26. A generator of the cyclic group F∗q is called a primitive element of
Fq.
Corollary 2.1.27. For a finite field Fq and every positive integer n there exist an irre-
ducible polynomial in Fq[x] of degree n.
Theorem 2.1.28. If f is an irreducible polynomial in Fq[x] of degree m then f has a
root α in Fqm . Furthermore, all the roots of f are simple and are given by the m distinct
elements α, αq, αq
2
, . . . , αq
m−1
of Fqm .
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There are two special types of bases of Fqm over Fq:
• polynomial basis - made up of the powers of a defining element α of Fqm over Fq,
i.e., {1, α, α2, . . . , αm−1}, where α is often primitive element of Fq[x]; and
• normal basis - consists of a suitable element α ∈ Fqm and its conjugates with
respect to Fq, i.e., {α, αq, . . . , αqm−1}.
2.2 Introduction to Elliptic Curves
Definition 2.2.1 ([41]). An elliptic curve E over a field K is defined by an equation
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x + a6 (2.1)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ K and ∆ 6= 0, where ∆ is the discriminant of E and is defined
as follows:
∆ = −d22d8 − 8d34 − 27d26 + 9d2d4d6,
d2 = a
2
1 + 4a2,
d4 = 2a4 + a1a3,
d6 = a
2
3 + 4a6,
d8 = a
2
1a6 + 4a2a6 − a1a3a4 + a2a23 − a24.
The set of points (x, y) ∈ K × K that satisfy equation (2.1) together with the point
at infinity ∞ is denoted by
E(K) =
{
(x, y) ∈ K ×K : y2 + a1xy + a3y − x3 − a2x2 − a4x− a6 = 0
} ∪ {∞} .
Remark 2.2.2. on Definition 2.2.1
• Equation (2.1) is a Weierstrass equation.
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• The condition ∆ 6= 0 ensures that elliptic curve is “smooth”, i.e., there are no points
at which the curve has two or more distinct tangent lines.
• We say that E is defined over the underlaying field K, because the coefficients
a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 of its defining equation are elements of K. If E is defined over
K, then E is also defined over any extension field containing K.
2.2.1 Simplified Weierstrass equations
Definition 2.2.3 ([41]). Two elliptic curves E1 and E2 defined over K and given by the
Weierstrass equations
E1 : y
2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
E2 : y
2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
are said to be isomorphic over K if there exist u, r, s, t ∈ K, u 6= 0, such that the change
of variables
(x, y)→ (u2x + r, u3y + u2sx+ t) (2.2)
transforms equation E1 into E2. The transformation (2.2) is called an admissible change
of variables.
A Weierstrass equations (2.1) can be simplified considerably by applying admissible
changes of variables. We consider separately the cases where the underlaying field K has
characteristic different from 2 and 3, or equal to 2, or 3.
1. If char(K) 6= 2, 3, then by
(x, y)→
(
x− 3a21 − 12a2
36
,
y − 3a1x
216
− a
3
1 + 4a1a2 − 12a3
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)
E is transformed to the curve y2 = x3+ax+b, a, b ∈ K, where ∆ = −16(4a3+27b2).
2. If char(K) = 2, then if
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• a1 6= 0, then by
(x, y)→
(
a21x+
a3
a1
, a31y +
a21a4 + a
2
3
a31
)
E is transformed to the curve y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b, a, b ∈ K. Such a curve
is said to be non-supersingular, and ∆ = b;
• a1 = 0 then by
(x, y)→ (x+ a2, y)
transforms E to the curve y2 + cy = x3 + ax + b, a, b, c ∈ K. Such a curve is
said to be supersingular, and ∆ = c4.
3. If char(K) = 3 then if
• a21 6= −a2 then by
(x, y)→
(
x +
d4
d2
, y + a1x + a1
d4
d2
+ a3
)
where d2 = a
2
1 + a2 and d4 = a4 − a1a3, then E is transformed to the curve
y2 = x3 + ax2 + b, a, b ∈ K. Such curve is said to be non-supersingular, and
∆ = −a3b.
• a21 = −a2, then by
(x, y)→ (x, y + a1x+ a3) ,
E is transformed to the curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b, a, b ∈ K. Such curve is said to
be supersingular, and it has ∆ = −a3.
2.2.2 Group law for Elliptic Curves
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over K. There is a chord-and-tangent rule for adding
two points in E(K). Together with this addition operation, the set of points E(K) forms
an abelian group with ∞ serving as its identity. The addition rule is best explained
geometrically, i.e., see Fig. 2.1. Let P (x1, y1) and Q(x2, y2) be two distinct points on an
elliptic curve E. Then the sum R, of P and Q is defined as follows. First draw a line
through P and Q; this line intersects the elliptic curve at a third point. Then R is the
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Figure 2.1: Point addition on an elliptic curve: R = P +Q.
reflection of this point about the x−axis.
The double R, of P , is defined as follows. First draw the tangent line to the elliptic curve
at P , see Fig. 2.2. This line intersects the elliptic curve at a second point. Then R is
reflection of this point about x−axis. Algebraic formulas for the group law are derived
from the geometric description as follows.
Group law for E/K : y2 = x3 + ax + b, char(K) 6= 2, 3
1. Identity. P +∞ =∞+ P = P , P ∈ E(K).
2. Negatives. Let P = (x, y) ∈ E(K), then (x, y) + (x,−y) =∞, where −P = (x,−y)
is negative of P , −P ∈ E(K), and −∞ =∞.
3. Point addition. Let P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) ∈ E(K), where P 6= ±Q. Then
P +Q = (x3, y3), such that
x3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)2
− x1 − x2 and y3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1.
4. Point Doubling. Let P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(K), where P 6= −P , then 2P = (x3, y3),
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Figure 2.2: Point doubling on an elliptic curve: R = P + P .
where
x3 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)2
− 2x1 and y3 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1.
Group law for non-supersingular E/GF (2k) : y2 = x3 + ax2 + b
1. Identity. P +∞ =∞+ P , P ∈ E(GF (2k)).
2. Negatives. If P = (x, y) ∈ E(GF (2k)), then (x, y) + (x, x + y) = ∞, where −P =
(x, x+ y) ∈ E(GF (2k)), and it is called negative of P, and −∞ =∞.
3. Point addition. Let P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) ∈ E(GF (2k)), where P 6= ±Q, then
P +Q = (x3, y3), where
x3 = λ
2 + λ+ x1 + x2 + a and y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1
with λ = (y1 + y2)/(x1 + x2).
4. Point doubling. Let P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(GF (2k)), P 6= −P , then 2P = (x3, y3), where
x3 = λ
2 + λ+ a = x21 +
b
x21
, y3 = x
2
1 + λx3 + x3
with λ = x1 + y1/x1.
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Group law for supersingular E/GF (2k) : y2 + cy = x3 + ax + b
1. Identity. P +∞ =∞+ P , P ∈ E(GF (2k))
2. If P = (x, y) ∈ E(GF (2k)), then (x, y) + (x, y + c) = ∞, where −P = (x, x + c) ∈
E(GF (2k)), and it is called negative of P, and −∞ =∞.
3. Point addition. Let P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2) ∈ E(GF (2k)), where P 6= ±Q, then
P +Q = (x3, y3), where
x3 =
(
y1 + y2
x1 + x2
)2
+ x1 + x2 and y3 =
(
y1 + y2
x1 + x2
)
(x1 + x3) + y1 + c.
4. Point doubling. Let P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(GF (2k)), P 6= −P , then 2P = (x3, y3), where
x3 =
(
x21 + a
c
)2
y3 =
(
x21 + a
c
)
(x1 + x3) + y1 + c.
2.2.3 Point Representation in the Projective Coordinates
The formulas for point addition and point doubling in affine coordinates require a field
inversion and several field multiplications. If inversion in the field K is significantly more
expensive than multiplication, then it is advantageous to represent points using projective
coordinates instead of affine coordinates.
Let K be a field, and let c and d be positive integers, then one can define an equivalence
relation ∼ on the set K3/{(0, 0, 0)} of nonzero triplets over K by
(X1, Y1, Z1) ∼ (X2, Y2, Z2) if X1 = λcX2, Y1 = λdY2, Z1 = λZ2, λ ∈ K∗.
The equivalence class containing (X, Y, Z) ∈ K3/{(0, 0, 0)} is
(X : Y : Z) = {(λcX, λdY, λZ) : λ ∈ K∗}.
(X : Y : Z) is called projective point, and (X, Y, Z) is called a representative of (X : Y : Z).
The set of all projective points is denoted by P(K). Any element of an equivalence class
can serve as its representative, i.e., if Z 6= 0, then (X/Zc, Y/Zd, 1) is a representative
of the projective point (X : Y : Z). There is a 1 − 1 correspondence between the set of
projective points
P(K)∗ = {(X : Y : Z) : X, Y, Z ∈ K,Z 6= 0}
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and the set of affine points
A(K) = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ K} .
The set of projective points
P(K)0 = {(X : Y : Z) : X, Y, Z ∈ K,Z = 0}
is called the line at infinity, since its points do not correspond to any of the affine points.
The projective form of the Weierstrass equation (2.1) of an elliptic curve E defined over
K is obtained by replacing x by X/Zc, and y by Y/Zd, and clearing denominators.
Several types of projective coordinates have been proposed for the non-supersingular
elliptic curve E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b over a binary field K, i.e., with char(K) = 2:
1. Standard projective coordinates. Here c, d = 1. The projective point (X : Y : Z),
Z 6= 0, corresponds to the affine point (X/Z, Y/Z). The projective equation of the
elliptic curve is
Y 2Z +XY Z = X3 + aX2Z + bZ3.
The point at infinity ∞ corresponds to (0 : 1 : 0), while negative of (X : Y : Z) is
(X : X + Y : Z).
2. Jacobian projective coordinates. Here c = 2, d = 3. The projective point (X : Y : Z),
Z 6= 0, corresponds to the affine point (X/Z2, Y/Z3). The projective equation of
the elliptic curve is:
Y 2 +XY Z = X3 + aX2Z2 + bZ6.
The point at infinity ∞ corresponds to (1 : 1 : 0), while the negative of (X : Y : Z)
is (X : X + Y : Z).
3. Lo´pez-Dahab (LD) projective coordinates. Here c = 1, d = 2. The projective point
(X : Y : Z), Z 6= 0, corresponds to the affine point (X/Z, Y/Z2). The projective
equation of the elliptic curve is:
Y 2 +XY Z = X3Z + aX2Z2 + bZ4.
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The point at infinity ∞ corresponds to (1 : 0 : 0), while the negative of (X : Y : Z)
is (X : X + Y : Z). Formulas for computing double (X3 : Y3 : Z3) of (X1 : Y1 : Z1)
are
Z3 ← X21Z21 , X3 ← X41 + bZ41 , Y3 ← bZ41Z3 +X3
(
aZ3 + Y
2
1 + bZ
4
1
)
.
Formulas for computing sum (X3 : Y3 : Z3) of X1 : Y1 : Z1 and (X2 : Y2 : 1) are
A← Y2Z21 + Y1, B ← X2Z1 +X1, C ← Z1B, D ← B2
(
C + aZ21
)
, Z3 ← C2,
E ← AC, X3 ← A2+D+E, F ← X3+X2Z3, G← (X2 + Y2)Z23 , Y3 ← (E + Z3)F+G.
2.3 Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
The security of all elliptic curve cryptographic schemes is based on the hardness of the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), see Subsection 1.3.6. The most naive
algorithm for solving the ECDLP is exhaustive search, where one computes the sequence
of points P, 2P, 3P, 4P, . . . until Q is encountered. The running time is approximately n
steps in the worst case, and n/2 on average, where n is order of P . The countermeasure
for this type of attack is to choose n sufficiently large, i.e., n ≥ 280. The best general-
purpose attack known on the ECDLP is the combination of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm
and Polard’s rho algorithm, which has a fully-exponential running time of O(
√
p), where
p is the largest prime divisor of n. To resist this attack, n should be chosen such that it
is divisible by a prime number p sufficiently large, so that
√
p with (p > 2160) steps is an
infeasible amount of computation.
2.3.1 Pohlig-Hellman attack.
The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [74] reduces the computation of l = logP Q to the com-
putation of the discrete logarithm in the prime order subgroup of 〈P 〉. It follows that the
ECDLP in 〈P 〉 is no harder then the ECDLP in its prime order subgroups. Therefore, as
a countermeasure we select P such that the order n of P is divisible by a large prime.
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2.3.2 Pollard’s Rho Attack.
The rho algorithm for computing discrete logarithms was invented by Pollard [75]. The
main concept of the Pollard’s rho algorithm is to find distinct pairs (c′, d′) and (c′′, d′′) of
integers modulo n such that
c′P + d′Q = c′′P + d′′Q.
Then
(c′ − c′′)P = (d′′ − d′)Q = (d′′ − d′)lP,
and so
(c′ − c′′) ≡ (d′′ − d′)l (modn).
Therefore, l = logPQ can be obtained by computing
l = (c′ − c′′)(d′′ − d′)−1modn.
A naive method for finding such pairs (c′, d′) and (c′′, d′′) is to select random integers
c, d ∈ [0, n− 1] and store the triplets (c, d, cP + dQ) in a table sorted by the third com-
ponent until a point cP + dQ is obtained for a second time - such an occurrence is called
a collision. By the birthday paradox , the expected number of iterations before a collision
is obtained is approximately
√
pin/2, but the drawback of this algorithm is the storage
requirement for the
√
pin/2 triplets. Pollard’s rho algorithm finds (c′, d′) and (c′′, d′′) in
roughly the same expected time as the naive method, but with negligible storage require-
ments. The idea is to define an iterating function f :< P >7→< P >, so that given
X ∈< P > and c, d ∈ [0, n− 1] with X = cP + dQ, it is easy to compute X = f(X) and
c, d ∈ [0, n− 1] with X = cP + dQ, where f should have the characteristics of a random
function.
The Pollard’s rho method takes about
√
pin/2 steps, where each step is an elliptic ad-
dition. Also, this method it can be parallelized ([72]), so that if m processors are used,
then the expected number of steps by each processor before a single discrete logarithm is
obtained is (
√
pin/2/m). The Pollard-λ method takes about 2
√
n steps. Also, it can be
parallelized so that if m processors are used, then the expected number of steps by each
processor before a single discrete logarithm is obtained is about (2
√
n)/m.
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2.3.3 Isomorphism attacks.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field Fq, and let P ∈ E(Fq) have prime order n,
and G be group of order n. Since n is prime, < P > and G are both cyclic and hence
isomorphic. If one could efficiently compute an isomorphism
ψ :< P >→ G,
then ECDLP instances in < P > could be efficiently reduced to instances of the DLP in
G. Given P and Q ∈< P >, we have
logPQ = logψ(P )ψ(Q).
Isomorphism attacks reduce the EDLP to the DLP in groups G for which subexponential-
time (or faster) algorithms are known. They result in ECDLP solvers that are faster than
the Pollard’s rho algorithm, but only for special classes of elliptic curves. The following
attacks have been devised: attack on the prime-field-anomalous curves, the Weil and Tate
pairing attacks, and Weil descent attacks.
Attack on prime-field anomalous curves
The attack on the prime-field-anomalous curves reduces the ECDLP in an elliptic curve
of order p defined over the prime field Fp to the DLP in the additive group F
+
p of integers
modulo p.
Definition 2.3.1. Let E be elliptic curve defined over a prime field Fp. It is said to be
prime-field-anomalous if #E(Fp) = p.
If E is a prime-field-anomalous curve, the group E(Fp) is cyclic, since it has prime
order, therefore E(Fp) is isomorphic to the additive group F
+
p of integers modulo p:
ψ : E(Fp)→ F+p . (2.3)
Araki and Satoh [83], Smart [90] and Semaev [85] showed that the isomorphism (2.3) can
be efficiently computed for prime-field anomalous elliptic curves. Therefore, these curves
must not be used in cryptographic protocols.
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Weil and Tate Pairing Attacks
The Weil and Tate Pairing Attacks are due to Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone [67], and
Frey and Ruck [33]. Let P ∈ E(Fp) be of prime order n, and let k be the smallest positive
integer such that qk ≡ 1 (modn) and k | n− 1. Since n | qk − 1, the multiplicative group
F∗qk of the extension field Fqk has a unique subgroup G of order n. The Weil pairing attack
constructs an isomorphism from < P > to G when n - (q − 1) is satisfied, while Tate
pairing attack construct an isomorphism between < P > and G without this additional
constraint. The integer k is called embedding degree.
This attack is only practical if k is small. The special class of elliptic curves with small em-
bedding degree include supersingular curves, and elliptic curves of trace 2 (#E(Fq) = q − 1),
i.e., these curves have k ≤ 6.
To ensure that an elliptic curve E defined over Fq is immune to the Weil and Tate pairing
attacks, it is sufficient to check that n, the order of the base point P ∈ E(Fq), does not
divide qk−1 for all small k for which the DLP in F∗q is considered tractable. For example,
if n > 2160, then it is enough to check this condition for all k ∈ [1, 20].
2.4 Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters
Domain parameters for an elliptic curve scheme describe an elliptic curve E defined over
finite field Fq, a base point P ∈ E(Fq), and its order n.
Definition 2.4.1. Domain parameters D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h) are comprised of:
1. The field order q.
2. Field representation FR used for the elements of Fq.
3. Seed S, if the elliptic curve was randomly generated.
4. Coefficients a, b ∈ Fq that define equation of the elliptic curve E over Fq, i.e.,
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b in the case of binary field.
5. Base point P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fq).
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6. The order n of P .
7. The cofactor h = #E(Fq)/n
Elliptic curve domain parameters are specified by several standards. Table 2.1 gives
overview of the properties of the elliptic curves defined over binary fields GF (2k) recom-
mended by: IEEE P1363-2000 [43], American National Standards Institute (ANSI) [3],
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG) [84], the Wireless Transport Layer
Security Specification [98] by the WAP forum, New European Schemes for Signature, In-
tegrity and Encryption (NESSIE) [71], the specification for the Financial Services Markup
Language (FSML) [34] by the eCheck initiative, Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) 186-2 [32] issued by the NIST, and from IPSec [45].
2.5 Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Schemes
2.5.1 Signature Scheme - ECDSA
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is the elliptic curve analogue
of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). It appears in the standards such as ANSI
X9.62, FIPS 186-2 [32], IEEE 1363-2000 [43] and ISO/IEC 15946-2, as well as several
draft standards. Here, H represents a cryptographic hash function whose outputs have
bit length no more then that of n. In order for ECDSA to be secure, it is necessary
Algorithm 1 ECDSA signature generation
Input: Domain parameters D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), private key d, message m.
Output: Signature (r, s).
1. Select k ∈R [1, n− 1].
2. Compute kP = (x1, y1), and convert x1 to an integer x1.
3. Compute r = x1 modn. If r = 0, then go to step 1.
4. Compute e = H(m).
5. Compute s = k−1(e+ dr)modn. If s = 0 then go to step 1.
6. Return (r, s).
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Standard Binary Curves
IEEE size: > 161 bits
any “small” cofactor
avoid known weak curves
gives no specific curves
SECG size: 113, 131, 163, 193, 233, 239, 283, 409, 571
cofactor 2, or 4
curve E is chosen verifiably at random as specified
in ANSI X9.62 from the seed
ANSI X9.63 size: > 160
any “small” cofactor
gives no specific curves
NIST size: 163, 232, 283, 409, 571
cofactor 2, (or 4 for Koblitz curve with a = 0)
pseudo random curve + Koblitz curve
WAP size: 113, 163, 233
cofactor 2
(some curves are equal to SECG)
FSML size: 163, 283
cofactor 2
(curves are subset of SECG)
NESSIE size: > 160
IPSec size: 155 - 571
cofactor 2, 4, or 12
(most of the curves are equal to SECG)
Table 2.1: Recommended parameters for elliptic curves over GF (2k).
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Algorithm 2 ECDSA signature verification
Input: Domain parameters D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), public key Q, message m, signa-
ture (r, s).
Output: Acceptance, or rejection of the signature.
1. Verify that r and s are integers in the interval [1, n− 1]. If any verification fails then
return (“Reject the signature”).
2. Compute e = H(m).
3. Compute w = s−1modn.
4. Compute u1 = ew (modn) and u2 = rw (modn).
5. Compute X = u1P + u2Q.
6. If X =∞ then return (“Reject the signature”).
7. Convert the x-coordinate x1 of X to an integer x1; compute v = x1modn.
8. If v = r then return (“Accept the signature”); else return (“Reject the signature”).
that the ECDLP is intractable, and that hash function H is cryptographically secure, i.e.,
that it is primage resistant and collision resistant. Informally, a function f : X → Y is
pre-image resistant if given y ∈ Im(f) ⊂ Y it is infeasible to find an x ∈ X such that
f(x) = y. Similarly, f is collision resistant if it is infeasible to find x 6= x′ ∈ X such that
f(x) = f(x′).
2.5.2 Public-key encryption - ECIES
The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is a variant of the ElGamal
public-key encryption scheme, which was proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [15]. It is
standardized in ANSI X9.63 [3], ISO/IEC 15946-3 and in IEEE P1363a draft standard.
The following cryptographic primitives are used:
• KDF - a key derivation function that is constructed from a hash function H.
• ENC - the encryption function for a symmetric-key encryption scheme such as the
AES, and DEC is the decryption function.
• MAC - is a message authentication code.
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Algorithm 3 ECIES encryption
Input: Domain parameters D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), public key Q, plaintext m.
Output: Ciphertext (R,C, t).
1. Select k ∈R [1, n− 1].
2. Compute R = kP and Z = hkQ. If Z =∞ then go to step 1.
3. (k1, k2)← KDF (xZ, R), where xZ is the x-coordinate of Z.
4. Compute C = ENCk1(m) and t = MACk2(C).
5. Return (R,C, t).
Algorithm 4 ECIES decryption
Input: Domain parametersD = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), private key d, ciphertext (R,C, t).
Output: Plaintext m, or rejection of the ciphertext.
1. Perform an embedded public key validation of R. If the validation fails then return
(“Reject the ciphertext”).
2. Compute Z = hdR. If Z =∞ then return (“Reject the ciphertext”).
3. (k1, k2)← KDF (xZ, R), where xZ is the x-coordinate of Z.
4. Compute t′ = MACk2(C). If t
′ 6= t then return (“Reject the ciphertext”).
5. Compute m = DECk1(C).
6. Return (m).
ECIES is proven to be secure under the assumption that the symmetric-key encryp-
tion scheme and MAC algorithm are secure, and that some non-standard variants of the
computational and decision Diffie-Hellman problems are intractable.
2.5.3 Key Establishment - ECMQV
ECMQV is a three pass key agreement protocol that has been standardized in ANSI
X9.63 [3], IEEE 1363-2000 [43], and ISO/IEC 15946-3. Elliptic curve domain parameters
are D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), A’s key pair is (QA, dA), B’s key pair (QB, dB), KDF is a
key derivation function, MAC is a message authentication code. If R is an elliptic curve
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point then R is defined to be an integer
(
xmod 2df/2e
)
+ 2df/2e, where x is the integer
representation of the x-coordinate of R, and f = blog2 nc + 1 in the bitlength of n.
Protocol 5 ECMQV key agreement
Goal: A and B establish a shared secret key.
Protocol messages:
A→ B : A,RA
A← B : B,RB, tB = MACk1(2, B, A,RB, RA)
A→ B : tA = MACk1(3, A, B,RA, RB)
1. A selects kA ∈R [1, n− 1], computes RA = kAP , and sends A, RA to B.
2. B does the following:
2.1 Perform an embedded public key validation of RA.
2.2 Select kB ∈R [1, n− 1] and compute RB = kBP .
2.3 sB = (kB +RBdB)modn and Z = hsB(RA +RAQA), and verify Z 6=∞.
2.4 (k1, k2)← KDF (xZ), where xZ is the x-coordinate of Z.
2.5 Compute tB = MACk1(2, B, A,RB, RA).
2.6 Send B, RB, tB to A.
3. A does the following:
3.1 Perform an embedded public key validation of RB.
3.2 sA = (kA +RAdA)modn and Z = hsA(RB +RBQB), and verify Z 6=∞.
3.3 (k1, k2)← KDF (xZ), where xZ is the x-coordinate of Z.
3.4 Compute t = MACk1(2, B, A,RB, RA), and verify that t = tB.
3.5 Compute tA = MACk1(3, A, B,RA, RB) and send tA to B.
4. B computes t = MACk1(3, A, B,RARB), and verifies that t = tA.
5. The session key is k2.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed the algebraic, cryptographic and mathematical back-
ground to elliptic curves that is required to understand the discussion of fault attacks and
countermeasures which are taken up in the rest of the thesis.
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Chapter 3
Fault Models
Theoretical fault attacks are based on the fault models which model physical behavior
of an attacked device. It is important to base all fault models on the real world, since
fault attacks are implemented on real devices in the real physical world. In this thesis, we
are not concerned with the physical realization of inducing faults; rather physical events
will be translated into mathematical form. The mathematical aspect of fault attacks is
necessary to prove that algorithmic countermeasures work and whether an attack can
break a system, and recover secret information. To derive reasonable fault models so that
they are justified by physical attacks, parameter settings from known actual attacks are
combined with hardware countermeasures on the card. The most prominent fault models
are provided by [73] and [20], and are used throughout the literature. In this chapter we
will justify and modify these models so that we can later use them on proposed schemes
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we propose decomposed computation in the parallel,
mutually independent channels, and we assume that during each run of an attacked
algorithm, in one single attack, an adversary can apply any of the proposed fault models,
i.e., Random Fault Model (RFM), Arbitrary Fault Model (AFM), or Single bit Fault Model
(SFM) per different channel. This way more channels can be targeted, where different
fault models can be used on different channels. Also till now, no publication has implied
that different fault models can be used in one single attack. We propose that if one single
attack means targeting more channels, then different fault models can indeed be used in
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one single attack. Therefore, in Section 3.1 we discus fault attacks and possible physical
ways of inducing fault. In Section 3.2 we present characterization of the fault models, as
well as, possible fault models for schemes/algorithms that we propose later on in Chapter
5 and Chapter 6.
3.1 Fault Attacks
Fault attacks have been used before the cryptography community become aware of them,
i.e., pay TV card hackers used clock glitches [1]. The first successful fault attack has been
reported by Boneh el al. [22]. They have presented two important attacks on variants
of RSA, used for computing digital signatures. These results triggered extensive research
in the field of fault attacks, several authors extended these ideas to other cryptosystems
using other fault models and different means of physical attacks.
Fault attacks are based on tampering with a device so that device performs abnormally.
They exploit physical properties of devices. From the reaction of the device which can be
a faulty result, an error message, or some form of security reset, including destruction of
the device, an adversary wishes to learn about the secret key hidden in a device. Since
cryptographic algorithms are public, adversary can determine what variables are used and
what values they have depending on the secret key. This allows them to determine what
kind of error will provoke a certain reaction, which may be observable by the adversary,
e.g., if a single bit in the secret key is flipped during an attack, and the device does
not detect this fault, a faulty result with a specific pattern is returned. By comparing
this faulty result with the correct one, an adversary might be able to deduce one bit of
the secret key. An adversary may also target the flow of operations, such that certain
operations are repeated or skipped. To achieve and exploit a desired effect, he needs to
have knowledge about how a certain physical attack will affect the logical flow of the
attacked algorithm. Only then he will be able to bound his success probability and to
compute secret data from a faulty output. Fault attacks can exploit faults in two different
ways:
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• an adversary causes the attacked device to malfunction and to output a faulty result;
then the faulty result is used to derive secret information;
• oracle attacks - does not use the actual faulty result for computations, only the
information whether the result was faulty or not.
3.1.1 Physical Methods to Induce Faults
There are numerous ways to induce faults into physical devices, but since the focus of this
thesis are the theoretical and algorithmic aspects of fault attacks, we will briefly mention
some of them:
• Power Spikes - short massive variations of the power supply, which are called spikes,
can be used to induce errors into the computation of the smartcard. Spikes allow
to induce both memory faults, as well as faults in the execution of a program (code
change attacks). Both can be used to affect an arbitrary number of bits, starting
with single affected bits. Experimental results of inducing faults by spikes are in
detail described in [6].
• Clock Glitches - smartcards do not create their own clock signal, they use a ran-
domized clock, they only randomize the clock signal provided by the external card
reader. Since the adversary may replace the card reader by laboratory equipment,
he may provide the card with a clock signal, which incorporates short massive de-
viations from the standard signal, which are beyond the required tolerance bounds.
Such signals are called glitches. They can be used to both induce, memory faults,
as well to cause a faulty execution behavior (code change attacks). More details can
be found in [2], [1],[52].
• Heat/Infrared Radiation - electronic equipment only works reliably in a certain range
of temperature. If the outside temperature is too low, or too high, faults occur. A
heating source can be easily focused at devices such as smartcards. Changes in
memory due to heat usually affect a large area, i.e., many bits.
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• Focused Ion Beams - can be used to drill holes in the passivation layer of a smartcard,
which can then be filled by a conducting material in order to access individual
elements, or bus lines with measuring equipment, only if card is unpacked. Also, it
can be tuned finely enough to ionize silicon locally, which may be interpreted as a
signal by the circuit. Destructive faults are possible by destroying circuit elements,
or bus lines. More details can be found in [52].
• External Electrical Field Transients/Eddy Currents - Changes in the external elec-
trical field can induce faults into smartcard by placing device in an electromagnetic
field, which may influence the transistors and memory cells. The main problem
using such an approach is to target specific bits, or variables stored on the card.
In [77] different approach was presented, i.e., given a coil, which is placed near a
conducting surface, a magnetic field can be created if the coil is subject to an alter-
nating current. This magnetic field induces eddy currents on the surface of the near
conducting material. Eddy currents can be used to measure cracks in a surface, as
well as electromagnetic emissions, also can be used to heat a material in a uniform
way till is melted. Hence, can induce heat in a transient, permanent, or destructive
way in a smartcard. Also, inducing eddy current does not require to unpack a chip,
and can induce faults very precisely.
Countermeasures
Manufactures have developed large variety of the hardware countermeasures, which are
usually specifically constructed for different means of physical attacks, i.e.,
• sensors and filters - e.g., anomalous frequency detectors, anomalous voltage detec-
tors, or light detectors;
• redundancy - doubled memory, hardware, where result is computed twice in parallel,
or doubled computation;
• randomized clock - used to achieve an unstable internal frequency, bus line, memory
encryption, dummy random cycles and active and passive shields protecting the
internal circuits.
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Hardware countermeasures have a disadvantage, since highly reliable countermeasures are
expensive, while other detect only specific attacks. Also, they are beyond the scope of
this thesis, an will not be discussed in detail.
The scope of this thesis is to develop new software countermeasures, since they are easier
to deploy, and they are cost efficient. Current software countermeasures include: masking,
checksums, randomization, counters, baits and variable redundancy.
3.2 Fault Models
We assume a strong adversary, and a smartcard with several countermeasures in effect,
the most important of which are:
(i) randomized clock which blurs timing behavior of a device,
(ii) memory and data encryption is incorporated to ensure that large number of bits is
affected if a single bit is flipped by fault, and
(iii) address and bus line scrambling is employed such that the physical layout of the
memory cells does nor reflect the logical layout.
As fault attacks, we consider methods, approaches and algorithms which when applied to
the attacked processor return the desired effect. We assume that the fault attack induces
faults into processors by some physical set up, such that processor is exposed to some
physical stress (cosmic rays, heat/infrared radiation, power spikes, clock glitches, etc.).
An adversary can run the processor several times while inducing faults into structural
elements of an attacked processor, until the desired effects occur. As a reaction the
attacked processor malfunctions, i.e., memory cells change their current, bus lines transmit
different signals, or structural elements are damaged. It is faulty (does not compute the
correct output given its input), and its output is erroneous such that computation assigned
to the faulty processor is disturbed, and its channel is affected. Our concern is the effect
of a fault as it manifests itself in a modified data, or a modified program execution. We
identify memory cells with their values, and we say that faults are induced into variables,
or bits. Note that any fault induced in a variable x can be described by means of an
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additive error term x 7→ x′ = x + e(x), but the error term e(x) can itself take on quite
different characteristics, depending on the type of the fault. The fault type describes the
effect of the fault on an arbitrary set of bits, and in the literature is classified as:
Stuck-at Faults. Let b be an arbitrary bit stored in memory. Assume that b is modified
by a stuck-at fault. Then b 7→ b′ = c, where the constant c = 1 or c = 0. The value
of the affected bit is not changed any more, even if a variable x, which uses these bits,
is overwritten. Clearly stuck-at faults will have a noticeable effect only if the variable is
overwritten at some point. The effect is permanent, but not necessarily destructive.
Bitflip Faults. Let b be an arbitrary bit stored in memory. Assume that b is modified by
a bitflip fault. Then b 7→ b′ = b + 1 (mod 2). The effect may be transient, permanent or
destructive. A bitflip fault is easy to visualize, and always results in a fault on a variable
using the bit which is faulty.
Random Faults. Let b be an arbitrary bit stored in memory. Assume that b is modified
by a random fault. Then b 7→ b′ where b′ is a random variable taking on the values 0 or 1.
The effect may be transient, permanent, or destructive. Since several physical methods
of fault induction are difficult to control precisely, random faults are considered to be the
most realistic fault type. The random variable which models the fault may be uniform or
non-uniform.
Bit Set or Reset Fault. Let b be an arbitrary bit stored in memory. Assume that b is
modified by a bit set, or reset fault. Then b 7→ b′ = ci where ci ∈ {0, 1}. The values ci are
known and are usually chosen by the adversary. The effect may be transient, permanent,
or destructive.
Note that the above faults can be considered for an arbitrary, but unknown set of bits
B, where assumptions about how the adversary controls the choice of B can also model
different attack scenarios. A full characterization of the different parameters needed to
fully describe known fault attacks is presented in [73]. Therefore, fault attacks differ in:
• power to locate - a selected variable can be targeted, a selected bits can be targeted,
or no power to locate;
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• the timing of the induced faults - no control on timing, a exact time can be met, a
fault is induced in a block of few operations;
• the number of bits affected - single faulty bit, few faulty bits, random number of
faulty bits.
• the character of the fault - stuck-at fault, bit flip fault, random fault;
• the probability of the implied effect of an induced fault;
• the duration of an effect - depending on the type of the physical stress, fault effects
can be of different duration:
1. Destructive faults - an adversary destroys a physical structure on the chip,
which causes a certain bit, or variable to be fixed at a specific value for all
successive runs of the device, it cannot be reversed;
2. Permanent faults - change an affected variable until that variable is explicitly
overwritten, e.g., by a reset at the start of the next run;
3. Transient faults - the induced fault is only short-lived, such that after a given
amount of time, the effect ceases to exist and the correct value is present again.
Contrary to the the destructive faults, permanent and transient faults do not modify the
hardware of an attacked device. In the literature, it is assumed that transient faults only
affect the next request for the affected variable. Permanent and transient faults have the
same effect if a faulty variable is used only once. Otherwise, in case of permanent faults
all next request yield the faulty value, while in the case of transient faults immediate next
request gives faulty value, subsequent requests yield correct value. Therefore, we assume
the following fault models (inspired by [73]).
3.2.1 Random Fault Model (RFM)
Assume that an adversary does not know much about his induced faults to know its effect,
but he knows the affected variable at specific channel. Therefore, we assume that affected
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variable rj ∈ GF (2k) (or rj(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mj(x) >) at specific channel j is changed
to some random value from the finite field GF (2k) (or GF (2)[x]/ < mj(x) >), where all
values can occur with the same probability.
Therefore, we assume that specific variable at specific channel used in Algorithm 12 and
Algorithm 15 in Chapter 6, can be targeted, where an adversary can not target specific
point of time, every line of code, iteration of a loop, is hit with the uniform probability.
All bits of the targeted variable are affected, i.e., random number of bits, where fault type
are random faults. Probability of an implied effect of an induced fault is certain, while
duration of an effect is transient, or permanent.
This model is used if the attacker knows that an induced fault at specific channel
will set the affected variable to a random value from GF (2k) (or GF (2)[x]/ < mj(x) >)
according to the uniform distribution, or if his fault attack does not depend on some
special values that have to appear at some time, or with specific probability. In addition,
we can assume following two cases:
• an adversary may be is able to hit a targeted variable at a specific channel in
a reasonable small interval of operation, or loop iterations, where this interval is
derived from other sources of information;
• the affected variable at a specific channel is not known with certainty, i.e., an ad-
versary may be able to hit a variable from a set of a few different variables.
In practice we have assumed a very weak adversary, where fault induced into memory, or
the CPU at different point will leave the attacker with at most information that a certain
variable is faulty.
3.2.2 Arbitrary Fault Model (AFM)
Here we have assumed that an adversary can target a specific line of code at a specific
channel, but no specific variable in that line, i.e., adversary has limited control over
induced faults, does not know much about his induced faults to know its type, or error
distribution. Therefore, any number of bits can be affected, according to an unknown
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probability distribution. Specific point of time can not be targeted, but if the affected
line of the code at specific channel is from a loop, then every iteration of the loop is hit with
uniform probability. The probability of the implied effect is certain, while duration of an
effect is transient, or permanent. In AFM, transient faults on any variable, or operation
in the affected line of code at specific channel is the same as if the result of the targeted
line of code is changed by some fault at specific channel. In situation of permanent fault,
we assume that all variables used in the targeted line at specific channel of code are hit
with the same uniform probability. This attack is successful if attacker does not need
the assumptions about the distribution of the error value, or does not need to be able
to guess the error term to get information. Also, we can assume that an adversary can
not target specific line of code at specific channel, but will hit any line at specific channel
with known probability.
Mathematically, the effect of an attack using these fault models can be modeled as an
addition of an unknown error ei ∈ GF (2k) (or ej(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mj(x) >). In case of
RFM we assume that a variable rj at specific channel j is changed to some random value
rj+ej, where ej ∈ GF (2k) (or rj(x) 7→ rj(x)+ej(x) where ej(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mj(x) >)
with the same uniform probability, i.e., fault may result in any faulty value, while for AFM
if we let ri be component to which is assigned the result of the affected line of code at
specific channel, then the faulty value is ri+ei, where ei ∈ GF (2k) (or rj(x) 7→ rj(x)+ej(x)
where ej(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mj(x) >), and whose probability distribution is arbitrary and
unknown.
3.2.3 Single bit Fault Model (SFM)
Here we assume a very strong adversary who can target at a specific point of time (or if
affected variable is used in the loop, then a specific iteration) a bit of a specific variable
used at a specific line of code at specific channel. Also, we can assume that at a specific
channel at an unspecified time, a specific variable used in a specific line of code can be
targeted, but not a specific bit of the variable. If the affected variable is used in a loop
then every iteration is hit with the same probability.
Mathematically, the effect of an attack using these fault models can be modeled as an
49
addition of a single bit, i.e., x 7→ x+2i, 0 ≤ i ≤ k− 1, where in the first case, bit position
i is chosen by an adversary, while in second case we assume that is chosen according to
the uniform distribution.
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented the mathematical aspect of fault attacks through fault
models, i.e., Random Fault Model, Arbitrary Fault Model and Single bit Fault Model.
These fault models have been motivated by real devices and real physical world, where
power of an adversary is compared with power of the countermeasures present on the
smartcard. Single bit Fault Model is the strongest fault model between all. If an adver-
sary is able to target at specific point of time a bit of a specific variable used at specific
line of code at specific channel, then he is also able to recover any bit of any other variable
used in the algorithm at the specific channel. This fault model may seem unrealistic when
one considers the countermeasures of today’s smartcards. Given the countermeasures of
today’s smartcards, the most realistic fault model is Random Fault Model, and especially
Arbitrary Fault Model, since countermeasures of today’s smartcards ensure that they are
immune against really strong fault models such as Single bit Fault Model. The weakest
adversary is assumed in the Arbitrary Fault Model, since it can be realized by any physical
attacks which can be applied with high success probability.
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 we propose schemes/algorithms where computation is de-
composed into parallel, mutually independent channels an we assume that an adversary
can use either RFM, AFM, or SFM per channel. Also, we assume that more channels can
be targeted at the same time, where either RFM, AFM, or SFM can be used per different
channel.
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Chapter 4
Fault Attacks on Elliptic Curve
Cryptosystems
Security of elliptic curve cryptosystems is based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP) in the group of points on an elliptic curve. However, it has been proven
that security of cryptosystems does not only depend on the mathematical properties.
Side channel attacks provide information which reveals important and compromising de-
tails about secret data. Some of these details can be used as a new trapdoor to invert a
trapdoor one-way function without the secret key. This allows an adversary to break a
cryptographic protocol, even if it has been proved to be secure in the mathematical sense.
Specifically, in the case of fault attacks which are active attacks, an adversary has to
tamper with an attacked device in order to create faults. E.g., if an adversary can inflict
some physical stress on the smartcard, he can induce faults into circuitry or memory, as a
result these faults are manifested in computation as errors. Therefore, a faulty final result
is computed. Moreover, if the computation depends on some secret key, facts about the
secret key can be concluded.
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we present the fault attacks given in [16], [27], [4]. These refer-
ences assume that a faulty result is not on the original elliptic curve with overwhelming
probability, and that a faulty result is easily detected by simply checking if the final result
is a valid point on the original curve. Otto in [73] pointed out that any attack that yields
a faulty result which is a valid point on the original curve, would be undetectable by
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their proposed countermeasures, and that those undetectable points can be used for a
new attacks. A Sign Change Attack [21] is a fault attack on scalar multiplication which
does not change the original curve E, and works with points on the curve E over GF (p).
The authors of [21] claim that a sign change attack does not apply to elliptic curves of
the characteristic 2, but we will show that sign change faults can be created in the affine
addition formula of the non-supersingular elliptic curves over GF (2k). In Section 4.3
we show that it is possible to create faulty points that are valid points on the original
non-supersingular elliptic curve over GF (2k) by inducing faults into the affine addition
formula. In Section 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 we present an analysis by investigating the possi-
bilities of attacks which induce faults into variables used in the affine addition formula
of non-supersingular elliptic curve. We derive conditions that the inflicted error has to
satisfy in order to yield an undetectable faulty point, by investigating each variable used
in the affine additions. Since our aim is to show that undetectable faulty points for non-
supersingular elliptic curves over GF (2k) can be created and that point validation is not
enough, we avoid analysis of the affine doubling formula, and other point representations,
since analysis of affine addition proves our claim.
4.1 Differential Fault Attacks on ECC
Biehl et al. [16] extended the idea of differential fault attacks (DFA) on the RSA cryp-
tosystem [23] to schemes using elliptic curves. The basic idea of DFA is the enforcement
of bit errors into the decryption, or the signing process which is performed inside the
smartcard, so that information on the secret key can leak out. The authors of [16] assume
a cryptographically strong elliptic curve which is publicly known, and a secret key d ∈ Z
which is stored inside a “tamper-proof” device and which is unreadable for outside users.
Also they assume that we have access to the “tamper-proof” device such that we can
compute dP for arbitrary input points P . The common idea in these papers is that by
inserting, or by disturbing the representation of a point by means of a random register
fault we can force the device to apply its point addition (respectively multiplication) al-
gorithm to a value which is not a point on the given curve, but on some different curve. A
52
crucial observation is that the result of this computation is a point on the new (probably
cryptographically less strong) curve, which can be exploited to compute d. These attacks
work by misusing the “tamper-proof” device to execute its computation steps on group
structures not originally intended by the designer of the cryptosystem. They present three
different types of attacks that can be used to derive information about the secret key, if
bit errors can be inserted into the elliptic curve computation in a “tamper-proof” device:
1. No correctness check for input points - it is assumed that the device does not explic-
itly check whether an input point P , (or the result of the computation) is a point
on the cryptographically strong elliptic curve E = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a6) defined as in
(2.1). An adversary chooses the input pair P˜ = (x, y) to the “tamper-proof” device
such that the tuple (a1, a2, a3, a4, a˜6), where a˜6 = y
2 + a1xy+ a3y− x3 − a2x2 − a4x
defines an elliptic curve E˜, whose order has a small divisor l, such that ord(P˜ ) = l.
The output of the “tamper-proof” device with input P˜ is dP˜ on E˜. By repeating
this procedure with different choices of P˜ , l can be computed by use of the Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
2. Placing register faults properly - it is assumed that an adversary can enforce register
faults inside the “tamper-proof” device at some precise moment at the beginning of
the multiplication, after the device checks whether the given input point is a point
in the group of points of the cryptographically strong elliptic curve E. Therefore,
the device internally computes with P˜ , and if it does not check whether the output
point is point on a E, outputs lP˜ . We determine a6 such that lP˜ satisfies the curve
equation E˜ = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a˜6). By checking all possible candidates P˜ , we find one
that is on E˜.
3. Faults at random moments of the multiplication - here an adversary can introduce
register faults during the computation of an a-priori chosen specific block of multi-
pliers bits, i.e., it is assumed that an adversary can repeatedly input some point P
on E into the “tamper-proof” device and enforce a register fault during m successive
iterations of the fast multiplication algorithm. Also, even if one cannot influence
at which block the register fault happens, one can deduce the secret key after an
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expected number of polynomially many enforced random register faults.
Similar ideas have been described in [60], where a key recovery attack is presented on the
discrete logarithm based protocols working in a prime order subgroup. The attack uses
small order subgroups in Z∗p to compute part of the secret key in a protocol working in a
subgroup of a prime order q.
M. Ciet and M. Joy [27] generalize results from [16] by relaxing their assumptions.
They analyze the implications of permanent faults (intentional, or accidental) in non-
volatile memory, where the system parameters are stored. They consider permanent
faults in the representation of point P , in the definition of the field Fq, and in the curve
parameters. Also, they extend the analysis to transient faults, originating from a pertur-
bation of the reading in non-volatile memory, and resulting in faulty values for the system
parameters used in working memory, throughout computation.
1. Faults in the base point - Let the point P = (x, y) be a system parameter that
is stored in the non-volatile memory of the cryptographic device. It is read from
that memory for computation of dP . Assume that only the x coordinate of point
P is corrupted (or only y is corrupted ). The cryptographic device then computes
Q˜ = dP˜ , where P˜ = (x˜, y) is unknown, but fixed. It is easy to recover value of P˜
from output value Q˜ = d(x˜, y) = (x˜d, y˜d). Point Q˜ defines a curve E˜(a1, a2, a3, a4, a˜6)
with a˜6 = y˜d
2 + a1x˜dy˜d + a3y˜d − x˜3d − a2x˜2d − a4x˜d. Since P˜ = (x˜, y) ∈ E˜, x˜ is a root
of the polynomial
X3 + aX2 + (a4 − a1)X +
(
a˜6 − y2 − a3y
)
. (4.1)
By assuming that (4.1) has a unique root x˜, where l = ordE˜(P˜ ) is small enough so
that discrete logarithm of Q˜ is computable, the value of d (mod l) can be recovered.
Otherwise, there are 2, or 3 candidates for x˜, since x˜ is a root of (4.1). In the
permanent-fault model it is assumed that only a portion of x is corrupted, so the
candidate having the most bits matching those of x is likely to be x˜. In the transient
fault model, the whole value of x is likely to be corrupted.
If both coordinates x, y are corrupted, such that P˜ = (x˜, y˜) is the corresponding
point, the output value Q˜ = dP˜ = (x˜d, y˜d) yields the value a˜6. We only know that
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the point P˜ lies on the curve E˜(a1, a2, a3, a4, a˜6). Further assumptions are needed
to completely recover P˜ .
2. Faults in the definition of the field GF (2k) - The finite field GF (2k) is regarded as a
quotient GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >, where f(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree k
over GF (2), which is stored in non-volatile memory as a binary string (a0, . . . , ak)
corresponding to f(x) =
∑k
i=0 aiX
i, with ak = 1. A non-singular elliptic curve over
GF (2k) is given by E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b. Assume that there is an error in the
representation of f(x), so that computation is performed modulo f˜(x) =
∑k
i=0 a˜iX
i,
instead of modulo f(x). The polynomial f˜(x) can be recovered by observing that
b˜ ≡ y2 + xy + x3 + ax2 ≡ y˜2d + x˜dy˜d + x˜3d + ax˜2d (mod f(x)),
where dP˜ = (x˜d, y˜d) and P˜ ≡ P (mod f˜(x)). Let
∆(X) = y2 + xy + x3 + ax2 + y˜2d + x˜dy˜d + x˜
3
d + ax˜
2
d,
then it follows that f˜(x)|∆(X). Given the factorization of ∆, trying all possible
combinations yields f˜(x) as the polynomial whose representation best matches the
representation of f(x). In case of permanent fault, scalar multiplication, Q˜′ = d′P˜
with d′ 6= d, eases the recovery of P˜ as a factor of gcd(∆,∆′) where ∆′ is defined
from Q˜′. If the fault is transient, it is always possible to distinguish f˜(x).
3. Faults in the curve parameters - Modification of the parameter a6 does not affect
the computation of dP , since a6 is not needed in the addition formula. Assume
that the parameter a4 is faulty, i.e., a˜4 is introduced into the computation. Then,
computation is performed over the curve E˜(a1, a2, a3, a˜4, a˜6). Since, P = (x, y) and
Q˜ = dP = (x˜d, y˜d) lie on the curve E˜, we have the system of equations:
a˜4x + a˜6 = y
2 + a1xy + a3y − x3 − a2x2
a˜4x˜d + a˜6 = y˜
2
d + a1x˜dy˜d + a3y˜d − x˜3d − a2x˜2d.
After solving system for a˜4 and a˜6, we compute the logarithm of Q˜ with respect to
P in < P >⊆ E˜(a1, a2, a3, a˜4, a˜6), and get the value dmod l, where l = ordE˜(P ).
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4.2 Invalid-Curve Attacks
Adrian et al. [4] combined the small subgroup attack of Lim and Lee [60] and DFA of
Bieh et al. [16] that are effective on the one-pass ECDH, ECIES, and one-pass ECMQV
protocols if the receiver of an elliptic curve point does not verify that the point does
indeed lie on the elliptic curve specified by the domain parameters. If E˜ is an elliptic
curve defined over Fq whose equation differs from E’s equation only in the coefficient a6,
then the addition laws for E˜ and E are the same and elliptic curve E˜ is called an invalid
curve relative to E. The only way to prevent the invalid-curve attack is to check that a
received point does indeed lie on the legitimate elliptic curve. Now, we will mention some
invalid-curve attacks.
4.2.1 Invalid-Curve Attack on One-Pass ECDH
Suppose that one-pass ECDH is used by entity A to establish a shared secret key k
with entity B, where k is subsequently used by B to send messages authenticated with a
message authentication algorithm (MAC) to A. A selects an invalid curve E˜, such that
it contains a point Q˜ of small order l, and sends Q˜ to B. B computes Z = kBQ˜ and
k = H(x(Z)). When B sends A a message m and its tag t = MACk(m), A can determine
the correct Z, by finding Z ′ ∈< Q˜ > satisfying t = MACk′(m) where k′ = H(x(Z ′)).
Since Q˜ has order l, the expected number of trials before A succeeds is l/2, where A has
determined kl ≡ ±kBmod l. Therefore, A knows that k2l ≡ k2B (mod l). By repeating
the attack with point Q˜ with pairwise relatively prime orders, entity A can recover z =
k2Bmodn for N > n
2 by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Since k2B < n
2 < N we have
that z = k2B, and A can compute kB =
√
z, while B is unaware that the attack has taken
the place.
4.2.2 Invalid-Curve Attack on ECIES
Entity A selects a point Q˜ of order l on an invalid curve E˜. Entity A makes a guess
kl ∈ [0, l − 1] for kBmod l and computes Z = klQ˜ . A transmits Q˜ (instead of RA) to
B, who computes Z ′ = kBQ˜, with overwhelming probability that key k′2 derived from Z
′
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satisfies t = MACk′2(c) if and only if kl ≡ ±kBmod l. If A is able to determine whether
or not B accepts the chipertext, then A can be expected to determine ±kBmod l, after
about l/4 iterations on the average. The attack can be repeated to recover kB. Here, the
victim B may be aware that an invalid-curve attack has been lunched on the ECIES, if
he notices that he is receiving many invalid ciphertexts from A.
The attacks presented in [16], [27] and [4] assume that with overwhelming probability a
faulty result is not on the original elliptic curve with overwhelming probability, and if that
the smartcard checks if the final result is a valid point on the original curve then the faulty
point is captured. By this argument, any attack that yields a faulty result which is a valid
point on the original curve, would be undetectable by their proposed countermeasures.
Therefore, those undetectable points can be used for new attacks. In the next section
we demonstrate that it is possible to create faulty points that are valid points of the
original non-supersingular elliptic curve over GF (2k). We derive necessary conditions for
the errors which cause undetectable faulty results. Our analysis is performed through use
of computer the algebra system MAPLE.
4.3 Point Addition - Undetectable faulty points
A fault induced into the affine point addition formula of non-supersingualr elliptic curve
over GF (2k) might be useful to recover secret data. We assume that the error induced
into variable x can be written as a sum x + e, e ∈ GF (2k), where e is random variable,
whose distribution depends on a chosen fault model. We will consider permanent and
transient faults, since some variables are used more than once. Let P1, P2 be two points
on non-supersingular elliptic curve E over GF (2k) defined by
E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b.
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We assume that P1 6= P2 in point addition. This implies that P3 = (x3, y3) = P1 + P2 is
computed as:
x3 = λ
2 + λ+ x1 + x2 + a
y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1, where
λ =
y1 + y2
x1 + x2
. (4.2)
Also, let P = (x, y) ∈ GF (2k), then −P = (x, x + y) is the negative of the point P .
The variables that are used are the point coordinates x1, y1, x2, y2, the variable λ and the
output coordinates x3, y3, and each of them can be targeted by fault attacks. We describe
in detail the conditions required for an error to be undetectable.
4.4 Attacks targeting λ = (y1 + y2)/(x1 + x2)
The parameter λ is computed using Equation (4.2). We investigate faults in parameters
y1, y2, x1, x2.
Faults induced into y2
Assume that an adversary induces faults into y2, i.e., y2 7→ y2 + e, e ∈ GF (2k). Since y2
is only used once, we have that permanent and transient fault have same effect and do
not need to be considered separately. The induced fault forces faulty values λ˜, x˜3, y˜3 in
the computation, i.e.,
λ˜ =
y1 + y2 + e
x1 + x2
=
y1 + y2
x1 + x2
+ e˜ = λ+ e˜, where e˜ =
e
x1 + x2
, x1 6= x2, (4.3)
x˜3 = λ˜
2 + λ˜+ x1 + x2 + a = (λ+ e˜)
2 + (λ+ e˜) + x1 + x2 + a
= x3 + e˜(e˜+ 1), (4.4)
y˜3 = λ˜(x1 + x˜3) + x˜3 + y1 = (λ+ e˜) (x1 + x3 + e˜ (e + 1)) + x3 + e˜(e+ 1) + y1
= λ(x1 + x3) + λe˜(e+ 1) + e˜(x1 + x3) + e˜
2(e+ 1) + x3 + e˜(e˜+ 1) + y1
= y3 + e˜ ((e˜+ 1) (λ+ e˜ + 1) + x1 + x3) . (4.5)
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A faulty point P˜3 = (x˜3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e˜ (x1 + x2)
(
e˜+
x2
x1 + x2
)(
e˜2 + e˜+
y1x2 + x1y2 + x
3
1 + x
2
1x2
(x1 + x2)2
)
+ T = 0, (4.6)
where
T = y23 +x3y3 +x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b+
x1 (x
3
1 + x
2
1a + x1y1 + y
2
1 + a2x
2
2 + y
2
2 + x
3
2 + x2y2)
(x1 + x2)
2 e˜. (4.7)
Since, P1, P2 are valid points, and the correct result P3 is a valid point on the elliptic
curve, by applying the Weierstrass equation y2i +xiyi = x
3
i +x
2
ia+ b, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we have
that T = 0. Therefore,
e˜ (x1 + x2)
(
e˜ +
x2
x1 + x2
)(
e˜2 + e˜+
y1x2 + x1y2 + x
3
1 + x
2
1x2
(x1 + x2)2
)
= 0. (4.8)
It follows that
e˜ = 0⇒ e = 0,
e˜ =
x2
x1 + x2
⇒ e = x2.
The first value e = 0 represents error free computation, and it can be neglected. To solve
e˜2 + e˜ +
y1x2 + x1y2 + x
3
1 + x
2
1x2
(x1 + x2)2
= 0, (4.9)
we will use formulas for the solution of quadratic equations over GF (2k) given in [25].
Let
x2 + x +m = 0, m ∈ GF (2k), (4.10)
and let T4(m) be trace of m for k even such that
T4(m) =
(k−2)/2∑
i=0
m2
2i
, then
Theorem 4.4.1 ([25]). Assume that (4.10) has a solution x1 in GF (2
k), and k is odd,
then solution can be expressed as
x1 =
∑
j∈J
m2j
=
∑
i∈I
m2i,
where I = {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}, J = {0, 2, 4, . . . , k − 1}.
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Theorem 4.4.2 ([25]). Assume that (4.10) has a solution x1 in GF (2
k) and k ≡ 2 (mod 4),
then x1 can be expressed as follows:
x1 =
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
, for T4(m) = 0,
x1 = α +
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
, for T4(m) = 1,
where α2 + α = 1.
Theorem 4.4.3 ([25]). If (4.10) has a solution x1 in GF (2
k), k ≡ 0 (mod 4), and T4(m) =
1, then x1 can be expressed as
x1 = S + S
2 +m2
k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 ,
where
S =
(k/4)−1∑
j=1
(k/4)−1∑
i=j
m2
2i−1+k/2+22j−2
. (4.11)
Therefore, let m =
y1x2+x1y2+x31+x
2
1x2
(x1+x2)2
, x1 6= x2 in (4.9), then depending on the degree k
of the finite field we have
• if k is odd then
e˜ =
∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}. (4.12)
Therefore, the faulty point is valid if
e = (x1 + x2)
∑
i∈I
m2i. (4.13)
• if k ≡ 2 (mod 4) then
– if T4(m) = 0 then
e˜ =
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
. (4.14)
Therefore, the faulty point is valid if
e = (x1 + x2)
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
. (4.15)
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– if T4(m) = 1 and α
2 + α = 1 then
e˜ = α +
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
. (4.16)
The faulty point is valid if
e = (x1 + x2)
α + (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
 . (4.17)
• if k ≡ 0 (mod 4), T4(m) = 1 and where S is as in (4.11) then
e˜ = S + S2 +m2
k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 . (4.18)
The faulty point is valid if
e = (x1 + x2)
S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 . (4.19)
Therefore,
e˜ ∈
{
0,
x2
x1 + x2
, e˜∗
}
,
where depending on the field degree k, e˜∗can be as in (4.12), (4.14), (4.16), (4.18). More-
over,
e ∈ {0, x2, e∗} ,
where depending on k, e∗ can be as in (4.13), (4.15), (4.17), (4.19).
The value e = x2 represents the case when −P2 = (x2, y2 + x2) is used instead of P2 =
(x2, y2). Also, e
∗ has value that depends on the degree k of the finite binary extension
field.
Faults induced into y1
Assume that an adversary induces faults into y1, i.e., y1 7→ y1 + e, e ∈ GF (2k). Since y1
is used in computation of y3 we need to investigate permanent and transient faults.
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Transient Faults. Fault induced into y1 yields exactly same values for λ˜, x˜3, y˜3, as
when it is induced into y2, i.e., see (4.3), (4.4), (4.5). Therefore,
e˜ ∈
{
0,
x2
x1 + x2
, e˜∗
}
,
where depending on the field degree k, e˜∗ can be as in (4.12), (4.14), (4.16), (4.18).
Moreover,
e ∈ {0, x2, e∗} ,
where depending on k, e∗ can be as in (4.13), (4.15), (4.17), (4.19). Therefore, the induced
transient fault in y1 which produces a valid faulty point depends on the value x2, and
value e∗, which depends on the degree k of the finite binary extension field.
Permanent Faults. In case of a permanent fault induced into y1, the computation
of λ˜ and x˜3 is same as for when fault is induced into y2, see (4.3), (4.4), and
y˜3 = λ˜(x1 + x˜3) + x˜3 + y˜1 = (λ+ e˜) (x1 + x3 + e˜ (e˜ + 1)) + x3 + e˜ (e˜ + 1) + y1 + e
= y3 + e˜ ((e˜+ 1) (λ+ e˜ + 1) + x3 + x2) .
A faulty point P˜3 = (x˜3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e˜ (x1 + x2)
(
e˜+
x1
x1 + x2
)(
e˜2 + e˜+
y1x2 + x1y2 + x
3
2 + x1x
2
2
(x1 + x2)2
)
+ T = 0,
where
T = y23 +x3y3 +x
3
3 +ax
2
3 +b+
x2 (x
3
1 + x
2
1a + y
2
1 + x1y1 + a2x
2
2 + y
2
2 + x
3
2 + x2y2)
(x1 + x2)
2 e˜. (4.21)
Since, P1, P2 are valid points and the correct result P3 is a valid point on the elliptic curve,
then by applying the Weierstrass equation y2i + xiyi = x
3
i + x
2
i a+ b, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we have
that T = 0. Therefore,
e˜ (x1 + x2)
(
e˜+
x1
x1 + x2
)(
e˜2 + e˜+
y1x2 + x1y2 + x
3
2 + x1x
2
2
(x1 + x2)2
)
= 0. (4.22)
It follows that
e˜ = 0⇒ e = 0,
e˜ =
x1
x1 + x2
⇒ e = x1.
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The first value e = 0 represents error free computation, therefore it can be neglected. To
solve
e˜2 + e˜+
y1x2 + x1y2 + x
3
2 + x1x
2
2
(x1 + x2)2
= 0 (4.23)
we will use formulas for the solution of quadratic equations over GF (2k) given in [25].
Let m =
y1x2+x1y2+x32+x1x
2
2
(x1+x2)2
, with x1 6= x2, then the solution is
e˜ ∈
{
0,
x1
x1 + x2
, e˜∗
}
,
where depending on the field degree k, e˜∗ can be as in (4.12), (4.14), (4.16), (4.18).
Moreover,
e ∈ {0, x1, e∗} ,
where depending on k, e∗ can be as in (4.13), (4.15), (4.17), (4.19). Therefore, permanent
fault in y1 which produces a valid faulty point depends on the value x1, which represents
the case when −P1 = (x1, y1 + x1) is used instead of P1 = (x1, y1), and value e∗, which
depends on the degree k of the finite field.
Fault induced into x2
Assume that an adversary induces a fault into x2, i.e., x2 7→ x2 + e, e ∈ GF (2k). Since
x2 is used in computation of x3 we need to investigate permanent and transient faults.
Transient faults. Given transient fault we have
λ˜ =
y1 + y2
x1 + x2 + e
= λ+ e˜, where e˜ =
e(y1 + y2)
(x1 + x2)2 + e(x1 + x2)
, (4.24)
x˜3 = (λ+ e˜)
2 + (λ+ e˜) + x1 + x2 + a = λ
2 + e˜2 + λ+ e˜+ x1 + x2 + a
= x3 + e˜(e˜+ 1), (4.25)
y˜3 = λ˜(x1 + x˜3) + x˜3 + y1 = (λ+ e˜) (x1 + x3 + e˜ (e˜ + 1)) + x3 + e˜(e˜+ 1) + y1
= y3 + e˜ ((e˜+ 1) (λ+ e˜ + 1) + x1 + x3) . (4.26)
We assume that e 6≡ (x1 +x2) (mod 2), since otherwise an arithmetic error will be caused.
A faulty point P˜3 = (x˜3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
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over GF (2k). Therefore,
e˜ (x1 + x2)
(
e˜+
x2
x1 + x2
)(
e˜2 + e˜+
y1x2 + x1y2 + x
3
1 + x
2
1x2
(x1 + x2)2
)
+ T = 0,
where
T = y23 + x3y3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b +
x1 (x
3
1 + x
2
1a + x1y1 + y
2
1 + a2x
2
2 + y
2
2 + x
3
2 − x2y2)
(x1 + x2)
2 e˜.
Since, P1, P2 are valid points and the correct result P3 is a valid point on the elliptic curve,
by applying the Weierstrass equation y2i + xiyi = x
3
i + x
2
i a+ b, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we have that
T = 0. Therefore,
e˜ (x1 + x2)
(
e˜+
x2
x1 + x2
)(
e˜2 + e˜+
y1x2 + x1y2 + x
3
1 + x
2
1x2
(x1 + x2)2
)
= 0. (4.27)
Since equation (4.27) is exactly the same as equation (4.6), it follows that
e˜ ∈
{
0,
x2
x1 + x2
, e˜∗
}
,
where x1 6= x2. Depending on the field degree k, e˜∗ can be as in (4.12), (4.14), (4.16),
(4.18). Moreover,
e ∈
{
0,
x2(x1 + x2)
y1 + y2 + x2
, e∗
}
, y1 + y2 + x2 6= 0,
where depending on k, e∗ can be as one of the following:
• if k is odd then
e =
(x1 + x2)
2
∑
i∈Im
2i
(y1 + y2) + (x1 + x2)
∑
i∈I m
2i
, I ∈ {1, 3, . . . , k − 2},
if (y1 + y2) + (x1 + x2)
∑
i∈Im
2i 6= 0.
• if k ≡ 2 (mod 4) then
– if T4(m) = 0 then
e =
(x1 + x2)
2
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m +m
2)2
2+4i
(y1 + y2) + (x1 + x2)
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)22+4i
,
if (y1 + y2) + (x1 + x2)
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)2
2+4i 6= 0.
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– if T4(m) = 1 and α
2 + α = 1 then
e =
(x1 + x2)
2(α +
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m +m
2)2
2+4i
)
(y1 + y2) + (x1 + x2)(α+
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)22+4i)
,
if (y1 + y2) + (x1 + x2)(α+
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)2
2+4i
) 6= 0.
• if k ≡ 0 (mod 4), T4(m) = 1 and S is as in (4.11) then
e =
(x1 + x2)
2
(
S + S2 +m2
k−1
(
1 +
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i+k/2
))
(y1 + y2) + (x1 + x2)
(
S + S2 +m2k−1
(
1 +
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i−k/2
)) ,
if (y1 + y2) + (x1 + x2)
(
S + S2 +m2
k−1
(
1 +
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i−k/2
))
6= 0.
Permanent faults. In the case of a permanent fault induced into x2, the computation
of λ˜, x˜3, y˜3 is as follows:
λ˜ =
y1 + y2
x1 + x2 + e
= e˜(y1 + y2), where e˜ =
1
x1 + x2 + e
,
x˜3 = λ˜
2 + λ˜+ x1 + x˜2 + a = (e˜ (y1 + y2))
2 + e˜(y1 + y2) + x1 + x2 + e+ a
= e˜2(y1 + y2)
2 + e˜(y1 + y2) +
1
e
+ a, e 6= 0,
y˜3 = λ˜(x1 + x˜3) + x˜3 + y1
= e˜(y1 + y2)
(
x1 + e˜
2 (y1 + y2)
2 + e˜ (y1 + y2) +
1
e˜
+ a
)
+ e˜2(y1 + y2)
2 +
e˜(y1 + y2) +
1
e˜
+ a+ y1, e˜ 6= 0
= e˜(y1 + y2)
(
x1 + e˜
2 (y1 + y2)
2 + a+ 1
)
+ y2 +
1
e
+ a, e 6= 0.
We assume that e 6≡ (x1 +x2) (mod 2), since otherwise an arithmetic error will be caused.
A faulty point P˜3 = (x˜3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
Ae˜3 +Be˜2 + Ce˜ +D = 0, where (4.28)
A = y42 + y
3
1x1 + y
3
2x1 + y
2
1y2x1 + y1y
2
2x1 + y
4
1,
B = y31 + y1y
2
2 + y
2
1x1 + y
2
2x
2
1 + y
2
2x1 + y
2
1x
2
1,
C = ay1x1 + ay2x1 + y1y2 + y
2
2,
D = y1x1 + y1a+ y2x1 + y
2
1 + b.
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We will solve equation (4.28) by the method proposed in [25]. We will transform the equa-
tion (4.28) into quadratic equation and we will apply formulas for solution of quadratic
equations over GF (2k). Therefore, we multiply equation (4.28) by 1/A, A 6= 0, i.e.,
e˜3 +
B
A
e˜2 +
C
A
e˜+
D
A
= 0. (4.29)
Let a = B
A
, b = C
A
, c = D
A
, then (4.29) can be rewritten as
e˜3 + ae˜2 + be˜ + c = 0. (4.30)
Now, substitute a + x(a2 + b)
1
2 into (4.30), then (4.30) is rewritten as
x3 + x+
ba + c
(a2 + b)
√
a2 + b
= 0, (a2 + b)
√
a2 + b 6= 0. (4.31)
Let l = ba+c
(a2+b)
√
a2+b
, then (4.31) can be written as
x3 + x + l = 0. (4.32)
Now, substitute x = ω + 1
ω
, ω 6= 0 in (4.32) then
ω6 + 1 + lω3
ω3
= 0, ω3 6= 0. (4.33)
Let ω3 = z in (4.33) then
z2 + 1 + lz
z
= 0 ⇒ z2 + lz + 1 = 0. (4.34)
Let t = z/l in (4.34) then
t2 + t +
1
l2
= 0, l2 6= 0. (4.35)
Let m = 1/l2, then depending on the field degree k solution of the quadratic equation
(4.35) is as follows: if k is odd then
t =
∑
i∈I
(m)2i , I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}.
Therefore,
z = l
∑
i∈I
(m)2i , I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2},
ω =
(
l
∑
i∈I
(m)2i
)1/3
, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2},
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x =
(
l
∑
i∈I
(m)2i
)1/3
+
1(
l
∑
i∈I (m)
2i
)1/3 , I ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2},
(
l
∑
i∈I
(m)2i
)1/3
6= 0,
e˜ = a+ (a2 + b)1/2
(l∑
i∈I
(m)2i
)1/3
+
1(
l
∑
i∈I (m)
2i
)1/3
 , I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}.
(4.36)
The faulty point is valid if
e =
1
a+ (a2 + b)1/2
((
l
∑
i∈I (m)
2i
)1/3
+ 1
(l
∑
i∈I(m)
2i)
1/3
)− (x1 +x2), I ∈ {1, . . . , k−2},
(4.37)
if a+ (a2 + b)1/2
((
l
∑
i∈I (m)
2i
))1/3
+ 1
(l
∑
i∈I(m)
2i)
1/3 6= 0.
If k ≡ 2 (mod 4) then
• if T4(m) = 0 then
t =
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
.
Therefore,
z = l
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
,
ω =
l (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
1/3 ,
x =
l (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
1/3 + 1(
l
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)22+4i
)1/3 ,
if
(
l
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)2
2+4i
)1/3
6= 0. Now it follows
e˜ = a+ (a2 + b)1/2

l (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
1/3 + 1(
l
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m +m
2)22+4i
)1/3
 .
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The faulty point is valid if
e =
1
a + (a2 + b)1/2
((
l
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m +m
2)22+4i
)1/3
+ 1(
l
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)22+4i
)1/3
)
−(x1 + x2), (4.38)
and if
(
l
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m +m
2)2
2+4i
)1/3
+ 1(
l
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)22+4i
)1/3 6= 0.
• if T4(m) = 1 and where α2 + α = 1, then
t = α +
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
.
Therefore,
z = l
α + (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
 ,
ω =
l
α + (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
1/3 ,
x =
l
α + (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
1/3 + 1(
l
(
α +
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)22+4i
))1/3 ,
where
(
l
(
α +
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m +m
2)2
2+4i
))1/3
6= 0.
Now it follows
e˜ = a+(a2+b)1/2
l
α + (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
1/3+ 1(
l
(
α +
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)22+4i
))1/3 .
The faulty value is valid if
e =
1
a+ (a2 + b)1/2
(
l
(
α +
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m +m
2)22+4i
))1/3
+ 1(
l
(
α+
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)22+4i
))1/3
+(x1 + x2), (4.39)
and if denominator is different than 0.
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If k ≡ 0 (mod 4) and S is as in (4.11), then
t = S + S2 +m2
k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 .
Therefore,
z = l
S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 ,
ω =
l
S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
1/3 ,
x =
(
l
(
S + S2 +m2
k−1
(
1 +
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i+k/2
)))2/3
+ 1(
l
(
S + S2 +m2k−1
(
1 +
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i+k/2
)))1/3 ,
if denominator is different than 0. Now it follows
e˜ = a + (a2 + b)1/2

(
l
(
S + S2 +m2
k−1
(
1 +
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i+k/2
)))2/3
+ 1(
l
(
S + S2 +m2k−1
(
1 +
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i+k/2
)))1/3
 .
The faulty point is valid if
e =
1
a + (a2 + b)1/2
((
l
(
S+S2+m2k−1
(
1+
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i+k/2
)))2/3
+1(
l
(
S+S2+m2k−1
(
1+
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i+k/2
)))1/3
) + (x1 + x2), (4.40)
and if denominator is different than 0.
Fault induced into x1
Assume that an adversary induces a fault into x1, i.e., x1 7→ x1 + e, e ∈ GF (2k). Since x1
is used in computation of x3 and y3, we need to investigate permanent and transient faults.
Transient faults. Given a transient fault in x1 the computed faulty values λ˜, x˜3, y˜3
are same as in (4.24), (4.25), (4.26). Therefore, it follows exactly the same analysis as for
the case when transient fault is induced into x2.
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Permanent faults. In case of permanent fault induced into x2, the computation of
λ˜, x˜3, y˜3 is as follows:
λ˜ =
y1 + y2
x1 + x2 + e
= e˜(y1 + y2) where e˜ =
1
x1 + x2 + e
,
x˜3 = λ˜
2 + λ˜+ x˜1 + x2 + a = (e˜ (y1 + y2))
2 + e˜(y1 + y2) + x1 + e + x2 + a
= e˜2(y1 + y2)
2 + e˜(y1 + y2) +
1
e˜
+ a, e˜ 6= 0,
y˜3 = λ˜(x˜1 + x˜3) + x˜3 + y1
= e˜(y1 + y2)
(
x1 + e+ e˜
2 (y1 + y2)
2 + e˜ (y1 + y2) +
1
e˜
+ a
)
+ e˜2(y1 + y2)
2 +
e˜(y1 + y2) +
1
e˜
+ a+ y1
= e˜(y1 + y2)
(
x2 + e˜
2 (y1 + y2)
2 + a+ 1
)
+
1
e˜
+ a+ y1, e˜ 6= 0.
We assume that e 6≡ (x1 +x2) (mod 2), since otherwise an arithmetic error will be caused.
Faulty point P˜3 = (x˜3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
Ae˜3 +Be˜2 + Ce˜ +D = 0, where (4.41)
A = y21y2x2 + y1y
2
2x2 + y
3
1x2 + y
3
2x2 + y
4
2 + y
4
1,
B = y32 + y
2
1y2 + y
2
1x2 + y
2
2x
2
2 + y
2
2x2 + y
2
1x
2
2,
C = ay1x2 + ay2x2 + y
2
1 + y1y2,
D = y1x2 + y2x2 + y2a+ y
2
2 + b.
The arguments which one used to solve equation (4.41) is exactly the same as for equation
(4.28). Therefore, depending on the degree of the finite field k, the error value e ∈ GF (2k)
can be as (4.37), or (4.38), or (4.39), or (4.40).
4.5 Attacks targeting x3 = λ
2 + λ + x1 + x2 + a
Here we are going to investigate faults in x1, x2, a and λ. The values x2, a are not used
in computation of y3. Therefore, transient and permanent faults have the same effect,
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while values λ, x1 and x3, are used again and transient and permanent faults have to be
investigated separately. Faults induced into x3 are analyzed later in Section 4.6.
Fault induced into x1
Assume that an adversary induces a fault into x1, i.e., x1 7→ x1 + e, e ∈ GF (2k). Since
x1 is used in the computation of y3, we need to investigate permanent and transient faults.
Transient faults. Given a transient fault into x1 the following values are computed:
x˜3 = λ
2 + λ+ x1 + e+ x2 + a = x3 + e,
y˜3 = λ(x1 + x˜3) + x˜3 + y1 = λ(x1 + x3 + e) + x3 + e + y1
= y3 + e(λ+ 1).
A faulty point P˜3 = (x˜3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e
(
x3
(
λ+ 1 + y3 + x
2
3
)
+ e
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)
+ e2
)
+ T = 0,
where T = y23 + x3y3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b. Since, P1, P2 are valid points and correct result P3
is a valid point on the elliptic curve, by applying the Weierstrass equation y23 + x3y3 =
x33 + x
2
3a+ b we have that T = 0. Therefore,
e
(
x3
(
λ+ 1 + y3 + x
2
3
)
+ e
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)
+ e2
)
= 0.
The first solution e = 0 can be neglected, since it represents error free computation, while
the other follows as a solution of the quadratic equation
e2 + e
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)
+ x3
(
λ+ 1 + y3 + x
2
3
)
= 0. (4.42)
Now, let y = e
(λ+1)2+λ+1+x3+a
, (λ + 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a 6= 0, x1 6= x2, then (4.42) can be
written as
y2 + y +
x3(λ+ 1) + y3 + x
2
3(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)2 = 0. (4.43)
Equation (4.43) can be solved by using formulas for solutions of quadratic equations over
GF (2k) given in [25]. Let m =
x3(λ+1)+y3+x23
((λ+1)2+λ+1+x3+a)
2 ; then depending on the degree k of the
finite field, the possible error values are:
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• if k is odd then
y =
∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}, such that
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}.
• if k ≡ 2 (mod 4) then
– if T4(m) = 0 then
y =
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
, such that
e =
(
(λ + 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
) (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
.
– if T4(m) = 1 and α
2 + α = 1 then
y = α +
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
such that
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)α+ (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
 .
• if k ≡ 0 (mod 4) and T4(m) = 1 with S as in (4.11), then
y = S + S2 +m2
k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 such that
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 .
Permanent faults. In the case of a permanent fault induced into x1 the computation
of the value x˜3 is the same as when transient fault is induced into x1, while
y˜3 = λ(x˜1 + x˜3) + x˜3 + y1 = y3 + e.
A faulty point P˜3 = (x˜3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e
(
y3 + x3 + x
2
3 + e (x3 + a) + e
2
)
+ T = 0
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where
T = y23 + x3y3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b.
Since, P1, P2 are valid points and the correct result P3 is a valid point on the elliptic
curve, by applying the Weierstrass equation y23 +x3y3 = x
3
3 +x
2
3a+ b we have that T = 0.
Therefore,
e
(
y3 + x3 + x
2
3 + e (x3 + a) + e
2
)
= 0.
The first solution e = 0 can be neglected, since it represents error free computation, while
other follows as a solution of the quadratic equation
e2 + e (x3 + a) + y3 + x3 + x
2
3 = 0. (4.44)
Now, let y = e
x3+a
, x3 + a 6= 0, then the equation (4.44) can be written as
y2 + y +
y3 + x3 + x
2
3
(x3 + a)2
= 0. (4.45)
The equation (4.45) can be solved by using formulas for solutions of quadratic equations
over GF (2k) given in [25]. Let m =
y3+x3+x23
(x3+a)2
, then depending on the degree k of the finite
field possible error values are:
• if k is odd then
y =
∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}, such that
e = (x3 + a)
∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}.
• if k ≡ 2 (mod 4) then
– if T4(m) = 0 then
y =
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
, such that
e = (x3 + a)
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
.
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– if T4(m) = 1 and α
2 + α = 1 then
y = α +
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
such that
e = (x3 + a)
α + (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
 .
• if k ≡ 0 (mod 4) and T4(m) = 1 with S as in (4.11), then
y = S + S2 +m2
k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 such that
e = (x3 + a)
S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 .
Fault induced into x2 (or a, or λ
2)
If adversary induces faults into x2 7→ x2 + e, (a 7→ a + e, or λ2 7→ λ2 + e), e ∈ GF (2k),
we have the same situation as when a transient fault is induced into x1. Since x2
(or a, or λ2) it is not used again after computation of x3, we do not need to investi-
gate transient and permanent faults separately. Therefore, for m =
x3(λ+1)+y3+x23
((λ+1)2+λ+1+x3+a)
2 ,(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)2
, x1 6= x2, depending on the degree k of the finite field possible
error values are:
• if k is odd then
y =
∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}, such that
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}.
• if k ≡ 2 (mod 4) then
– if T4(m) = 0 then
y =
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
, such that
e =
(
(λ + 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
) (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
.
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– if T4(m) = 1 and α
2 + α = 1 then
y = α +
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
such that
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)α+ (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
 .
• if k ≡ 0mod 4 and T4(m) = 1 with S as in (4.11), then
y = S + S2 +m2
k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 such that
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 .
Faults induced into λ
Assume that an adversary induces a fault into λ 7→ λ + e, e ∈ GF (2k), during the com-
putation of the x3. Since, it is used in the computation of the y3 we need to consider
permanent and transient faults separately.
Transient faults. Assume that an adversary induces a transient fault, then:
x˜3 = (λ+ e)
2 + λ+ e + x1 + x2 + a = x3 + e(e + 1), (4.46)
y˜3 = λ(x1 + x˜3) + x˜3 + y1 = λ (x1 + x3 + e (e+ 1)) + x3 + e(e+ 1) + y1
= y3 + e(e+ 1)(λ+ 1). (4.47)
Let e˜ = e(e+ 1), then (4.46) can be rewritten as:
x˜3 = x3 + e˜,
y˜3 = y3 + e˜(λ+ 1).
A faulty point P˜3 = (x˜3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e˜
(
x3 (λ+ 1) + y3 + x
2
3 + e˜
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)
+ e˜2
)
+ T = 0,
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where
T = y23 + x3y3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b.
Since, P1, P2 are valid points and the correct result P3 is a valid point on the elliptic curve,
then by applying the Weierstrass equation y23 + x3y3 = x
3
3 + x
2
3a+ b we have that T = 0.
Therefore,
e˜
(
x3 (λ+ 1) + y3 + x
2
3 + e˜
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)
+ e˜2
)
= 0.
Therefore, e˜ = 0, i.e., e = 0, e = 1. The solution e˜ = 0 can be neglected, since it represents
error free computation, while other follows as a solution of the quadratic equation
e˜2 + e˜
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)
+ x3 (λ+ 1) + y3 + x
2
3 = 0. (4.48)
Now, let y = e˜
(λ+1)2+λ+1+x3+a
, (λ + 1)2 + λ + 1 + x3 + a 6= 0, x1 6= x2, then the equation
(4.48) can be written as
y2 + y +
x3(λ+ 1) + y3 + x
2
3
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
= 0. (4.49)
Equation (4.49) can be solved by using formulas for solutions of quadratic equations over
GF (2k) given in [25]. Let m =
x3(λ+1)+y3+x23
(λ+1)2+λ+1+x3+a
, then depending on the degree k of the
finite field possible error values are:
• if k is odd then
y =
∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}.
Therefore,
e˜ =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}.
Moreover,(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)∑
i∈I
m2i = e(e+ 1), I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2},
e2 + e +
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ + 1 + x3 + a
)∑
i∈I
m2i = 0. (4.50)
Let l =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)∑
i∈I m
2i then (4.50) can be rewritten as
e2 + e+ l = 0. (4.51)
Depending on the degree k of the finite field it follows
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– if k is odd then
e =
∑
i∈I
l2i I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}. (4.52)
– if k ≡ 2 (mod 4) then
∗ if T4(l) = 0
e =
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(l + l2)2
2+4i
, i.e., (4.53)
∗ if T4(l) = 1 and α2 + α = 1 then
e = α+
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(l + l2)2
2+4i
, i.e., (4.54)
– if k ≡ 0mod 4, T4(l) = 1 and S is as in (4.11) then
e = S + S2 + l2
k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
l2
2i+l/2
 , i.e., (4.55)
• if k ≡ 2mod 4 then
– if T4(m) = 0 then
y =
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(
m+m2
)22+4i
.
Therefore,
e˜ =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ + 1 + x3 + a
) (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(
m +m2
)22+4i
.
Moreover,
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
) (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(
m +m2
)22+4i
= e(e+ 1), i.e.,
e2 + e+
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
) (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(
m+m2
)22+4i
= 0. (4.56)
Let l =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (m+m
2)
22+4i
, then (4.56) can be
written as (4.51). Depending on the degree k faulty point is valid if solution e
is as in (4.52), (4.53), (4.54), (4.55).
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– if T4(l) = 1 and α
2 + α = 1 then
y = α +
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(l + l2)2
2+4i
.
Therefore,
e˜ =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)α+ (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(l + l2)2
2+4i
 .
Moreover,
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)α + (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(l + l2)2
2+4i
 = e(e + 1), i.e.,
e2 + e +
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)α + (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(l + l2)2
2+4i
 = 0. (4.57)
Let l =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
) (
α+
∑(k−6)/4
i=0 (l + l
2)2
2+4i
)
, then (4.57)
can be rewriten as (4.51). Depending on the degree k of the finite field, a
faulty point is valid if the solution e is as in (4.52), (4.53), (4.54), (4.55).
• if k ≡ 0 (mod 4) and T4(m) = 1 and S is as in (4.11) then
y = S + S2 +m2
k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 .
Therefore,
e˜ =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 , i.e.,
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ + 1 + x3 + a
)S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 = e(e+1), i.e.,
e2 + e+
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
)S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
m2
2i+k/2
 = 0.
(4.58)
Let l =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + λ+ 1 + x3 + a
) (
S + S2 +m2
k−1
(
1 +
∑(k/4)−1
i=0 m
22i+k/2
))
, then
(4.58) can be rewrriten as (4.51). Depending on the degree k of the finite field, a
faulty point is valid if the solution e is as in (4.52), (4.53), (4.54), (4.55).
78
Permanent faults. In case of a permanent fault induced into λ, the computation of
the value x˜3 is the same as when transient fault is induced into λ, while
x˜3 = x3 + e(e + 1),
y˜3 = λ˜(x1 + x˜3) + x˜3 + y1 = (λ+ e)(x1 + x3 + e(e+ 1)) + x3 + e(e+ 1) + y1
= y3 + e ((e + 1)(λ+ e + 1) + x1 + x3) .
A faulty point P˜3 = (x˜3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e(x1 + x2)(e+
x2
x1 + x2
)(e2 + e +
x31 + x
2
1x2 + y1x2 + y2x1
(x1 + x2)2
) + T = 0
where
T = y23 + x3y3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b+
x1(ax
2
1 + x
3
1 + x1y1 + y
2
1 + y
2
2 + ax
2
2 + x
3
2 + x2y2)
(x1 + x2)2
.
Since, P1, P2 are valid points and correct result P3 is a valid point on the elliptic curve,
then by applying the Weierstrass equation y23 + x3y3 = x
3
3 + x
2
3a+ b we have that T = 0.
Therefore,
e(x1 + x2)(e+
x2
x1 + x2
)(e2 + e +
x31 + x
2
1x2 + y1x2 + y2x1
(x1 + x2)2
) = 0.
It follows that
e = 0,
e =
x2
x1 + x2
, x1 6= x2.
The first value e = 0 represents error free computation, therefore it can be neglected.
Since, equation
e2 + e+
x31 + x
2
1x2 + y1x2 + y2x1
(x1 + x2)2
= 0 (4.59)
is exactly the same as equation (4.9), the solutions of (4.9) are error values for equation
(4.59).
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4.6 Fault attacks on y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1
The value of y3 is computed using λ, x1, x3 and y1. Since, λ, x1, y1, y3 are not used again
in the addition formula we do not need to investigate permanent and transient faults
separately, while in case of variable x3 which is returned by the addition formula this
distinction is necessary.
Fault induced into λ
Assume that an adversary induces a fault into λ 7→ λ + e, e ∈ GF (2k) such that the
computed faulty value is:
y˜3 = (λ+ e)(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1
= y3 + e(x1 + x3).
A faulty point P˜3 = (x3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x3y˜3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e
(
x3 (x1 + x3) + e (x1 + x3)
2)+ T = 0, where
T = y˜3
2 + x3y˜3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b = 0.
Therefore, a valid faulty point occurs only if
e ≡ 0 (mod 2),
e ≡ x3
x1 + x3
(mod 2) if x1 6= x3.
Fault induced into y1
Assume that an adversary induces faults into y1 7→ y1 + e, e ∈ GF (2k), then
y˜3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1 + e
= y3 + e.
A faulty point P˜3 = (x3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x3y˜3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e(x3 + e) + T = 0, where
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T = y˜3
2 + x3y˜3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b = 0.
A Valid faulty point will occur only if
e = 0 (mod 2),
e = x3 (mod 2).
Fault induced into x1
Assume that an adversary induces a fault into x1 7→ x1 + e, e ∈ GF (2k), then
y˜3 = λ(x1 + e+ x3) + x3 + y1
= y3 + λe.
A faulty point P˜3 = (x3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x3y˜3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e(x3λ+ λ
2e) + T = 0, where
T = y˜3
2 + x3y˜3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b = 0.
A valid faulty point will occur only if
e = 0 (mod 2),
e =
x3
λ
(mod 2) if λ 6= 0.
Fault induced into y3
Assume that an adversary induces a fault into y3 7→ y3 + e, e ∈ GF (2k). Therefore,
P˜3 = (x3, y˜3) is a valid point only if
e ≡ x3mod 2.
Fault induced into x3
Assume that an adversary induces a fault into x3 7→ x3 + e, e ∈ GF (2k). Since x3 is used
later we need to investigate both transient and permanent faults.
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Transient faults. Assume that an adversary induces transient fault into x3, then
y˜3 = λ(x1 + x3 + e) + x3 + e + y1
= y3 + e(λ+ 1).
A faulty point P˜3 = (x3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x3y˜3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e
(
x3 (λ+ 1) + (λ+ 1)
2 e
)
+ T = 0, where
T = y˜3
2 + x3y˜3 + x
3
3 + ax
2
3 + b = 0.
Therefore, a valid faulty point occurs only if
e = 0 (mod 2),
e =
x3
λ+ 1
(mod 2) if λ 6= 1.
Permanent faults. Assume that an adversary induces a permanent fault into x3,
then
x˜3 = x3 + e
y˜3 = y3 + (λ+ 1)e.
A faulty point P˜3 = (x3, y˜3) is a valid faulty point only if y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜33 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0
over GF (2k). Therefore,
e
(
x3(λ+ 1) + y3 + x
2
3 +
(
(λ+ 1)2 + 1 + λ+ x3 + a
)
e+ e2
)
+ T = 0,
T = y˜3
2 + x˜3y˜3 + x˜3
3 + ax˜3
2 + b = 0.
The solution e = 0 can be neglected, since it is error free, while the equation
e2 +
(
(λ+ 1)2 + 1 + λ+ x3 + a
)
e + x3(λ+ 1) + y3 + x
2
3 = 0 (4.60)
is solved by using formulas for the solution of the quadratic equation over GF (2k) given
in [25]. Let z = e
(λ+1)2+1+λ+x3+a
, (λ+ 1)2 + 1 + λ+ x3 + a 6= 0 in (4.60), then
z2 + z +m = 0, where m =
x3(λ+ 1) + y3 + x
2
3
((λ+ 1)2 + 1 + λ+ x3 + a)2
.
Depending on the degree k of the finite field we have
82
• if k is odd then
z =
∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}.
Therefore, the faulty value is valid if
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + 1 + λ+ x3 + a
)∑
i∈I
m2i, I ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . , k − 2}.
• if k ≡ (2mod 4) then
– if T4(m) = 0 then
z =
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
.
Therefore, the faulty point is valid if
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + 1 + λ+ x3 + a
) (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i
.
– if T4(m) = 1 and α
2 + α = 1 then
z = α +
(k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m +m2)2
2+4i.
Therefore, the faulty point is valid if
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + 1 + λ+ x3 + a
)α+ (k−6)/4∑
i=0
(m+m2)2
2+4i
 .
• if k ≡ 0 (mod 4), T4(m) = 1 and S is as in (4.11) then
z = S + S2 +m2
k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
22i+k/2
 .
Therefore, the faulty point is valid if
e =
(
(λ+ 1)2 + 1 + λ+ x3 + a
)S + S2 +m2k−1
1 + (k/4)−1∑
i=0
22i+k/2
 .
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter by investigating each variable used in the affine addition formula of a
non-supersingular elliptic curve we have derived conditions that an inflicted error needs
to have in order to yield an undetectable faulty point on a non-supersingular elliptic curve
over GF (2k). Note that if an adversary can add the value x2 to y2 in computation of λ,
or if the point P2 = (x2, y2) in affine point addition, can be set to −P2 = (x2, y2 + x2)
then valid a faulty point can be created. Similarly, if an adversary can permanently add
the value of x1 to y1 in the computation of λ, or if the point P1 = (x1, y1) in affine point
addition can permanently be set to −P1 = (x1, y1 + x1) then a valid faulty point can
be created. Moreover, if an adversary can induce faults such that x2 (or permanently
x1) is added to y1 + y2 in the computation of λ, the same effect is obtained as if x2 is
added to y2 (or permanent x1 to y1) in the computation of λ. Also, after the correct
computation of y3, if an adversary mounts the attack such that value of x3 is added to
y3, then a valid faulty point can be achieved. Finally, most of the induced faults that
produce undetectable faulty points have error values depending on the degree k of the
finite field. Since it is possible to create faulty points that are valid points on the original
non-supersingular elliptic curve by inducing faults into the affine addition formula of the
non-supersingular curve, the common countermeasure of checking if the point is on the
curve fails, therefore other possible countermeasures are required.
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Chapter 5
Fault-Tolerant Computation in
Finite Fields by Embedding in Rings
The arithmetic structure of finite fields is utilized in public key cryptography (smartcard
technology, e-commerce, and internet security), as well as in coding theory (error-free
communications and data storage). The security of cryptosystems does not only depend
on the mathematical properties; an adversary can attack the implementation rather than
algorithmic specification. Cryptosystems are used in the real world where cryptographic
protocols are implemented in software, or hardware, obeying laws of physics. The circuits
used leak information, e.g., power and timing information, over side channels. Thus, one
has a gray box, where an adversary has access to several side-channels. Elliptic curve
cryptographic applications rely on computation in a very large finite (with more then 2160
elements). Unfortunately, a single fault in computation can yield an erroneous output,
which can then be used by an adversary to break cryptosystem. Since we require high
reliability and robustness, fault tolerant finite field computation in elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems is crucial.
Imbert et al. in [44] present fault-tolerant computation over the integers based on the
modulus replication residue number system, which allows modular arithmetic computa-
tions over identical channels. Rayhani-Masoleh et al. in their work [81] present multipliers
for fields GF (2k) whose operations are resistant to errors caused by certain faults. They
can correct single errors caused by one, or more faults in the multiplier circuits. Gaubatz
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and Sunar in [37] introduce scaled embedding for Fault-Tolerant Public Key Cryptogra-
phy based on arithmetic codes and binary cyclic codes in order to achieve robust fault
tolerant arithmetic in the finite field. Also, Gaubatz et al. in [36] present a scheme for
robust multi-precision arithmetic over positive integers, protected by a non-linear arith-
metic residue codes. Karpovsky et al. in [48] present a method that uses systematic
nonlinear (cubic) robust error detecting codes to protect a hardware implementation of
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against a side-channel attack known as Differ-
ential Fault Analysis attack [42].
In this chapter we are concerned with protection of elliptic curve cryptosystems by pro-
tecting finite field computation against active side channel attacks, i.e., fault attacks -
where an adversary induces faults into a device, while it executes the correct program.
In Section 5.1 we propose a Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) based fault tolerant
computation (FTC) in finite field for use in elliptic curve cryptosystems, as well as La-
grange Interpolation (LI) based fault tolerant computation in Section 5.2. Computation
is decomposed into parallel, mutually independent, channels, so that fault effects do not
spread to the other channels. By assuming fault models from Chapter 3 we test error
correcting/detecting capability of our proposed schemes. We provide analysis of the er-
ror detection and correction capabilities of our proposed schemes in Subsection 5.1.3 and
5.2.4, as well as an error correction algorithms in Subsection 5.1.4 and 5.2.5. Our approach
is based on the error correcting codes, i.e., redundant residue polynomial codes [24] and
Reed-Solomon codes [80].
5.1 CRT based Fault-Tolerant Computation
In this section we provide CRT based FTC. This approach is based on the use of well
known error correcting codes, i.e., redundant residue polynomial codes [24] which are gen-
eralization of Reed-Solomon codes [80].
Let GF (q) be a finite field and GF (q)[x] the ring of polynomials over GF (q). Let
m1(x), m2(x), . . . , mn(x) be n moduli in GF (q)[x] which are relatively prime, and let
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M(x) =
∏n
i=1mi(x). Furthermore, assume that the degree of each mi(x) is d, and kd
information signals u = (u0, u1, . . . , ukd−1) are represented by polynomial
a(x) = u0 + u1x + . . .+ ukd−1xkd−1.
Then a redundant residue polynomial code is the residue representation of a(x), i.e.,
v = (a1(x), a2(x), . . . , an(x)) , where ai(x) ≡ a(x)modmi(x), i = 1, . . . , n,
where deg(ai(x)) < d. Polynomial a(x) is recovered by the Chinese remainder theorem.
Now, we will present application of this code to the fault tolerant computation in the
finite binary extension field.
5.1.1 CRT based Finite Field Encoding
We want to protect computation over the field GF (2k), which can be represented as the
set of polynomials modulo a irreducible polynomial f(x), deg(f(x)) = k, i.e.,
GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >=
{
a0 + . . .+ ak−1xk−1 | ai ∈ GF (2)
}
.
The inputs to the computation are elements from the binary extension field GF (2k) rep-
resented as a polynomials of degree ≤ k − 1 whose coefficients are from GF (2).
Let n be the expected degree of the output, which is not reduced modulo irreducible
polynomial f(x), then computation of the finite field GF (2k) can be performed with
encoded operands in the larger polynomial ring R[x] = GF (2)[x]/ < m(x) >, where
deg(m(x)) > n. Operations in the ring R[x] are polynomial addition and multiplication
modulo ring modulus m(x).
Let the ring modulus m(x) be product of the v pairwise relatively prime polynomials, i.e.,
m(x) = m1(x)m2(x) · . . . ·mv(x).
Then, there is an isomorphism between polynomial ring R[x] and direct product ring R′
of v smaller rings GF (2)[x]/ < mi(x) >, i.e.,
R[x] ∼= GF (2)[x]/ < m1(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < mv(x) > .
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Let φ be a bijective mapping, i.e.,
φ : GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >→ R′,
then for all polynomials a(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > we have
φ (a (x)) = (a1 (x) , . . . , av (x)) ,
where ai(x) ≡ a(x) (modmi (x)) for i = 1, . . . , v. Inverse mapping φ−1 is computed by
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) for polynomials,
a(x) ≡
(
v∑
i=1
ai(x)Ti(x)Mi(x)
)
(modm(x)) , (5.1)
whereMi(x) =
m(x)
mi(x)
, and polynomials Ti(x) are computed by solving congruences Ti(x)Mi(x) ≡
1 (modmi(x)).
Computation in the larger ring
In general, let ∗ represent any of the two operations of the finite field GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) >, i.e., (addition, or multiplication), and  represent any of the two operations of
the polynomial ring R′, i.e., (componentwise addition, or componentwise multiplication).
Given input polynomials g(x), h(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > we want to compute
(g(x) ∗ h(x)) (mod f(x)),
where max{deg(g ∗ h)} = n. Computation is performed with encoded field elements in
the ring R′ ∼= R[x]. Let r = g(x) ∗ h(x) without the modulo f(x) reduction. Then
r = (g1(x), . . . , gv(x))  (h1(x), . . . , hv(x))
= (g1(x)  h1(x), . . . , gv(x)  hv(x)) ,
where gi(x) ≡ g(x)(modmi(x)), hi(x) ≡ h(x)(modmi(x)) and gi(x), hi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ <
mi(x) > for i = 1, . . . , v, and vector r ∈ R′. By CRT, vector r ∈ R′ will determine a
unique polynomial r(x) ∈ R[x] = GF (2)[x]/ < m(x) > of degree n, which is then reduced
modulo irreducible polynomial f(x), so that r(x)(mod f(x)) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >. Next
we will demonstrate how this computation can be protected by adding redundancy.
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5.1.2 Fault-Tolerant Computation
To protect computation in the finite field we add redundancy by adding more parallel,
modular channels than the minimum required to represent the output polynomial of a cer-
tain expected degree, i.e., see Fig. 5.1. Added redundant moduli mv+1(x), . . . , mc(x) have
to be relatively prime to each other and to the non-redundant moduli m1(x), . . . , mv(x).
Therefore, now computation happens in the larger direct product ring
R′′ = GF (2)[x]/ < m1(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < mv(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < mc(x) >,
where
m′(x) = m1(x) · . . . ·mv(x) ·mv+1(x) · . . . ·mc(x), (5.2)
such that
R′′ ∼= GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) > .
The redundant polynomial moduli have to be of degree larger then the largest degree of
the non-redundant moduli, i.e.,
deg(mv+j(x)) > max{deg{m1(x), . . . , mv(x)}}, j = 1, . . . , c− v,
and
deg
{
m′(x)
mj1(x) · . . . ·mjc−v(x)
}
> n, (5.3)
where c− v is added redundancy.
Computational efficiency
To have efficient reduction in the smaller polynomial rings GF (2)[x]/ < mi(x) >, i =
1, . . . , v, . . . , c, modulus m′(x) have to be chosen as a product of the pairwise relatively
prime polynomials which are of the special low Hamming weight, leading to efficient
modular reduction. Therefore, a smaller ring modulus can be chosen to be in the Mersenne
form xn−1, or pseudo-Mersenne form xn+u(x), where polynomial u(x) is of low weight.
InGF (2k), the reduction is relatively inexpensive if the field is constructed by choosing the
reduction polynomial to be a trinomial, i.e., xk + xm + 1 with m < k/2, or a pentanomial
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k m n h k m n h k m n h k m n h
163 7 6 3 307 8 4 2 233 9 4 1 383 9 5 1
167 6 4 2 311 7 5 3 239 12 7 1 389 10 9 5
173 8 5 2 313 7 3 1 241 9 8 4 397 12 7 6
179 4 2 1 317 7 4 2 251 7 4 2 401 12 8 5
181 7 6 1 331 10 6 2 257 7 6 2 409 7 5 3
191 7 6 4 337 10 6 1 263 11 5 2 419 15 5 4
193 9 7 4 347 11 10 3 269 7 6 1 421 5 4 2
197 9 4 2 349 6 5 2 269 7 6 1 431 5 3 1
199 9 4 1 353 9 7 4 271 11 7 6 433 11 5 3
211 11 10 8 359 9 7 1 277 12 6 3 439 8 3 2
223 5 4 2 367 9 4 2 281 9 4 1 443 10 6 1
227 10 9 4 373 8 7 2 283 12 7 5 449 11 6 4
229 10 4 1 379 10 8 5 293 11 6 1
Table 5.1: Irreducible pentanomials f(x) = xk + xm + xn + xh + 1 over GF (2), where
h < n < m < k/2, k ∈ [160 . . . 450], suitable to use in Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
(if no trinomial is available) xk + xm + xn + xh + 1 with h < n < m < k/2, see Table 5.1,
Table 5.2.
Algorithm 5 is only applied at the end of the computation, and its complexity is:
Theorem 5.1.1 ([35]). Let GF (2)[x] be polynomial ring over a field GF (2), m1(x),
. . . , mc(x) ∈ GF (2)[x], di = deg(mi(x)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ c , l = deg(m′(x)) =
∑
1≤i≤c di,
and ri(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mi(x) > with deg(ri(x)) < di. Then the unique solution r′(x) ∈
GF (2)[x] with deg(r′(x)) < l of the Chinese Remainder Problem r′(x) ≡ ri(x)(modmi(x))
for 1 ≤ i ≤ c for polynomials can be computed using O(l2) operations in GF(2).
Proof. In step 1 of the Algorithm 5 we compute m1(x), m1(x)m2(x), . . . , m1(x) · . . . ·mc(x)
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k m k m k m k m k m k m
167 6 241 70 353 173 199 67 337 57 433 33
167 35 257 12 359 68 223 33 337 135 433 61
167 59 257 41 359 117 223 34 337 139 433 118
167 77 257 48 367 21 223 64 337 147 433 153
167 149 257 51 367 171 223 70 353 69 439 49
191 9 263 93 383 90 223 91 353 95 439 133
191 18 271 58 383 108 233 74 353 138 439 145
191 51 271 70 383 135 239 36 353 143 439 156
191 71 281 93 401 152 239 81 353 153 439 171
193 15 281 99 401 170 239 81 353 153 439 171
193 73 313 79 409 87 239 81 353 153 439 171
193 85 313 121 431 120 239 81 353 153 439 171
199 34 337 55 431 200
Table 5.2: Irreducible trinomials f(x) = xk + xm + 1 over GF (2), where m < k/2,
k ∈ [160..450], suitable to use in Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
with at most
2
∑
2≤i≤c
(d1 + d2 + . . .+ di−1 + 1) (di + 1) = 2
∑
1≤j<i≤c
dj (di + 1) + 2
∑
2≤i≤c
(di + 1)
< 2
∑
1≤i,j≤c
dj (di + 1)
= 2
(∑
1≤j≤c
dj
)(∑
1≤i≤c
(di + 1)
)
= 2l(l + c) ∈ O(l2).
In step 2 we compute m′(x)/mi(x), 1 ≤ i ≤ c, where each division takes at most
(di + 1) (l − di + 1) operations, therefore∑
1≤i≤c
(2di + 1) (l − di + 1) ≤ 2n
∑
1≤i≤c
(di + 1) = 2l (l + c) ∈ O(l2).
In step 2 we fix i = 1, . . . , c. Then, the Extended Euclidean Algorithm with inputs
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Algorithm 5 Chinese Remainder Algorithm.
Inputs: m1(x), . . . , mc(x) ∈ GF (2)[x], ri(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mi(x) >, 1 ≤ i ≤ c.
Outputs: r′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) > where r(x) ≡ ri(x)(modmi(x)), 1 ≤ i ≤ c.
1. m′(x)← m1(x) · . . . ·mc(x)
2. for 1 ≤ i ≤ c do
3. compute m′(x)/mi(x)
4. call the Extended Euclid Algorithm to compute si(x), ti(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] with
5. si(x)
m′(x)
mi(x)
+ ti(x)mi(x) = 1, vi ← ri(x)si(x) mod mi(x)
6. return
∑
1≤i≤c vi
m′(x)
mi(x)
m′(x)/m(x) takes O(di(l − di)) operations. Since deg (si(x)) < deg (mi(x)) = di, then
to compute vi(x)si(x) (modmi(x)) it takes O(d
2
i ) operations. Therefore, there is O(ldi)
operations for each i, and O(l2) for step 2. In step 3, vi(x) (m
′(x)/mi(x)), i = 1, . . . , c
takes O(di(l − di)) operations, and O(cl) additions of all products. Therefore, the total
cost is O(l2).
5.1.3 Error correction and detection
Assume that there is one processor per independent channel as in Fig. 5.1. Let us assume
that we have c processors, where each processor computes the i -th polynomial residue and
i -th residue operations. Also, we assume that Chinese Remainder Algorithm (CRA) at
the end of the computation is error free. We assume that a fault attack induces faults into
processors by some physical means. As a reaction, the attacked processor malfunctions,
and it does not compute the correct output given its input. We are concerned with the
effect of a fault as it manifests itself in a modified data, or a modified program execution.
Therefore, we consider the fault models presented in Chapter 3. Since computation is
decomposed into parallel, mutually independent, modular channels, the adversary can use
either RFM, or AFM, or SFM per channel. Assume that at most c−v channels have faults.
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Figure 5.1: Fault tolerant computation over the finite field GF (2k).
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Let r′ ∈ R′′ be computed vector with c components, where ej(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mj(x) >
is the error polynomial at j -th position; then the computed component at the j-th
positions is bj = (r(x) + ej(x))(modmj(x)), and each processor will have as an output
component
bj =
 (r(x) + ej(x))(mod mj(x)), j ∈ {j1, . . . , jλ},r(x)modmj(x), else.
Here, we have assumed that the set of error positions are {j1, . . . , jλ}. By CRT the
computed vector r′ ∈ R′′ with corresponding set of c moduli gives as a output polynomial
r′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) >,
r′(x) ≡
(∑
1≤i≤c
ri(x)Ti(x)Mi(x)
)
(modm′(x))
=
(∑
1≤i≤c
ri(x)Ti(x)Mi(x) +
∑
1≤i≤λ
eji(x)Tji(x)Mji(x)
)
(modm′(x))
= (r(x) + e(x)) (modm′(x)) , (5.4)
whereMi(x) =
m′(x)
mi(x)
, Ti(x) is computed by solving congruences Ti(x)Mi(x) ≡ 1modmi(x),
and Mji(x) =
m′(x)
mji (x)
, while Tji(x) is computed by solving congruences Tji(x)Mji(x) ≡
1modmji(x). Polynomial r(x) (modm
′(x)) in (5.4) is correct expected polynomial of de-
gree ≤ n and e(x) (modm′(x)) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) > is the error polynomial such
that:
Theorem 5.1.2. Let eji(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mji(x) > be error polynomial at positions ji,
i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, λ ≤ c− v then deg(e(x)) > n.
Proof. We have that
e(x) =
(∑
1≤i≤λ
eji(x)Tji(x)Mji(x)
)
(modm′(x))
= ej1(x)Tj1(x)Mj1(x) + . . .+ ejλ(x)Tjλ(x)Mjλ(x)
=
m′(x)
mj1(x) · . . . ·mjλ(x)
λ∑
i=1
mj1(x) · . . . ·mjλ(x)
mji(x)
Tji(x)eji(x). (5.5)
Since,
deg
(
λ∑
i=1
∏λ
l=1mjl
mji(x)
Tji(x)eji(x)
)
< deg
(
m′(x)∏λ
l=1mjl(x)
)
,
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and by (5.3), deg
(
m′(x)∏λ
l=1mjl
)
> n, we have that deg(e(x)) > n.
Therefore, faulty processors affect the result in an additive manner.
Definition 5.1.3. The set of correct results of computation, where n is expected degree
of output polynomial of the computation without modulo f(x) reduction is
C = {r′ (x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) > | deg (r′ (x)) ≤ n} .
Lemma 5.1.4. The error is masked iff deg(e(x)) ≤ n.
Proof. Let deg(e(x)) ≤ n in (5.4), then deg(r′(x)) ≤ n, i.e., r′(x)(mod f(x)) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) >.
Lemma 5.1.5. Let the expected degree of output polynomial without reduction modulo
f(x) be n, and let c > v be the number of parallel independent, modular channels (or
number of processors). Then if up to c−v channels fail, the output polynomial r ′(x) 6∈ C.
Proof. By referring to (5.4), since if deg(e(x)) > n, the output polynomial r′(x) has to
be such that deg(r′(x)) > n. Since, expected degree of the output polynomial of the field
computation is n we have that r′(x) 6∈ C.
Lemma 5.1.6. Let the expected degree of the output polynomial without reduction modulo
f(x) be n, and let c > v be number of parallel, independent, modular channels (or num-
ber of processors). If there is no faulty processors then r ′(x)(mod f(x)) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) >.
Proof. If there are no faulty processors, then clearly no errors occurred, and deg(r ′(x)) ≤
n, so that r′(x) = r(x), r′(x) ∈ C. Therefore, r′(x)(mod f(x)) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >.
It is straightforward to appeal to the standard coding theory result below, to state the
error detection and correction capability of our set up:
Theorem 5.1.7. (i) If the number of parallel, mutually independent, modular, redundant
channels is d + t ≤ c− v (d ≥ t), then up to t faulty processors can be corrected, and up
to d simultaneously detected. (ii) By adding 2t parallel, redundant, independent modular
channels at most t faulty processors can be corrected.
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Proof. To prove this we will use the fact that channels can be discarded if the suitable
dynamic range is retained without affecting result. Assume that the expected degree of
output polynomial is n without modulo f(x) reduction, with coefficients from finite field
GF (2). There are v non-redundant channels. By adding one extra redundant, parallel,
independent, modular channel, we can detect one faulty processor, since by CTR output
vector will be of degree > n. By adding one more parallel, independent, modular channel,
this faulty processor can be corrected, or up to two faulty processors can be detected. By
removing one channel out of v + 2 channels, there are still v + 1 channels to detect the
fault. If the removed channel was one that is not faulty, then faulty channel is present
in the remaining v + 1 channels, and by CRT, the output polynomial is of degree > n.
Since the expected degree is n, the error is detected. If the removed channel is one that
is faulty, then the remaining v+ 1 channels define correct output polynomial of degree n,
unless the error is masked. Similarly, if we add 4 redundant channels than it is possible
to detect up to 4 faults, or detect up to two and correct up to two faults. In general,
by adding d + t, d ≥ t channels if we remove t correct channels than since d ≥ t, there
is the capability to detect up to d errors. In general, by adding 2t redundant, parallel,
independent, modular channels at most t faulty processors can be corrected.
5.1.4 Decoding based on the Euclid Algorithm
Let
s−1(x) = 1, t−1(x) = 0, d−1(x) = m′(x),
s0(x) = 0, t0(x) = 1, d0(x) = r
′(x),
and let
sn(x)m
′(x) + tn(x)r′(x) = dn(x)
be consecutive steps in Euclidean algorithm for calculating gcd(m′(x), r′(x)) where m′(x) is
given by (5.2), and r′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) > is output polynomial of the computation.
Also, let ji, i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, λ ≤ c− v be positions of error polynomial e(x), and let
m+(x) =
λ∏
i=1
mji(x),
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ν =
v∑
i=1
deg (mi (x)) +
λ∑
i=1
deg (mji (x))− 1,
u =
λ∑
i=1
deg (mji (x)) ,
then it follows:
Lemma 5.1.8 ([86]). If ν ≥ deg (gcd(m′(x), r′(x))), u + ν = deg (m′(x))− 1, then there
is a unique index j in the algorithm such that deg (tj) ≤ u, deg (dj) ≤ ν.
Theorem 5.1.9 ([86]). If t(x), d(x) are nonzero and t(x)r′(x) ≡ d(x)modm′(x), deg (t(x))+
deg (d(x)) < deg (m′(x)), then there is a unique index j and a polynomial ζ such that
t(x) = ζ(x)tj(x), d(x) = ζ(x)dj(x).
By (5.4) and (5.5) we have
r′(x) = r(x) +
m′(x)
m+(x)
λ∑
i=1
m+(x)
mji(x)
Tji(x)eji(x), i.e.,
r′(x)m+(x)−m′(x)
λ∑
i=1
m+(x)
mji(x)
Tji(x)eji(x) = r(x)m
+(x). (5.6)
Using (5.6) we apply Theorem 5.1.9 with t(x) = m+(x), and d(x) = r(x)m+(x), then
correct output residue is
r(x) =
r(x)m+(x)
m+(x)
=
d(x)
t(x)
=
dj(x)
tj(x)
,
where j is the first index for which
deg (dj(x)) <
v∑
i=1
deg (mi (x)) +
λ∑
i=1
deg(mji (x)).
If deg (dj (x))−deg (tj (x)) ≥
∑v
i=1 deg (mi (x)), or tj (x) - dj (x), then more then λ errors
occurred.
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Algorithm 6 Euclid’s Decoding Algorithm
Input: output vector of computation r′ = (r1(x), r2(x), . . . , rc(x)) ∈ R′′.
Output: r(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >.
1. By CRT algorithm compute r′(x)
2. if deg(r′(x)) ≤ n then
3. r(x) = r′(x), r(x)mod f(x)
4. else
5. t−1(x) = 0, t0(x) = 1, d−1(x) = m′(x), d0(x) = r′(x)
6. j = 1
7. while deg(dj(x)) >
∑v
i=1 deg (mi (x)) +
∑λ
i=1 deg(mji (x)) do
8. dj−2(x) = qj(x)dj−1(x) + dj(x) ; deg(dj(x)) < deg(dj−1(x))
9. tj(x) = tj−2(x)− qj(x)tj−1(x)
10. j = j + 1
11. return r(x) =
dj(x)
tj (x)
, r(x)mod f(x)
Example 5.1.10. Assume that we want to protect computation in GF (23) ∼= GF (2)[x]/ <
x3 + x + 1 >. Let the inputs to the computation be the following finite field elements:
a(x) = x+1, b(x) = x2+1. We want to compute following expression (a(x)b(x))mod f(x).
Let R[x] = GF (2)[x]/ < m(x) >, where
m(x) = x11 + x8 + x6 + x4 + x2
=
(
x2 + x + 1
)
x2
(
x3 + x2 + 1
) (
x4 + x + 1
)
= m1(x)m2(x)m3(x)m4(x).
Now, v = 2, c − v = 2 and error correction capability is t = 1. Therefore, computation
will happen with encoded field elements in the following direct product ring:
GF (2)[x]/ < m1(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < m4(x) >,
where
a(x)↔ a = (x + 1, x+ 1, x+ 1, x+ 1)
b(x)↔ b = (x, 1, x2 + 1, x2 + 1) , so that
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a b = (1, x+ 1, x, x3 + x2 + x + 1) , (5.7)
where  is componentwise multiplication.
By applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem on (5.7), it follows x3 + x2 + x+ 1 ∈ R[x].
Now, assume that an adversary induces faults into point P ∈ E/GF (23) by inducing faults
into one of 4 processors, by some physical set up, causing attacked processor to be faulty,
such that erroneous output of the computation is
a b = (1, x, x, x3 + x2 + x+ 1) , (5.8)
so that by applying CRT on (5.8) it follows that:
r′(x) = x9 + x6 + x4 + x3 + x.
From the extended Euclidian algorithm for calculating gcd (r ′(x), m(x)) we have d(x) =
x5 + x4 + x3 + x2, and s(x) = x3 + x2 + 1. Therefore r(x) = d(x)/t(x) = x3 + x2 + x+ 1,
i.e., r(x)(mod f(x)) = x2 ∈ GF (2k).
5.2 Lagrange Interpolation (LI) based Fault-Tolerant
Computation
In this section we provide LI based FTC. This approach is based on the use of the
first original approach of Reed-Solomon codes. Reed-Solomon codes are very effective in
correcting random symbol errors, and random burst errors, and they are widely used
for error control in communication and data storage systems, ranging from deep-space
telecommunications to compact discs. Suppose that we have a block of k information
symbols m0, m1, . . . , mk−1 ∈ GF (q). These symbols can be used to construct a polynomial
P (x) = m0 +m1x+ . . .+mk−1xk−1. A Reed-Solomon codeword c is formed by evaluating
P (x) at each of the q elements in the finite field GF (q), i.e.,
c = (c0, c1, . . . , cq−1) =
(
P (0), P (α), . . . , P (αq−1)
)
.
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Upon receiving message (P (0), P (α), . . . , P (αq−1)) decoding can be done by solving si-
multaneously any k of q equations,
P (0) = a0
P (α) = a0 + a1α + a2α
2 + . . .+ ak−1αk−1
P (α2) = a0 + a1α
2 + a2α
4 + . . .+ ak−1α
2k−2
...
P (1) = a0 + a1 + a2 + . . .+ ak−1.
Now, we will present application of the Reed-Solomon code to fault tolerant computation
in the finite binary extension field.
5.2.1 Lagrange Interpolation Finite Field Encoding
Recall that we want to protect computation of the finite binary extension field GF (2k),
which can be represented as the set of polynomials modulo an irreducible polynomial
f(x), deg(f(x)) = k, i.e.,
GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >= {a0 + . . .+ ak−1xk−1 | ai ∈ GF (2)},
where the element
a0 + a1x + . . .+ ak−1x
k−1 ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >
can also be considered as a vector
(a0, a1, . . . , ak−1) ∈ GF (2)k, ai ∈ GF (2).
Also, let the polynomial f(x) be primitive with f(α) = 0. Then
GF (2k) = {0, 1, α, α2, . . . , α2k−2}.
The inputs to the computation are elements from the binary extension field GF (2k) rep-
resented as a polynomials of degree ≤ k − 1 whose coefficients are from GF (2).
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Clearly, polynomials can be represented by their coefficients, or by their values at suffi-
ciently many points.
The input polynomials gi(x) from the finite field GF (2)[x] < f(x) > are evaluated at the
minimum required number of distinct elements from the set T = {αj |αj ∈ GF (2k)} such
that there are enough values to represent the polynomial resulting from the computation.
Evaluating input polynomials gi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] < f(x) > at distinct elements αj ∈ T is
same as taking remainder modulo x− αj.
Let n be the expected degree of the output, which is not reduced modulo irreducible
polynomial f(x). Then, there exist mapping φ
φ : GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > 7→ GF (2k)[x]/ < x− α0 > × . . .×GF (2k)[x]/ < x− αn >,
such that each input polynomial gi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > is evaluated at n+1 distinct
elements from the set T = {αj |αj ∈ GF (2k)}, i.e.,
gi(x)↔ (gi(α0), gi(α1), . . . , gi(αn)) , (5.9)
where gi(αj) ∈ GF (2k) (or equivalently gi(αj) ∈ GF (2)k) are evaluations of the in-
put polynomials gi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > at distinct elements from the set T .
Equivalently, gi (αj) is remainder of gi(x) on division by linear polynomial (x− αj), i.e.,
gi(x) ≡ gi (αj)mod (x− αj).
Computation in the Larger Ring
The computation of the finite field GF (2k) will be performed with encoded operands (as
in (5.9)) in the direct product ring:
R = GF (2k)[x]/ < x− α0 > × . . .×GF (2k)[x]/ < x− αn >∼= GF (2k)n+1, (5.10)
while preserving arithmetic structure.
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Also, we have that
R ∼= GF (2k)[x]/ < m(x) >, (5.11)
where
m(x) =
n∏
i=0
(x− αi),
such that deg (m (x)) = 1 + max {deg (g(x) ∗ h(x))}, where g(x), h(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) > are input polynomials.
Operations in the ring R are componentwise addition ⊕, i.e., for components ci, bi ∈
GF (2k) we have
(c0, c1, . . . , cn)⊕ (b0, b1, . . . , bn) = (c0 + b0, c1 + b1, . . . , cn + bn),
and componentwise multiplication , i.e., for components ci, bi ∈ GF (2k) we have
(c0, c1, . . . , cn) (b0, b1, . . . , bn) = (c0b0, c1b1, . . . , cnbn),
where ci + bi, cibi ∈ GF (2k).
Thus, the computation is decomposed into n + 1 parallel, independent channels that are
identical, such that computations in the each channel are mutually independent and hap-
pen over the same finite field GF (2k).
In general, let ∗ represent any of the two operations of the finite field GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) >, i.e., (addition, or multiplication), and  represent any of the two operations
of the polynomial ring R, i.e., (componentwise addition, or componentwise multiplica-
tion). Given input polynomials g(x), h(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > we want to compute
(g(x) ∗ h(x)) (mod f(x)), where max {deg (g ∗ h)} = n. Computation is performed with
encoded field elements in the ring R. Let r(x) = g(x) ∗ h(x) without the modulo f(x)
reduction. Then
r = (g(α0), g(α1), . . . , g(αn))  (h(α0), h(α1), . . . , h(αn))
= (g(α0)  h(α0), g(α1)  h(α1), . . . , g(αn)  h(αn))
= (r(α0), r(α1), . . . , r(αn)), (5.12)
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where g(αi), h(αi) are polynomial evaluations of polynomials g(x), h(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) > at n+ 1 distinct elements of GF (2k).
The following is well known:
Proposition 5.2.1. (Lagrange Interpolation Formula [59]). For n ≥ 0, let a0, . . . , an be
n+1 distinct elements of F , and let b0, . . . , bn be n+1 arbitrary elements of F . Then there
exist exactly one polynomial f ∈ F [x] of degree ≤ n such that f(ai) = bi for i = 0, . . . , n.
This polynomial is given by
f(x) =
n∑
i=0
bi
n∏
k=0
k 6=i
(ai − ak)−1(x− ak).
By Proposition 5.2.1, interpolating n + 1 output components r(αj) ∈ GF (2k) at distinct
elements αj ∈ GF (2k) will determine a unique polynomial r(x) ∈ GF (2k)[x]/ < m(x) > of
degree n. If the coefficients ai of the polynomial r(x) lie in GF (2), then r(x)(mod f(x)) ∈
GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >.
5.2.2 Fault-Tolerant Computation
To protect computation in the finite field we add redundancy by adding more parallel
channels than the minimum required to represent the output polynomial of a certain
expected degree, i.e., see Figure 5.2. Thus, input polynomials are evaluated at additional
distinct elements, with the constraint that elements αj ∈ GF (2k) at which polynomials
are evaluated are all distinct elements. Let n be expected degree of the output polynomial
without modulo f(x) reduction, then by Proposition 5.2.1, the minimum required number
of non-redundant polynomial evaluations is n + 1. We add c − n − 1 extra redundant
polynomial evaluations, c > n+1, so that computation now takes place in the even larger
direct product ring
R′ = GF (2k)[x]/ < x− α0 > × . . .×GF (2k)[x]/ < x− αc−1 >∼= GF (2k)c.
Also, we have that
R′ ∼= GF (2k)[x]/ < m′(x) >,
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Figure 5.2: Fault tolerant computation of the finite field GF (2k) in the ring R′.
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where
m′(x) =
c−1∏
i=0
(x− αi),
and deg(m′(x)) = c, c > n + 1.
Let n be the expected degree of the output, which is not reduced modulo irreducible
polynomial f(x). Then each input polynomial gi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > is evaluated
at c, c > n+ 1 distinct elements from the set T = {αj |αj ∈ GF (2k)}, i.e.,
gi(x)→ (gi(α0), gi(α1), . . . , gi(αn), gi(αn+1), gi(αn+2), . . . , gi(αc−1)) ∈ R′,
where gi(α0), gi(α1), . . . , gi(αn) are non-redundant components of i-th input polynomial,
and gi(αn+1), gi(αn+2), . . . , gi(αc−1) are redundant components of i-th input polynomial.
Now, let r′ ∈ R′ be an output vector of computation which is in the form
r′ = (r(α0), r(α1), . . . , r(αn), r(αn+1), r(αn+2), . . . , r(αc−1)) . (5.13)
By Proposition 5.2.1, if there is no fault effect, c output components r(αj) ∈ GF (2k) at
distinct elements αj ∈ GF (2k) will determine a unique polynomial r′(x) ∈ GF (2k)[x]/ <
m′(x) > of degree n with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2), otherwise, deg(r′(x)) > n with coeffi-
cients ai ∈ GF (2k).
Therefore, it follows that:
Definition 5.2.2. The set of correct results of computation, where n is expected degree
of output polynomial of the computation without modulo f(x) reduction, is
C =
{
r′ (x) ∈ GF (2k) [x] / < m′(x) > | deg (r′ (x)) < n+ 1, ai ∈ GF (2)} .
5.2.3 Complexity of Interpolation and Evaluation
Remark 5.2.3. Input polynomials are only evaluated at the beginning, while interpolation
performed at on the end of the computation. Only if there is no errors we do modulo f(x)
reduction of the interpolated polynomial.
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Lemma 5.2.4. Computational complexity of evaluating input polynomials gi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) > at c > n + 1 distinct elements from set T , where n is expected degree of the out-
put polynomial without modulo f(x) is O (ck), since the required number of operations in
GF (2k) is 2c (k − 1).
Proof. Let gi(x) =
∑k−1
i=0 aix
i ∈ GF (2k), then by Horner’s rule
gi(x) = (. . . (ak−1x+ ak−2) x+ . . .+ a1)x + a0
it can be evaluated at a single point αi ∈ T by k − 1 addition and k − 1 multiplications.
Therefore, evaluating gi(x) at c > n+ 1 distinct elements from T it will require 2c(k− 1)
operations in GF (2k). So computation complexity of input polynomial evaluation is
O(ck).
Lemma 5.2.5. Computational complexity of interpolating output vector r ′ ∈ R′ is O (c2),
c > n+ 1.
Proof. Proof is as in [35]. Therefore, let mi = x − αi, 0 ≤ i ≤ c, αi ∈ T . First it is
computed m0m1, m0m1m2, . . . , m
′ = m0m1 · . . . ·mc−1. This takes∑
1≤i<c
(2i− 1) = c2 − 2c+ 1
arithmetic operations. For 0 ≤ i ≤ c − 1 we divide m′ by mi, taking 2c − 2 operations.
Evaluation of m′/mi at αi takes at most 2c − 4 operations, then m′/mi is divided by
that value in order to obtain li =
∏
0≤j<c
j 6=i
x−αj
αi−αj , αi, αj ∈ GF (2k). This adds to 4c2 − 5c
operations for 0 ≤ i ≤ c− 1. Computing linear combination ∑0≤i≤c f(αi)li takes 2c2 − c
operations. Therefore, computational complexity of interpolating output vector r ′ ∈ R′
is O (c2), c > n+ 1.
Theorem 5.2.6. Total computational complexity of evaluating input polynomials gi(x) ∈
GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > at the beginning of computation, and interpolation of the result of
the computation at the end of computation is O(c2).
Proof. Since the computational complexity of evaluating inputs gi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) > is O(ck), where k < c, ck < c2 and complexity of interpolating result vector is
O(c2), then total complexity is O(c2).
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5.2.4 Error Detection and Correction
Assume that there is one processor per independent channel, i.e., see Figure 5.2. Let
us assume that we have c processors, where each processor computes i -th polynomial
evaluation and operations of the finite field GF (2k). Also, we assume that Lagrange in-
terpolation at the end of the computation is error free. We assume that a fault attack
induces faults into processors by some physical means. As a reaction, the attacked pro-
cessor malfunctions, and it does not compute the correct output given its input. We are
concerned with the effect of a fault as it manifests itself in a modified data, or a modified
program execution. Therefore, we consider the fault models presented in Chapter 3. Since
computation is decomposed into parallel, mutually independent, identical channels, the
adversary can use either RFM, or AFM, or SFM per channel.
Assume that at most c− n− 1 channels have faults. Let r′ ∈ R′ be computed vector
with c components, where ej ∈ GF (2k) is the error at j -th position; then the computed
component at the j-th positions is
rj = r(αj) + ej, (5.14)
and each processor will have as an output component
rj =
 r(αj) + ej, j ∈ {j1, . . . , jt},r(αj), else.
Here, we have assumed that the set of error positions are {j1, . . . , jt}, i.e., ej is the effect
of the fault in the channel ji.
By Proposition 5.2.1, the computed vector r′ ∈ R′ with corresponding set of c distinct
elements αj ∈ GF (2k) gives as a output unique polynomial r′(x) ∈ GF (2k)[x]/ < m′(x) >,
r′(x) =
∑
0≤i≤c−1
ri
∏
0≤j≤c−1
i6=j
x− αj
αi − αj
= r(x) +
∑
1≤l≤t
ejl
∏
0≤i≤c−1
jl 6=i
x− αi
αjl − αi
= r(x) + e(x), (5.15)
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where r(x) is correct expected polynomial of degree ≤ n with coefficients from the ground
field GF (2), and e(x) is the error polynomial such that
Theorem 5.2.7. Let effects of the fault ej1 6= 0, . . . , ejt 6= 0 be any set of 1 ≤ t ≤ c−n−1
elements of GF (2k), c > n + 1, then deg(e(x)) > n whose coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k).
Proof. We have that
e(x) =
∑
1≤l≤t
ejl
∏
0≤i≤c−1
jl 6=i
x− αi
αjl − αi
=
∏
0≤i≤c−1
(x− αi)
 ej1
(x− αj1)
∏
0≤i≤c−1
j1 6=i
(αj1 − αi)
+ . . .
. . .+
ejt
(x− αjt)
∏
0≤i≤c−1
jt 6=i
(αjt − αi)
 .
Since, deg
(∏
0≤i≤c−1(x−αi)
(x−αj1)
)
= c − 1, . . . , deg
(∏
0≤i≤c−1(x−αi)
(x−αjt)
)
= c − 1, c > n + 1, then
deg (e(x)) = c− 1 > n with coefficients ejk
(x−αj1)
∏
0≤i≤c−1
jk 6=i
(αjk−αi)
∈ GF (2k).
Therefore, faulty processors affect the result in an additive manner.
Theorem 5.2.8. The error is masked iff error polynomial e(x) has coefficients from
GF (2), and if deg(e(x)) ≤ n.
Proof. Let n be expected degree of the output polynomial without modulo f(x) reduction,
and let r′(x) be computed polynomial as in (5.15). Since, deg(r(x)) ≤ n with coefficients
ai ∈ GF (2), then if deg(e(x)) ≤ n with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2) we have that deg(r′(x)) ≤
n with ai ∈ GF (2) in which case error is masked.
Theorem 5.2.9. Let the expected degree of output polynomial be n without modulo f(x)
reduction, and let c > n + 1 be the number of parallel, independent channels (or number
of processors). Then if up to c− n− 1 channels fail, the output polynomial r ′(x) is such
that deg(r′(x)) > n with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k), i.e., r′(x) 6∈ C.
Proof. By referring to (5.15), since deg(e(x)) > n with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k), and
deg(r(x)) = n with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2), the output polynomial r′(x) has to be such
that deg(r′(x)) > n, and ai ∈ GF (2k). Therefore, r′(x) 6∈ C.
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Theorem 5.2.10. Let the expected degree of the output polynomial be n without modulo
f(x) reduction, and let c > n+ 1 be number of parallel, independent channels (or number
of processors). If there is no faulty processors then there are no errors and deg(r ′(x)) ≤ n
and coefficients ai ∈ GF (2), i.e., r′(x) ∈ C. Therefore, r′(x) (mod f(x)) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) >.
Proof. If there are no faulty processors, then clearly no errors occurred, and deg(r ′(x)) ≤
n with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2), so that r′(x) = r(x). Therefore r′(x) ∈ C implies
r′(x) (mod f(x)) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >.
It is straightforward to appeal to the standard coding theory result below, to state the
error detection and correction capability of our set up:
Theorem 5.2.11. If the number of parallel, mutually independent, identical redundant
channels is d+ t ≤ c− n− 1 (d ≥ t), then up to t faulty processors can be corrected, and
up to d simultaneously detected.
Proof. To prove this we will use the fact that channels can be discarded if the suitable
dynamic range is retained without affecting result. Assume that the expected degree
of output polynomial is n without modulo f(x) reduction, with coefficients from finite
field GF (2). There are n + 1 non-redundant channels. By adding one extra redundant
parallel independent channel, we can detect one faulty processor, since by interpolating
corresponding output vector of the computation the highest order coefficient of the output
polynomial will be non-zero. By adding one more parallel independent channels, this
faulty processor can be corrected, or up to two faulty processors can be detected. By
removing one channel out of n + 3 channels, there are still n + 2 channels to detect the
fault. If the removed channel was one that is not faulty, then one that is faulty is present in
the remaining n+2 channels, and by Proposition 5.2.1, the output polynomial is of degree
> n with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k). Since the expected degree is n, the error is detected. If
the removed channel is one that is faulty, then the remaining n+2 channels (by Proposition
5.2.1) define correct output polynomial of degree n with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2), unless
the error is masked. Similarly, if we add 4 redundant channels than it is possible to detect
up to 4 faults, or detect up to two and correct up to two faults. In general, by adding d+t,
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d ≥ t channels if we remove t correct channels than since d ≥ t, there is the capability to
detect up to d errors.
Similarly we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2.12. By adding 2t redundant independent channels at most t faulty proces-
sors can be corrected.
Proof. The proof follows from the proof of the Theorem 5.2.11.
While it is true that arbitrarily powerful adversaries can simply create faults in enough
channels and overwhelm the system proposed here, it is part of the design process to decide
on how much security is enough, since all security (i.e. extra channels) has a cost.
5.2.5 Decoding of the Output
The original approach of decoding Reed-Solomon codes can be applied to our case. If t
processors out of c are faulty, we can enumerate all combinations of n+1 equations, each
combination solve and keep counter for each solution, so that the largest number of votes
identifies correct solution. Since, this way of decoding is inefficient, the Welch-Berlekamp
decoding algorithm [95] can be used instead. For completness’ sake, we discuss the algo-
rithm below and provide detailed proofs:
Let output vector r′ ∈ R′ of computation be as in (5.13). We choose a set of n + 1
indices K = {0, 1, . . . , n}, and K = {0, . . . , c − 1} \ K. By Lagrange Interpolation we
determine polynomial
r′(x) =
∑
j∈K
rj
∏
i∈K,
i6=j
x− αj
αi − αj , (5.16)
where deg(r′(x)) ≤ n, j ∈ K.
If the output component rj ∈ GF (2k) includes an error, then output polynomial is as in
(5.15). Let component rl be as in (5.14), and
ψj(x) =
∏
i∈K
i6=j
x− αj
αi − αj ,
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then by evaluating (5.16) at αl ∈ GF (2k) we have
r′(αl) =
∑
j∈K
r(αj)ψj(αl) +
∑
j∈K
ejψj(αl).
Subtracting the interpolated values from the received values we have
rl − r′(αl) = r(αl) + el −
∑
j∈K
r(αj)ψj(αl)−
∑
j∈K
ejψj(αl).
Since deg(r(x)) ≤ n then the syndromes are
Sl = rl − r′(αl) = el −
∑
j∈K
ejψj(αl), for l ∈ K. (5.17)
Lets define a polynomial g(x) as
g(x) =
∏
j∈K
(x− αj), (5.18)
where its formal derivative is g′(x) such that
ψj(x) =
g(x)
(x− αj)g′(αj) .
Then the syndromes Sl can be expressed as
Sl = el −
∑
j∈K
ej
g(αj)
(αl − αj)g′(αj) ,
or
Sl
g(αl)
=
el
g(αl)
−
∑
j∈S
el
g′(αj)
1
(αl − αj) . (5.19)
For l ∈ K we let
yl =
Sl
g(αl)
. (5.20)
Now, let H be set of indices for which ei 6= 0, and define
dK(x) =
∏
i∈H⋂K(x− αi),
whose roots are those αi for which i ∈ K, and ei 6= 0, and
dK(x) =
∏
i∈H⋂K
(x− αi),
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whose roots are those αi for which i ∈ K, and ei 6= 0.
By writing equation (5.19) as
yl =
el
g(αl)
− v(αl)
dK(αl)
, (5.21)
and multiplying it by d(αl) = dK(αl)dK(αl), where for l ∈ K, either el = 0, or dK(αl) = 0,
we have the Welch-Berlekamp key equation
d(αl)yl = r
′(αl). (5.22)
By rewriting (5.22) in the form
yl =
r′(αl)
d(αl)
, (5.23)
and using rational interpolation we can obtain rational function r
′(x)
d(x)
, whose computation
complexity is O (c2), where
∣∣K∣∣ = c− n− 1.
The above discussion demonstrates the correctness of the algorithm below:
Algorithm 7 Welch-Berlekamp Decoding of the Output Vector.
Inputs: output vector of computation r′ = (r0, . . . , rn, rn+1, . . . , rc−1), set of c distinct
points T = {αj |αj ∈ GF (2k)}, set of indices K = {0, 1, . . . , n}, K = {0, . . . , c− 1} \K,
polynomial g(x) =
∏
i∈K (x− xi).
Outputs: polynomials d(x), r′(x).
1. By Lagrange interpolation, interpolate output vector r′ in order to get polynomial r′(x)
2. if deg(r′(x)) ≤ n and ai ∈ GF (2) then r′(x)
3. else
4. for i ∈ K do find r′(x), where deg(r′) ≤ n
5. evaluate r′(x), at αl, l ∈ K, |K| = c− n− 1
6. determine syndromes Sl = rl − r′(xl), l ∈ K
7. determine yl =
Sl
g(xl)
8. solve key equation d(xl)yl = r
′(xl)
9. return d(x), r′(x).
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The the error locations α0, . . . , αt−1 are the roots of the polynomial d(x), while the
error values are obtained from the following relation:
r′(x)g(x) = S(x)d(x),
such that
ei = Si − S(αi), i ∈ {0, . . . , t− 1}.
Example 5.2.13. Assume that we want to protect computation in the finite binary field
GF (23) ∼= GF (2)[x]/ < x3 +x+1 >, where α is primitive root of the primitive polynomial
x3 + x+ 1, i.e., α3 + α + 1 = 0.
Let the inputs to the computation be the following finite field elements in the polynomial
representation h1(x), g1(x), h2(x), g2(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < x3 + x + 1 > where
h1(x) = x+ 1, g1(x) = x
2 + 1,
h2(x) = x
2, g2(x) = x
2 + 1.
Assume that we want to compute following expression
[(h1 (x) g1 (x)) + (h2 (x) g2 (x))] (mod f(x)). (5.24)
Since, the maximum possible degree of expression (5.24) is 4, the minimum number of
polynomial evaluations is 5. Also we want to correct single errors, so we add c−n−1 = 2
extra channels. Therefore, we chose following set T of distinct points
T = {0, 1, α, α2, α3, α4, α5}
= {α0, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6},
where new encoded computation will happen in the ring R′ = GF (23)[x]/ <
∏6
i=0(x −
αi) >. Componentwise addition ⊕ and componentwise multiplication  are operations in
the ring R′.
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At elements of the set T we evaluate input finite field elements in the polynomial
representation h1(x), g1(x), h2(x), g2(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < x3 + x + 1 >. Therefore, we have
h1(x) at T is u1 = (1, 0, α
3, α6, α, α5, α4),
g1(x) at T is u2 = (1, 0, α
6, α5, α2, α3, α),
h2(x) at T is v1 = (0, 1, α
2, α4, α6, α, α3),
g2(x) at T is v2 = (1, 0, α
6, α5, α2, α3, α),
such that
(h1(x) g1(x))⊕ (h2(x) g2(x)) =
(
1, 0, α4, α, 1, α2, 1
)
.
Assume that an adversary induces faults into point P/GF (23) by inducing faults into one
of 7 processors by some physical set up, causing attacked processor to be faulty, such that
erroneous output of computation is
r′ =
(
1, 0, α4, α2, 1, α2, 1
)
.
Now, we select set of n + 1 = 5 indices K = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and we determine polynomial
r′ (x) whose degree is at most 4.
Therefore, the by interpolating vector
r′ =
(
1, 0, α4, α2, 1
)
at
(
0, 1, α, α2, α3
)
we get
r′ (x) = α3x4 + x3 + α6x2 + α4x + 1.
Given index selection K we evaluate r′(x) at α5 = α4, α6 = α5, i.e., r′(α4) = α, r′(α5) =
α5, such that
S = r′ − (1, 0, α4, α2, 1, α, α5) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, α4, α4) .
Therefore, syndromes are S5 = α
4, S6 = α
4.
Let now define polynomial
g (x) = x (x− 1) (x− α) (x− α2) (x− α3) .
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New interpolated data is given by α5 = α
4, α6 = α
5, and
y5 =
S5
g(α5)
= 1, and y6 =
S6
g(α6)
= α5.
The problem is to determine polynomials d(x), r′(x) from
d (x5) y5 = r
′ (x5)
d (x6) y6 = r
′ (x6) .
By rational interpolation at points (1, α4) , (α5, α5) we obtain that d(x) = α (α2 + x) and
r′ (x) = α9.
Therefore, error locations are the roots of the polynomial d(x), i.e., α3 = α
2, while error
values are obtained by
S (x) =
r′ (x) g (x)
d (x)
= αx4 + α6x2 + α5x,
such that e3 = S3 − S (α2) = α4, so that r3− e3 = α. Therefore, the correct output vector
of computation is
r′ =
(
1, 0, α4, α, 1, α2, 1
)
.
By interpolating r′ we have r′(x) = x4 + x3 + x+ 1, i.e., r′(x)mod f(x) = x2 + x.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed fault tolerant computation in a finite field for use in
elliptic curve cryptosystems. We have proposed a means of protecting computation of the
finite field GF (2k) against active side-channel attacks, i.e., fault attacks. Computation
is done in two stages, firstly in the larger polynomial ring by decomposing computation
in the parallel, mutually independent, modular/identical channels, and secondly, result is
reduced modulo irreducible polynomial f(x). This offers a great advantage, since com-
putations are mutually independent (fault effects do not spread to the other channels),
and they are performed over modular channels (CRT based FTC), or over the same field
(LI based FTC). Our approach is based on the use of well know error correcting codes,
i.e., redundant residue polynomial codes which are generalization of the Reed-Solomon
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codes and on the use of the first original approach of Reed-Solomon codes. By assuming
proposed fault models from Chapter 3, our proposed schemes provide protection against
their error propagation. Since the computation is decomposed into parallel, mutually
independent channels, the adversary can use either RFM, or AFM, or SFM per chan-
nel. Fault-tolerant computation is obtained by the use of redundancy. By adding d + t,
d ≥ t redundant modular/identical channels we can correct up to t faulty processors,
and simultaneously detect d faulty processors. Also, efficient error correction is possible
through the use of Euclid’s decoding algorithm for CRT based FTC and Welch-Berlekamp
decoding algorithm for LI based FTC. Moreover, it is part of the design process to decide
on how much security is enough, since all security (i.e. extra channels) has a cost. Also,
we can say that CRT based FTC is generalization of the LI based FTC. LI FTC is more
efficient in the sense that computation is done over identical channels.
In the next chapter we construct the new algorithmic countermeasures that are based on
those proposed schemes.
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Chapter 6
Montgomery FTC in Finite Fields
by Embedding in Rings
Highly reliable hardware countermeasures against fault attacks are very expensive and
most moderately priced countermeasures are only capable of detecting specific attacks.
New fault attacks are being developed frequently, so detecting currently known forms
of physical tampering will most probably not be sufficient against future developments.
Although preventing an error is always the best countermeasure, this cannot be guaranteed
by most hardware countermeasures. Therefore, algorithmic countermeasures are needed,
which do not depend on the physical attack, only on the induced fault. Moreover, they
are more cost efficient and easier to deploy.
In this chapter we construct new algorithms which are immune against fault attacks, i.e.,
fault tolerant residue representation (RR) modular multiplication algorithm in Subsection
6.1.2 and fault tolerant Lagrange representation (LR) modular multiplication algorithm in
Subsection 6.2.2. These algorithms provide fault tolerant computation in GF (2k) for use
in elliptic curve cryptosystems. By assuming the fault models from Chapter 3 we test
the error correcting/detecting capability of our proposed algorithmic countermeasures.
We provide analysis of the error detection and correction capabilities of our proposed
algorithmic countermeasures in Subsection 6.1.4 and 6.2.3, as well as an analysis of an
error correction algorithm.
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6.1 Montgomery Residue Representation FTC in Fi-
nite Fields
In this section we propose a fault tolerant residue representation modular multiplication
algorithm for fault tolerant computation in the finite field GF (2k) for use in elliptic curve
cryptosystems.
6.1.1 Multiplication in GF (2k)
Koc¸ and Acar give in [54] a finite field GF (2k) analogue of the Montgomery multiplication
for modular multiplication of integers [70]. Elements of the finite field are considered as
a polynomials of degree < k, while p(x) = xk is used as a Montgomery factor, since re-
duction modulo xk, and division modulo xk consist of ignoring the terms of degree larger
than k for the remainder operation, and shifting the polynomial to the right by k places
for the division. Instead of computing a(x)b(x) ∈ GF (2k) for a(x), b(x) ∈ GF (2k) it com-
putes a(x)b(x)p−1(x)mod f(x), where f(x) is a irreducible polynomial of degree k with
coefficients in GF (2), and p−1(x) is inverse of p(x) modulo f(x). The Montgomery multi-
plication method requires that p(x) and f(x) are relatively prime, i.e., gcd(p(x), f(x)) = 1,
such that by an Extended Euclidean Algorithm p(x)p−1(x) + f(x)f ′(x) = 1. Bajard et
Algorithm 8 Montgomery Multiplication in GF (2k)
Inputs: a(x), b(x) ∈ GF (2k), p(x), f ′(x)
Output: a(x)b(x)x−kmod f(x)
1. t(x)← a(x)b(x)
2. q(x)← t(x)f ′(x)mod p(x)
3. r(x)← (t(x) + q(x)f(x)) /p(x)
al. The authors of [7] first remarked that Koc¸ and Acar’s algorithm extends to any ex-
tension field GF (pk). In the polynomial basis representation, the elements of GF (pk)
can be modeled as the polynomials in GF (p)[x] of degree at most k − 1. Let f(x) be
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a monic irreducible polynomial of degree k, and let p(x) = xk be a Montgomery factor
such that gcd(p(x), f(x)) = 1. Then given a(x), b(x) ∈ GF (p)[x]/ < f(x) >, Algorithm
9 can be used to compute a(x)b(x)p−1(x)mod f(x). Bajard et al. [9] modified Algo-
Algorithm 9 Montgomery Multiplication over GF (pk)
Inputs: a(x), b(x) ∈ GF (p)[x], deg(a(x)), deg(b(x)) ≤ k − 1; irreducible polynomial
f(x) ∈ GF (p)[x], deg(f(x)) = k, p(x) = xk
Output: a(x)b(x)p−1(x)mod f(x)
1. q(x)← −a(x)b(x)f ′(x)mod p(x)
2. r(x)← (a(x)b(x) + q(x)f(x)) /p(x)
rithm 9 by allowing the polynomial p(x) to be any polynomial of degree k satisfying
gcd(p(x), f(x)) = 1, and replacing division by p(x) in step 2 of Algorithm 9 by a multipli-
cation by p−1(x) modulo another given polynomial p′(x). This operation is only possible
if gcd(p(x), p′(x)) = 1. Algorithm 10 computes a(x)b(x)p−1(x)mod f(x) for any relatively
prime polynomials p(x) and p′(x) satisfying gcd(p(x), f(x)) = 1 and gcd(p(x), p′(x)) = 1.
Algorithm 10 Montgomery Multiplication in GF (pk)
Inputs: a(x), b(x) ∈ GF (p)[x]/ < f(x) >, irreducible polynomial f(x) ∈ GF (p)[x],
deg(f(x)) = k, deg(a(x)), deg(b(x)) ≤ k − 1, deg(p(x)) = deg(p′(x)) ≥ k, s.t.
gcd(p(x), f(x)) = gcd(p(x), p′(x)) = 1
Output: a(x)b(x)p−1(x)mod f(x)
1. q(x)← −a(x)b(x)f ′(x)mod p(x)
2. r(x)← (a (x) b (x) + q (x) f (x)) p−1(x)(mod p′(x))
Lemma 6.1.1 ([9]). Algorithm 10 is correct and returns a(x)b(x)p−1(x)mod f(x).
Proof. In Step 1, q(x) is computed such that p(x)| (a(x)b(x) + q(x)f(x)). Indeed, a(x)b(x)+
q(x)f(x) ≡ a(x)b(x)−a(x)b(x)f ′(x)f(x) ≡ 0 (mod p(x)), and deg (a(x)b(x) + q(x)f(x)) =
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deg (q(x)f(x)) ≤ 2k − 1. Therefore, there exist polynomial s(x) such that a(x)b(x) +
q(x)f(x) = s(x)p(x), deg (s(x)) ≤ k − 1. In step 2 we compute (a(x)b(x) + q(x) f(x))
p−1(x) ≡ s(x) (mod p′(x)). Since, deg (p′(x)) ≥ k > s(x) we have that (a(x)b(x)+
q(x)f(x)) p−1(x) (mod p′(x)) = s(x) = r(x).
Bajard et al. [9] have proposed the first general Montgomery multiplication algorithm
based on trinomial residue arithmetic. We consider this algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 11 for
the case of residues in Mersenne form, or pseudo-Mersenne form and extend its use for the
fault tolerant computation in the field GF (2k) by the use of redundancy. Here, the finite
Algorithm 11 Residue Representation Modular Multiplication.
Inputs: ai(x), bi(x), av+j(x), bv+j(x), fv+j(x), i, j = 1, . . . , v. Precomputed: f
′
i(x),
p′−1v+j(x), kv+j(x), ki(x), i, j = 1, . . . , v, v × v matrices w,w′.
Output: (r1(x), . . . , rv(x)).
1. (t1(x), . . . , tv(x))← (a1(x), . . . , av(x))⊗ (b1(x), . . . , bv(x))
2. (q1(x), . . . , qv(x))← (t1(x), . . . , tv(x))⊗ (f ′1(x), . . . , f ′v(x))
3. Change of RR: (q1(x), . . . , qv(x))→ (qv+1(x), . . . , q2v(x))
4. (rv+1(x), . . . , r2v(x))← [(tv+1(x), . . . , t2v(x))⊕ (qv+1(x), . . . , q2v(x))⊗
(fv+1(x), . . . , f2v(x))]⊗
(
p′−1v+1(x), . . . , p
′−1
2v (x)
)
5. Change of RR: (rv+1(x), . . . , r2v(x))→ (r1(x), . . . , rv(x)).
field GF (2k) is considered as a the set of polynomials modulo a irreducible polynomial
f(x), deg(f(x)) = k, i.e.,
GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >= {a0 + . . .+ ak−1xk−1 | ai ∈ GF (2)},
and {m1(x), . . . , mv(x)} is a set of v relatively prime polynomials from the polynomial
ring GF (2)[x], such that
n = deg (m1 (x)) + . . .+ deg (mv (x)) ≥ k,
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where
m(x) = m1(x) · . . . ·mv(x), m(x) ∈ GF (2)[x].
Then by the Chinese Remainder Theorem (5.1) there exists a ring isomorphism between
these two algebraic structures, i.e.,
GF (2)[x]/ < m(x) >∼= GF (2)[x]/ < m1(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < mv(x) > .
Therefore, all a(x) ∈ GF (2k) have a corresponding residue representation, i.e.,
a(x)↔ a = (a1(x), . . . , av(x)) ,
where ai(x) ≡ a(x)(modmi(x)) for i = 1, . . . , v.
The Montgomery factor is then
p(x) =
v∏
i=1
mi(x),
such that gcd(p(x), f(x)) = 1. The computation is performed in parallel, i.e., qi (x) =
ai (x) bi (x) f
′
i (x), i = 1, . . . , v where f
′(x) ≡ f−1(x)(mod p(x)). Since the inverse mod-
ulo p(x) of p(x) does not exist, r (x) = (a (x) b (x) + q (x) f (x)) p−1 (x) is evaluated by
choosing a polynomial
p′(x) =
2v∏
i=v+1
mi(x),
where gcd(p(x), p′(x)) = 1, and gcd(mi(x), mj(x)) = 1 for i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , 2v. There-
fore, the change of the residue representation (q1(x), . . . , qv(x)) to (qv+1(x), . . . , q2v(x)) is
performed by:
qv+1(x)
qv+2(x)
...
q2v(x)
 =

w1,v+1(x) w2,v+1(x) . . . wv,v+1(x)
w1,v+2(x) w2,v+2(x) . . . wv,v+2(x)
...
...
...
...
w1,2v(x) w2,2v(x) . . . wv,2v(x)


k1(x)
...
kv−1(x)
kv(x)
 ,
where
wi,v+j(x) =
(
p(x)
mi(x)
)
(modmv+j(x)) , i, j = 1, . . . , v, and
ki(x) =
(
qi(x)
((
p(x)
mi(x)
)−1
modmi(x)
))
modmi(x),
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where i = 1, . . . , v. Now, computation of step 4 of Algorithm 11 happens in the following
direct product ring:
GF (2)[x]/ < mv+1(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < m2v(x) > .
Change of the residue representation (rv+1 (x) , . . . , r2v (x)) to (r1 (x) , . . . , rv (x)) is achieved
by: 
r1(x)
r2(x)
...
rv(x)
 =

w′v+1,1(x) w
′
v+2,1(x) . . . w
′
2v,1(x)
w′v+1,2(x) w
′
v+2,2(x) . . . w
′
2v,2(x)
...
...
...
...
w′v+1,v(x) w
′
v+2,v(x) . . . w
′
2v,v(x)


kv+1(x)
kv+2(x)
...
k2v(x)
 ,
where
w′v+i,j(x) =
(
p′(x)
mv+i(x)
)
(modmj(x)) , i, j = 1, . . . , v, and
kv+j =
(
rv+j(x) (p
′(x)mv+j(x))
−1
modmv+j(x)
)
modmv+j(x), j = 1, . . . , v.
In the next subsection we extend use of Algorithm 11 to fault tolerant computation in
the field GF (2k) by use of redundancy.
6.1.2 Montgomery Residue Representation FTC
Depending on the security required, to protect computation in the finite field we add re-
dundancy by adding more (c > v) parallel, modular channels than the required minimum,
i.e., see Fig. 6.1. The new redundant moduli
mv+1(x), . . . , mc(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]
have to be relatively prime to each other and to the non-redundant modulim1(x), . . . , mv(x).
Therefore, now computation happens in the larger direct product ring R′′
GF (2)[x]/ < m1(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < mv(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < mc(x) >,
where
m′(x) = m1(x) · . . . ·mv(x) · . . . ·mc(x), m′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x], deg (m′(x)) > n,
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Algorithm 12 Fault Tolerant RR Modular Multiplication.
Inputs: ai(x), bi(x), ac+j(x), bc+j(x), fc+j(x), i, j = 1, . . . , c, c > v. Precomputed: f
′
i(x),
p′−1c+j(x), kc+j(x), ki(x), i, j = 1, . . . , c, c× c matrices w,w′, c > v.
Output: r(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < m1(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < mc(x) >.
1. (t1(x), . . . , tc(x))← (a1(x), . . . , ac(x))⊗ (b1(x), . . . , bc(x))
2. (q1(x), . . . , qc(x))← (t1(x), . . . , tc(x))⊗ (f ′1(x), . . . , f ′c(x))
3. Change of RR: (q1(x), . . . , qc(x))→ (qc+1(x), . . . , q2c(x))
4. (rc+1(x), . . . , r2c(x))← [(tc+1(x), . . . , t2c(x))⊕ (qc+1(x), . . . , q2c(x))⊗
(fc+1(x), . . . , f2c(x))]⊗
(
p′−1c+1(x), . . . , p
′−1
2c (x)
)
5. Change of RR: (rc+1(x), . . . , r2c(x))→ (r1(x), . . . , rc(x)).
6. CRT interpolation: r(x)←(r1(x), . . . , rc(x)).
such that
R′′ ∼= GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) > .
The redundant polynomial moduli have to be of degree larger then the largest degree of
the non-redundant moduli, i.e.,
deg(mv+j(x)) > max {deg { m1(x), . . . , mv(x)}} , j = 1, . . . , c− v,
and
deg
{
m′(x)
mj1(x) · . . . ·mjc−v(x)
}
≥ n ≥ k, (6.1)
where c− v is the added redundancy.
Therefore, all a(x) ∈ GF (2k) have corresponding redundant residue representation, i.e.,
a(x)↔ a = (a1(x), . . . , av(x), . . . , ac(x)) ,
where ai(x) = a(x)(modmi(x)) for i = 1, . . . , c.
Now,
p(x) =
c∏
i=1
mi(x), i = 1, . . . , c
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is a Montgomery factor, such that gcd(p(x), f(x)) = 1, and computation is done in parallel,
i.e., qi(x) = ai(x)bi(x)f
′
i(x)(modmi(x)), i = 1, . . . , c, where f
′(x) ≡ f−1(x)(mod p(x)).
Since, the inverse modulo p(x) of p(x) does not exist, r(x) = (a(x)b(x) + q(x)f(x)) p−1(x)
is evaluated by choosing polynomial
p′(x) =
2c∏
i=c+1
mi(x),
where gcd(p(x), p′(x)) = 1, and gcd(mi(x), mj(x)) = 1 for i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , 2c. There-
fore, change of the residue representation (q1(x), . . . , qc(x)) to (qc+1(x), . . . , q2c(x)) is done
by: 
qc+1(x)
qc+2(x)
...
q2c(x)
 =

w1,c+1(x) w2,c+1(x) . . . wc,c+1(x)
w1,c+2(x) w2,c+2(x) . . . wc,c+2(x)
...
...
...
...
w1,2c(x) w2,2c(x) . . . wc,2c(x)


k1(x)
...
kc−1(x)
kc(x)
 ,
where
wi,c+j(x) =
(
p(x)
mi(x)
)
(modmc+j(x)) , i, j = 1, . . . , c, and
ki(x) =
(
qi(x)
((
p(x)
mi(x)
)−1
modmi(x)
))
modmi(x),
i = 1, . . . , c. Now, the computation of step 4 of Algorithm 4 happens in the following
direct product ring:
GF (2)[x]/ < mc+1(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < m2c(x) > .
The change of the residue representation (rc+1(x), . . . , r2c(x)) to (r1(x), . . . , rc(x)) is achieved
by: 
r1(x)
r2(x)
...
rc(x)
 =

w′c+1,1(x) w
′
c+2,1(x) . . . w
′
2c,1(x)
w′c+1,2(x) w
′
c+2,2(x) . . . w
′
2c,2(x)
...
...
...
...
w′c+1,c(x) w
′
c+2,c(x) . . . w
′
2c,c(x)


kc+1(x)
kc+2(x)
...
k2c(x)
 ,
where
w′c+i,j(x) =
(
p′(x)
mc+i(x)
)
(modmj(x)) , i, j = 1, . . . , c, and
kv+j =
(
rv+j(x)
(
p′(x)
mv+j(x)
)−1
modmv+j(x)
)
modmv+j(x).
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Theorem 6.1.2. If there are no fault effects, Algorithm 12 will determine a unique poly-
nomial of degree < n where n ≥ k with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2), otherwise, it will be of
degree ≥ n ≥ k.
Proof. Assume that there is no fault induced, then the theorem follows. Given a(x), b(x) ∈
GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >, deg (f(x)) = k in step 1 of Algorithm 12 we compute t(x) = a(x)b(x)
of degree ≤ 2k − 2. In step 2 of Algorithm 12 we compute q(x) = t(x)f ′(x)mod p(x) of
degree at most deg(p(x))− 1, where deg(p(x)) > n ≥ k. We have that deg(q(x)f(x)) ≤
deg(p(x))−1+k. Therefore, since 2k−2 < deg(p(x))−1+k and deg(p(x)) = deg(p′(x)) = k
we have that r(x) = (t(x)+ q(x)f(x))p′−1(x) is of degree at most k− 1. Otherwise, it will
be of degree ≥ n ≥ k.
Definition 6.1.3. The set of correct results of computation is
C = {r (x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < m′ (x) > | deg (r(x)) < n ≥ k} .
6.1.3 Complexity
The Chinese Remainder Algorithm 5 is only applied at the end of the computation, and
its complexity is:
Theorem 6.1.4 ([35]). Let GF (2)[x] be polynomial ring over a field GF (2), m1(x),
. . . , mc(x) ∈ GF (2)[x], di = deg(mi(x)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ c , l = deg(m′(x)) =
∑
1≤i≤c di, and
ri(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] with deg(ri(x)) < di. Then the unique solution r′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] with
deg(r′(x)) < l of the Chinese Remainder Problem r′(x) ≡ ri(x)(modmi(x)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ c
for polynomials can be computed using O(l2) operations in GF(2).
Theorem 6.1.5. Computational complexity of the Algorithm 12 is O(l2).
Proof. Let deg (m1 (x)) = d1, . . . , deg (mc (x)) = dc, and d1 + . . . + dc = l. Then
the complexity of step 1 is
∑c
i=1O (d
2
i ) < O ((
∑c
i=1 di)
2) = O(l2), same as of step
2. In step 3, matrix and vector are precomputed, and their multiplication has com-
plexity O(sc2) +
∑c
i=1O(di+c) < O(l
2), where s is degree of two polynomials multi-
plied such that s ≤ max
i
(2di), i = 1, . . . , c. The complexity of computing step 4 is
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4
∑c
i=1O(d
2
i+c) +
∑c
i=1O(di+c) < O(l
2). In step 5, O(s′(c2)) +
∑c
i=1O(di) < O(l
2), where
s′ is degree of two polynomials multiplied such that s′ ≤ max
i
(2di), i = c+1, . . . , 2c. Step
6 has complexity O(l2). Therefore, the complexity of the algorithm 12 is O(l2).
Assume a polynomial residue representation using c degree d trinomials, such that
cd > k. We note that in Algorithm 12, steps 1, 2 and 4 are accomplished in parallel. In
step 1 we perform c multiplications ai(x)bi(x)modmi(x). By using Mastrovito’s algorithm
for trinomials [96] we require d2 AND and d2 − 1 XOR operations. Therefore, the cost
of step 1 is cd2 AND, and c(d2 − 1) XOR. In steps 2 and 4 we perform 3c constant
multiplications expressed as 3c matrix-vector products of the form ZU , where Z is a
d × d precomputed matrix. The complexity is 3cd2 AND, and 3cd(d − 1) XOR, plus c
additions in step 4. The complexity for steps 1, 2 and 4 is: 4cd2 AND, and 4cd2− 2cd− c
XOR operations, with a latency 4TA + (1 + 4dlog2 de)TX , where TA and TX represent
delay for one AND gate, and one XOR gate respectively. In steps 3, 5, and 6, CRT
interpolation requires (c2 + c) modular multiplications modulo trinomial of degree d, and
precomputation of (c2 + c) matrices d×d. In case when there is no clue about coefficients
of the matrices then upper bound for the cost of one matrix-vector product is d2 AND
and d(d− 1) XOR operations, with latency TA + dlog2 deTX . Therefore, the complexity
of steps 3, 5, and 6 is 3(c2 + c)d2 AND, and 3(c2 + c)d(d − 1) XOR gates, with latency
3TA + 3dlog2 deTX . The gate count is:
#AND : 7cd2 + 3c2d2,
#XOR : cd (3c (d− 1) + 7d− 5)− c,
and the delay is equal to:
7TA + (1 + 7dlog2 de)TX .
Let assume that c = lx and d = l1−x (cd = l), then
#AND : 3l2 + 7l2−x,
#XOR : 3l2 − 5l + 7l2−x − 3lx+1 − lx,
and the latency is
7TA +
(
1 + 7dlog2 l1−xe
)
TX .
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The area complexity is usually given depending on the number of XOR gates. Therefore,
best asymptotic area complexity reached for x = 2/5 is O(l2), i.e.,
3l2 − 5l + 7l8/5 − 3l7/5 − l2/5.
Computational efficiency. To have efficient reduction in the smaller polynomial rings
GF (2)[x]/ < mi(x) >, i = 1, . . . , c, modulus m
′(x) have to be chosen as a product of
the pairwise relatively prime polynomials which are of the special low Hamming weight,
leading to efficient modular reduction. Therefore, a smaller ring modulus can be chosen to
be in the Mersenne form xn − 1, or pseudo-Mersenne form xn + u(x), where polynomial
u(x) is of low weight. In GF (2k), the reduction is relatively inexpensive if the field is
constructed by choosing the reduction polynomial to be a trinomial, i.e., xk + xm + 1
with m < k/2, or a pentanomial (if no trinomial available) xk + xm + xn + xh + 1 with
h < n < m < k/2, see Table 5.1, Table 5.2.
6.1.4 Error Detection and Correction
Let us assume that here is one processor per independent channel as in Fig. 6.1. Let us
assume that we have c processors, where each processor computes i -th polynomial residue
and i -th residue operations. Also, we assume that all precomputed inputs are error free,
as well as the Chinese Remainder Algorithm 5 at the end of the computation. As before,
we assume that a fault attack induces faults into processors by some physical means.
As a reaction, the attacked processor malfunctions, and it does not compute the correct
output given its input. We are concerned with the effect of a fault as it manifests itself
in a modified data, or a modified program execution. Therefore, we consider the fault
models presented in Chapter 3. Since computation is decomposed into parallel, mutually
independent channels, the adversary can use either RFM, or AFM, or SFM per channel.
Assume that at most c − v channels have faults. Let r′ ∈ R′′ be the computed vector
with c components, where ej(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mj(x) > is the error polynomial at j -th
position; then the computed component at the j-th positions is bj = r(x)(modmj(x)) +
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t1(x) = a1 (x)b1(x) t2(x) = a2 (x)b2 (x) tc(x) = ac (x)bc (x)
q2(x) = t2(x)f2(x)' qc (x) = tc(x)fc(x) 
.  .  .
.  .  .
Change of RR representation
q c+1(x) qc+2(x)
.  .  .
Change of RR representation
CRT Interpolation
Error detection and correction
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Figure 6.1: Fault tolerant computation over the finite field GF (2k).
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ej(x)(modmj(x)), and each processor will have as an output component
bj =
 (r(x) + ej(x))(modmj(x)), j ∈ {j1, . . . , jλ},r(x)(modmj(x)), else.
Here, we have assumed that the set of error positions are {j1, . . . , jλ}. By CRT the
computed vector r′ ∈ R′′ with corresponding set of c moduli mi(x) gives as a output
polynomial r′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) >,
r′(x) ≡
(∑
1≤i≤c
ri(x)Ti(x)Mi(x)
)
(modm′(x))
=
(∑
1≤i≤c
ri(x)Ti(x)Mi(x)
)
(modm′(x)) +
( ∑
1≤i≤λ
eji(x)Tji(x)Mji(x)
)
(modm′(x))
= (r(x) + e(x)) (modm′(x)) , (6.2)
whereMi(x) =
m′(x)
mi(x)
, polynomials Ti(x) are computed by solving congruences Ti(x)Mi(x) ≡
1 (modmi(x)), Mji(x) =
m′(x)
mji (x)
, polynomials Tji(x) are computed by solving congruences
Tji(x)Mji(x) ≡ 1 (modmji(x)). Moreover, r(x) (modm′(x)) is correct output polynomial
of degree < n and e(x) (modm′(x)) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) > is the error polynomial such
that:
Theorem 6.1.6. Let eji(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < mji(x) > be error polynomial at positions ji,
i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, λ ≤ c− v then deg(e(x)) ≥ n ≥ k.
Proof. We have that
e(x) =
(∑
1≤i≤λ
eji(x)Tji(x)Mji(x)
)
(modm′(x))
= ej1(x)Tj1(x)Mj1(x) + . . .+ ejλ(x)Tjλ(x)Mjλ(x)
=
m′(x)
mj1(x) · . . . ·mjλ(x)
λ∑
i=1
mj1(x) · . . . ·mjλ(x)
mji(x)
Tji(x)eji(x). (6.3)
Since,
deg
(
λ∑
i=1
∏λ
l=1mjl
mji(x)
Tji(x)eji(x)
)
< deg
(
m′(x)∏λ
l=1mjl(x)
)
,
and by (6.1), deg
(
m′(x)∏λ
l=1mjl
)
≥ n ≥ k, we have that deg(e(x)) ≥ n ≥ k.
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Therefore, the faulty processors affect the result in an additive manner.
Lemma 6.1.7. The error is masked iff deg(e(x)) < n where n ≥ k.
Proof. Let deg (e(x)) < n, n ≥ k in (6.2), then deg(r′(x)) < n, i.e., r′(x) ∈ C.
Lemma 6.1.8. Let the degree of the ring modulus m′(x) be n ≥ k, and let c > v be the
number of parallel, independent, modular channels (or number of processors). Then if up
to c− v channels fail, the output polynomial r′(x) 6∈ C.
Proof. By referring to (6.2), since if deg(e(x)) ≥ n, the output polynomial r′(x) has to
be such that deg(r′(x)) ≥ n. By Definition 6.1.3, r′(x) 6∈ C.
Lemma 6.1.9. Let the degree of the ring modulus m′(x) be n ≥ k, and let c > v be
number of parallel, independent, modular channels (or number of processors). If there is
no faulty processors then r′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >.
Proof. If there are no faulty processors, then clearly no errors occurred, and deg(r ′(x)) ≤
n, so that r′(x) = r(x), r′(x) ∈ C. Therefore, r′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >.
It is straightforward to appeal to the standard coding theory result below, to state the
error detection and correction capability of our set up:
Theorem 6.1.10. (i) If the number of parallel, mutually independent, modular, redundant
channels is d + t ≤ c− v (d ≥ t), then up to t faulty processors can be corrected, and up
to d simultaneously detected. (ii) By adding 2t redundant independent channels at most t
faulty processors can be corrected.
While it is true that arbitrarily powerful adversaries can simply create faults in enough
channels and overwhelm the system proposed here, it is part of the design process to de-
cide on how much security is enough, since all security (i.e. extra channels) has a cost.
Decoding is based on the Extended Euclidean Algorithm discussed in Subsection 5.1.4,
here we present the algorithm as Algorithm 13 for completeness.
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Algorithm 13 Euclid’s Decoding Algorithm
Input: output vector of computation r′ = (r1(x), r2(x), . . . , rc(x)) ∈ R′′
Output: r(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >
1. By CRT algorithm compute r′(x)
2. if deg(r′(x)) < n ≥ k then
3. r(x) = r′(x)
4. else
5. t−1(x) = 0, t0(x) = 1, d−1(x) = m′(x), d0(x) = r′(x)
6. j = 1
7. while deg(dj(x)) >
∑v
i=1 deg (mi (x)) +
∑λ
i=1 deg(mji (x)) do
8. dj−2(x) = qj(x)dj−1(x) + dj(x) ; deg(dj(x)) < deg(dj−1(x))
9. tj(x) = tj−2(x)− qj(x)tj−1(x)
10. j = j + 1
11. return r(x) =
dj(x)
tj (x)
Example 6.1.11. Assume that we want to protect computation in the finite binary exten-
sion field GF (23) ∼= GF (2)[x]/ < x3 + x + 1 >. Let the inputs to the computation be the
following finite field elements: a(x) = x, b(x) = x+ 1. We want to compute following ex-
pression (a(x)b(x))mod f(x), where f(x) = x3 +x+1. Let R[x] = GF (2)[x]/ < m′(x) >,
where
m′(x) = x2
(
x2 + x + 1
) (
x3 + x2 + 1
) (
x4 + x + 1
)
= m1(x)m2(x)m3(x)m4(x).
Now, v = 2, c−v = 2 and the error correction capability is t = 1. Therefore, computation
will happen with encoded field elements in the following direct product ring:
GF (2)[x]/ < m1(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < m4(x) >,
where
a(x)↔ a = (x, x, x, x) ,
b(x)↔ b = (x+ 1, x+ 1, x+ 1, x+ 1) ,
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f ′(x)↔ f ′ = (x+ 1, x+ 1, x, x2 + 1) ,
such that
a b = (x, 1, x2 + x, x2 + x) ,
q =
(
x, x + 1, 1, x3 + x2 + 1
)
,
where  is componentwise multiplication. Also, by ⊕ we denote componentwise addition.
Let {m5(x), m6(x), m7(x), m8(x)} be new set of residues, such that gcd(mi(x), mj(x)) = 1,
i, j = 1, . . . , 8, and p′(x) =
∏8
i=5mi(x), gcd(m
′(x), p′(x)) = 1, i.e.,
p′(x) =
(
x4 + x3 + 1
) (
x5 + x3 + x2 + x + 1
) (
x6 + x5 + x2 + x+ 1
) (
x7 + x+ 1
)
= m5(x)m6(x)m7(x)m8(x).
Therefore, change of residue representation of q is done by:
w =

x2 + x x3 + x2 + x x3 + 1 x3 + x + 1
x4 + x3 + 1 x2 + x+ 1 x3 + x2 + x + 1 x4 + x3 + x2 + x + 1
x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x + 1 x5 + x2 x4 + x3 + x2 + x + 1 x5 + x2 + 1
x6 + x4 + x3 + 1 x4 + x2 + x x6 + x5 + 1 x3 + x2 + x+ 1

k =

x
x
x2 + x
x3
 ,
such that q′ = wk = (x + 1, x2, x3 + x2 + x, x5 + x2 + 1). Now, the computatin happens
in the new ring:
GF (2)[x]/ < m5(x) > × . . .×GF (2)[x]/ < m8(x) >,
with,
a(x)↔ a′ = (x, x, x, x) ,
b(x)↔ b′ = (x + 1, x+ 1, x+ 1, x+ 1) ,
f(x)↔ f = (x3 + x+ 1, x3 + x+ 1, x3 + x+ 1, x3 + x + 1) ,
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p(x)−1 ↔ p−1 = (1, x3 + 1, x5 + x + 1, x5 + x4 + x3 + x) , such that,
a′  b′ = (x2 + x, x2 + x, x2 + x, x2 + x) ,
q′  f = (x2, x + 1, x2 + 1, x6 + 1) ,
a′  b′ ⊕ q′  f = (x, x2 + 1, x + 1, x6 + x2 + x + 1) ,
i.e., result of computation r′ = (a′  b′ ⊕ q′  f) p−1 is
r′ = (x, x, x, x) .
Now, we do change of residue representation by:
r1(x)
r2(x)
r3(x)
r4(x)
 =

x+ 1 1 1 1
x+ 1 x+ 1 x + 1 1
x2 1 x2 + x x2 + x
1 x2 + x + 1 x3 + x2 + x x3 + x2


1
x2 + x+ 1
x5 + x3 + x + 1
x6 + x5 + x4 + x2 + 1
 ,
so that final result of computation is:
r = (x, x, x, x) . (6.4)
By applying CRT interpolation on (6.4) we get r(x) = x. Since, deg(r(x)) < 4, r(x) ∈ C,
i.e., r(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > .
Now assume that an adversary induces faults into point P ∈ E/GF (23) by inducing
faults into one of 8 processors by some physical set up, causing attacked processor to be
faulty, such that erroneous output of the computation is
r′(x) = (x + 1, x, x, x) . (6.5)
By applying CRT interpolation on (6.5) we get
r′(x) = x9 + x6 + x4 + x2 + x + 1. (6.6)
Since deg(r′(x)) > 4 we detect an error, and by the extended Euclid’s algorithm for
gcd (r′(x), m′(x)) we have that at j = 1, d(x) = x3, and t(x) = x2. Therefore, correct
residue output is r(x) = d(x)/t(x) = x.
133
6.2 Montgomery Lagrange Representation FTC in
Finite Fields
In this section we propose a fault tolerant Lagrange representation (LR) modular multi-
plication algorithm for fault tolerant computation in the GF (2k) for use in elliptic curve
cryptosystems.
6.2.1 Montgomery LR Computation in the GF (2k)
Bajard et al. in [7] have proposed a new multiplication algorithm for the implementation
of elliptic curve cryptography over an optimal extension field GF (pk), where p > 2k. We
will show that their proposed algorithm is correct for p = 2, i.e., Algorithm 14.
Our aim is to extend use of this algorithm for fault tolerant computation in the field
GF (2k) by use of redundancy. Operations used in Algorithm 14 are: componentwise ad-
Algorithm 14 LR Modular Multiplication.
Inputs: a(x), b(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >, irreducible polynomial f(x) ∈ GF (2)[x],
p(x) =
∏k
i=1(x− αi), p′(x) =
∏2k
i=k+1(x− αj), αi ∈ T , αj ∈ T ′, gcd(p, p′) = gcd(p, f) = 1,
T =
{
αi ∈ GF (2k) | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
}
, T ′ =
{
αj ∈ GF (2k) | j ∈ {k + 1, . . . , 2k}
}
, αi 6= αj.
Precomputed: f ′(x), ξ(x) ∈ GF (2k)[x], k × k matrices w,w′.
Output: (r1, . . . , rk).
1. (t1, . . . , tk)← (a1, . . . , ak)⊗ (b1, . . . , bk)
2. (q1, . . . , qk)← (t1, . . . , tk)⊗ (f ′1, . . . , f ′k)
3. Change of LR: (q1, . . . , qk)→ (qk+1, . . . , q2k)
4. (rk+1, . . . , r2k)← [(tk+1, . . . , t2k)⊕ (qk+1, . . . , q2k)⊗ (fk+1, . . . , f2k)]⊗ (ξk+1, . . . , ξ2k)
5. Change of LR: (rk+1, . . . , r2k)→ (r1, . . . , rk).
dition ⊕ and componentwise multiplication ⊗.
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Let the finite binary extension field GF (2k), be represented as the set of polynomials
modulo an irreducible polynomial f(x), deg(f(x)) = k, i.e.,
GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >=
{
a0 + . . .+ ak−1xk−1 | ai ∈ GF (2)
}
, (6.7)
and where f(x) is primitive with f(α) = 0, so that
GF (2k) =
{
0, 1, α, α2, . . . , α2
k−2
}
. (6.8)
The input polynomials gi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] < f(x) > are evaluated at k distinct elements
from the set
T =
{
αj ∈ GF (2k) | j ∈ { 1, . . . , k}
}
. (6.9)
Then, there exists a mapping φ
φ : GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > 7→ GF (2k)[x]/ < x− α1 > × . . .×GF (2k)[x]/ < x− αk >,
such that each input polynomial gi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > is evaluated at k distinct
elements from the set (6.9), i.e.,
gi(x)↔ (gi(α1), gi(α2), . . . , gi(αk)) , (6.10)
where gi(αj) ∈ GF (2k) are evaluations of the input polynomials gi(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ <
f(x) > at distinct elements from the set (6.9).
Lemma 6.2.1. LR modular multiplication Algorithm 14 can be applied to the field GF (2k)
if and only if the finite field is represented as in (6.7) and (6.8).
Proof. Since the inputs to the computation are elements in the LR, and since we require at
least 2k polynomial evaluations for LR modular multiplication Algorithm 14, by consid-
ering elements of the GF (2k) as in (6.7) and (6.8), each element of GF (2k) in polynomial
representation can be evaluated at least at the 2k field elements represented as in (6.8),
since 2k > 2k for k ≥ 3.
Firstly, the computation is performed in parallel in the field GF (2k) as in step 1, 2
and 4 of Algorithm 14. As a Montgomery factor we chose polynomial
p(x) =
k∏
i=1
(x− αi) , αi ∈ T, (6.11)
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such that gcd (p(x), f(x)) = 1. Since, r(x) = t(x) + q(x)f ′(x), f ′(x) ≡ f−1(x)(mod p(x)),
is a multiple of p(x), its LR representation at points from set T are composed of 0s.
Therefore, to avoid this we choose new set of distinct elements
T ′ =
{
αj ∈ GF (2k) | j ∈ { k + 1, . . . , 2k}
}
, (6.12)
such that αi 6= αj, i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , 2k. Also we define
p′(x) =
2k∏
j=k+1
(x− αj), αj ∈ T ′
with the constraint that gcd(p(x), p′(x)) = 1.
Therefore, the computation happens in the new direct product ring
R′ = GF (2k)[x]/ < x− αk+1 > × . . .×GF (2k)[x]/ < x− α2k >,
where αj ∈ T ′. Let
q(x) =
k∑
i=1
qi
k∏
j=1
i6=j
x− αj
αi − αj , αi, αj ∈ T,
such that
wm,i =
k∏
j=1
j 6=i
α′m − αj
αi − αj , α
′
m ∈ T ′, αi, αj ∈ T,
and the change of LR in step 3 is achieved by:

qk+1
...
q2k−1
q2k
 =

w1,1 . . . w1,k
...
...
...
wk−1,1 . . . wk−1,k
wk,1 . . . wk,k


q1
...
qk−1
qk
 . (6.13)
In step 4 of Algorithm 14, ri = (ti + qifi)ξi, i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , 2k}, is computed in parallel
where
ξi =
(
k∏
j=1
(αi − αj)
)−1
mod f(α), αi ∈ T ′.
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To the get vector r such that its components are polynomial evaluations at distinct ele-
ments of the set T , we perform the change of LR, i.e., let
w′m,i =
k∏
j=1
j 6=i
αm − α′j
α′i − α′j
, αm ∈ T, α′i, α′j ∈ T ′,
then

r1
...
rk−1
rk
 =

w′1,1 . . . w
′
1,k
...
...
...
w′k−1,1 . . . w
′
k−1,k
w′k,1 . . . w
′
k,k


rk+1
...
r2k−1
r2k
 . (6.14)
By Lagrange interpolation (LI), the k output components at distinct elements form set T
will determine a unique polynomial of degree ≤ k − 1 with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k).
In the next subsection we extend use of this algorithm for fault tolerant computation in
the field GF (2k) by use of redundancy.
6.2.2 Montgomery Lagrange Representation FTC
To protect multiplication of the finite field we use redundancy by adding more parallel
channels than the minimum required, i.e., c > k, see Fig. 6.2. Thus, inputs are evaluated
at c distinct points (c > k) from the set
T =
{
αi ∈ GF (2k) | i ∈ {1, . . . , k, . . . , c}
}
, (6.15)
where c depends on security required, i.e., inputs are evaluated at additional c−k distinct
elements αi ∈ GF (2k). By adding c − k extra redundant polynomial evaluations, the
computation now happens in the larger direct product ring
R = GF (2k)[x]/ < x− α1 > × . . .×GF (2k)[x]/ < x− αc >, (6.16)
where αi ∈ T , and
R ∼= R[x] = GF (2k)[x]/ < m(x) >, (6.17)
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where
m(x) =
c∏
i=1
(x− αi), c > k, αi ∈ T. (6.18)
The operations used are componentwise multiplication ⊗, and componentwise addition
⊕.
Inputs gi(x) ∈ GF (2k)[x]/ < f(x) > are evaluated at c distinct elements from the set
(6.15), i.e.,
gi(x)→ (gi (α1) , . . . , gi (αk) , . . . , gi (αc)) ,
where gi(α1), . . . , gi(αk) are non-redundant components, and gi(αk+1), . . . , gi(αc) are re-
dundant components.
In Algorithm 15, steps 1, 2 and 4 are performed in parallel in the field GF (2k). As a
Montgomery factor we choose polynomial
p(x) =
c∏
i=1
(x− αi) , αi ∈ T, (6.19)
Algorithm 15 Fault tolerant LR Modular Multiplication.
Inputs: a(x), b(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) >, irreducible polyinomial f(x) ∈ GF (2)[x],
p(x), p′(x) ∈ GF (2k)[x], deg(p) = deg(p′) = c, gcd(p, p′) = gcd(p, f) = 1, T ={
αi ∈ GF (2k) | i ∈ {1, . . . , c}
}
, T ′ =
{
αj ∈ GF (2k) | j ∈ {c+ 1, . . . , 2c}}, αi 6= αj. Pre-
computed: f ′(x), ξ(x) ∈ GF (2k)[x], c× c matrices w,w′.
Output: r(x) ∈ GF (2k)[x]/ < ∏ci=1(x− αi) >,αi ∈ T .
1. (t1, . . . , tk, . . . , tc)← (a1, . . . , ak, . . . , ac)⊗ (b1, . . . , bk, . . . , bc)
2. (q1, . . . , qk, . . . , qc)← (t1, . . . , tk, . . . , tc)⊗ (f ′1, . . . , f ′k, . . . , f ′c)
3. Change of LR: (q1, . . . , qc)→ (qc+1, . . . , q2c)
4. (rc+1, . . . , r2c)← [(tc+1, . . . , t2c)⊕ (qc+1, . . . , q2c)⊗ (fc+1, . . . , f2c)]⊗ (ξc+1, . . . , ξ2c)
5. Change of LR: (rc+1, . . . , r2c)→ (r1, . . . , rc)
6. Lagrange interpolation: (r1, . . . , rc).
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such that gcd(p(x), f(x)) = 1. Since, r(x) = t(x) + q(x)f ′(x), f ′(x) ≡ f−1(x)(mod p(x)),
is a multiple of (6.19), we choose new set of distinct elements
T ′ =
{
αj ∈ GF (2k) | j ∈ {c+ 1, . . . , 2c}
}
, (6.20)
such that αi 6= αj, i 6= j, i, j = 1, . . . , 2c, and we define
p′(x) =
2c∏
j=c+1
(x− αj), αj ∈ T ′ (6.21)
with constraint that gcd(p(x), p′(x)) = 1. Therefore, the computation happens in the new
direct product ring
R′ = GF (2k)[x]/ < x− αc+1 > × . . .×GF (2k)[x]/ < x− α2c >,
where αj ∈ T ′. Let
q(x) =
c∑
i=1
qi
c∏
j=1
i6=j
x− αj
αi − αj , αi, αj ∈ T,
such that
wm,i =
c∏
j=1
j 6=i
α′m − αj
αi − αj , α
′
m ∈ T ′, αi, αj ∈ T,
and the change of LR is achieved by:

qc+1
...
q2c−1
q2c
 =

w1,1 . . . w1,k . . . w1,c
...
...
...
...
...
wc−1,1 . . . wc−1,k . . . wc−1,c
wc,1 . . . wc,k . . . wc,c


q1
...
qc−1
qc
 . (6.22)
In step 4 of Algorithm 15, ri = (ti + qifi)ξi, i ∈ {c + 1, . . . , 2c} is computed in parallel
where
ξi =
(
c∏
j=1
(αi − αj)
)−1
mod f(α), αi ∈ T ′.
Now, to get a vector r such that its components are polynomial evaluations at distinct
elements of the set T , we do change of LR, i.e., let
w′m,i =
c∏
j=1
j 6=i
αm − α′j
α′i − α′j
, αm ∈ T, α′i, α′j ∈ T ′,
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then

r1
...
rc−1
rc
 =

w′1,1 . . . w
′
1,k . . . w
′
1,c
...
...
...
...
...
w′c−1,1 . . . w
′
c−1,k . . . w
′
c−1,c
w′c,1 . . . w
′
c,k . . . w
′
c,c


rc+1
...
r2c−1
r2c
 . (6.23)
Theorem 6.2.2. If there are no fault effects, Algorithm 15 will determine a unique poly-
nomial of degree ≤ k − 1 with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k), otherwise, it will be of degree
≥ k.
Proof. See proof of Theorem 6.1.2.
Definition 6.2.3. The set of correct results of computation is
C =
{
r(x) ∈ R[x] | deg (r(x)) < k, ai ∈ GF (2k)
}
.
Computational Complexity
Polynomial interpolation is only done at the end of the computation, and its complexity
is O(c2), while complexity of polynomial evaluation is O(ck), c > k. Matrices w,w′ are
precomputed, as well as ξ and f ′(x).
Lemma 6.2.4. Total computational complexity of the Algorithm 15 is O(c2), c > k.
Proof. In Algorithm 15, steps 1 and 2 require c operations each, while steps 3 and 4
require 2c2− c operations each. Also, step 4 requires c2 + c. By taking into consideration
complexity of polynomial evaluation and interpolation we have that total complexity of
the Algorithm 15 is O(c2).
Lemma 6.2.5. The matrices (6.22) and (6.23) satisfy relation wi,j = w
′
i+1,j if and only
if sets of c distinct points are chosen as T = {α2mi ∈ GF (2k) | i ∈ {1, . . . , c}}, T ′ ={
α2mi+1 ∈ GF (2k) |
i ∈ {1, . . . , c}}.
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Proof. Let
wi,j =
c∏
s=1
s6=j
α2mi+1 − α2ms
α2mj − α2ms , (6.24)
and multiply (6.24) by αc−1/αc−1, then
wi,j =
c∏
s=1
s6=j
α2mi+2 − α2ms+1
α2mj+1 − α2ms+1
=
c∏
s=1
s6=j
α2(mi+1) − α2ms+1
α2mj+1 − α2ms+1 .
Since mi+1 = mi + 1 we have
wi,j =
c∏
s=1
s6=j
α2mi+1 − α2ms+1
α2mj+1 − α2ms+1 = w
′
i+1,j.
6.2.3 Error Correction and Detection
There is one processor per independent channel as in Fig. 6.2. Let us assume that we have
c processors, where each processor computes i -th polynomial evaluation and operations
of the finite field GF (2k). Also, we assume that all precomputed inputs are error free,
as well as the Lagrange interpolation in step 6 of Algorithm 15. As before, we assume
that a fault attack induces faults into processors by some physical means. As a reaction,
the attacked processor malfunctions, and it does not compute the correct output given
its input. We are concerned with the effect of a fault as it manifests itself in a modified
data, or a modified program execution. Therefore, we consider the fault models presented
in Chapter 3. Since computation is decomposed into parallel, mutually independent,
identical channels, the adversary can use either RFM, or AFM, or SFM per channel.
Assume that at most c − k channels have faults. Let r′ ∈ R be computed vector with
c components, where ej ∈ GF (2k) is the error at j -th position; then the computed
component at the j-th positions is
rj = r(αj) + ej, (6.25)
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t1=a (a1)b(a1) t2=a (a2)b (a2) tc=a (ac)b (ac)
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.  .  .
.  .  .
Change of LR representation
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.  .  .
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Figure 6.2: Fault tolerant multiplication over the finite field GF (2k).
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and each processor will have as an output component
rj =
 r(αj) + ej, j ∈ {j1, . . . , jt},r(αj), else.
Here, we have assumed that the set of error positions are {j1, . . . , jt}, i.e., ej is the effect
of the fault in the channel ji. By Lagrange interpolation, the computed vector r
′ ∈ R
with corresponding set of c distinct elements from set T in (6.15), gives as output the
unique polynomial r′(x) ∈ GF (2k)[x]/ < m(x) >,
r′(x) =
∑
1≤i≤c
ri
∏
1≤j≤c
i6=j
x− αj
αi − αj
=
∑
1≤i≤c
ri(αi)
∏
1≤j≤c
i6=j
x− αj
αi − αj +
∑
1≤l≤t
ejl
∏
1≤i≤c
jl 6=i
x− αi
αjl − αi
= r(x) + e(x), (6.26)
where r(x) is correct polynomial of computation such that deg(r(x)) ≤ k − 1 with coeffi-
cients from GF (2k); and e(x) is the error polynomial such that:
Theorem 6.2.6. Let effects of the fault ej1 6= 0, . . . , ejt 6= 0 be any set of 1 ≤ t ≤ c − k
elements of GF (2k), c > k, then deg(e(x)) > k − 1 whose coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k).
Proof. We have that
e(x) =
∑
1≤l≤t
ejl
∏
1≤i≤c
jl 6=i
x− αi
αjl − αi
=
∏
1≤i≤c
(x− αi)
 ej1
(x− αj1)
∏
1≤i≤c
j1 6=i
(αj1 − αi)
+ . . .+
ejt
(x− αjt)
∏
1≤i≤c
jt 6=i
(αjt − αi)
 .
Since,
deg
(∏
1≤i≤c (x− αi)
(x− αj1)
)
= c− 1, . . . , deg
(∏
1≤i≤c (x− αi)
(x− αjt)
)
= c− 1,
c > k, then deg (e(x)) > k − 1 with coefficients
ejk
(x− αjk)
∏
1≤i≤c
jk 6=i
(αjk − αi)
∈ GF (2k).
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Therefore, the faulty processors affect the result in an additive manner, see (6.26).
Lemma 6.2.7. The error is masked iff error polynomial e(x) has coefficients from GF (2k),
and if deg(e(x)) ≤ k − 1.
Proof. Let r′(x) be the computed polynomial as in (6.26). Since, deg(r(x)) ≤ k − 1 with
coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k), then if deg(e(x)) ≤ k − 1 with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k) we have
that deg(r′(x)) ≤ k − 1 with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k) in which case error is masked.
Lemma 6.2.8. Let k be the degree of the finite field, and let c > k be number of parallel
independent channels (or number of processors). If there are no faulty processors then
r′(x) ∈ C.
Proof. If there are no faulty processors, then clearly no errors occurred, and deg(r ′(x)) ≤
k − 1 with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k), i.e., r′(x) ∈ C.
Lemma 6.2.9. Let k be the degree of the finite field, and let c > k be the number of
parallel independent channels (or number of processors). Then if up to c − k channels
fail, the output polynomial r′(x) 6∈ C.
Proof. By referring to (6.26), since deg(e(x)) > k − 1 with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k), and
deg(r(x)) ≤ k− 1 with coefficients ai ∈ GF (2k), then the output polynomial r′(x) has to
be such that deg(r′(x)) > k − 1 with ai ∈ GF (2k), i.e., r′(x) 6∈ C.
It is straightforward to appeal to the standard coding theory result below, to state the
error detection and correction capability of our set up:
Theorem 6.2.10. (i) If the number of parallel, mutually independent, modular, redundant
channels is d+ t ≤ c− k (d ≥ t), then up to t faulty processors can be corrected, and up
to d simultaneously detected. (ii) By adding 2t redundant independent channels at most t
faulty processors can be corrected.
While it is true that arbitrarily powerful adversaries can simply create faults in enough
channels and overwhelm the system proposed here, it is part of the design process to de-
cide on how much security is enough, since all security (i.e. extra channels) has a cost.
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We also remark that the Welch-Berlekamp Algorithm 16 is suitable for correcting the
faults induced by the attacks described in this paper. Note that to specify the algorithm
we choose a set of k indices K = {0, 1, . . . , k− 1}, and K = {0, . . . , c− 1} \K. Discussion
of this Algorithm is given in Chapter 5, Subsection 5.2.5.
Algorithm 16 Welch-Berlekamp Decoding of the Output Vector.
Inputs: output vector of computation r′ = (r0, . . . , rk−1, rk, . . . , rc−1), set of c distinct
points T =
{
αi |αi ∈ GF (2k)
}
, set of indices K = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, polynomial g(x) =∏
i∈K (x− xi)
Outputs: polynomials d(x), h(x).
1. By Lagrange interpolation, interpolate output vector r′ in order to get polynomial r′(x)
2. if deg(r′(x)) < k and ai ∈ GF (2k) then r′(x)
3. else
4. for i ∈ K do find r′(x), where deg(r′) < k
5. evaluate r′(x), at αl, l ∈ K
6. determine syndromes Sl = rl − r′(xl), l ∈ K
7. determine yl =
Sl
g(xl)
8. solve key equation d(xl)yl = h(xl)
9. return d(x), h(x).
Example 6.2.11. Assume that we want to protect computation in the finite binary field
GF (25) ∼= GF (2)[x]/ < x5 + x2 + 1 >, where α is a primitive root of the primitive
polynomial x5 + x2 + 1, i.e., α5 + α2 + 1 = 0.
Let the inputs to the computation be the following finite field elements: a(x) = x3 +x2 +1,
b(x) = x3 + 1. We want to compute following expression (a(x)b(x))mod f(x). Since,
k = 5, the minimum number of polynomial evaluations is 5, but in order to correct a
single error, we add c − k = 2 extra channels. Therefore, we choose following sets of
distinct points
T = {α18, α20, α22, α24, α26, α28, α30} and T ′ = {α19, α21, α23, α25, α27, α29, α31},
such that p(x) =
∏7
i=1 (x− αi), αi ∈ T , and p′(x) =
∏7
i=1(x − αj), αj ∈ T ′, and
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gcd(p(x), p′(x)) = 1.
At elements of the set T and T ′ we evaluate inputs, i.e.,
aT = (α
27, α30, α8, α18, α, α8, α24), aT ′ = (α, α
2, α6, α16, α3, α17, 1),
bT = (α
12, α3, α10, α4, α9, α7, α26), bT ′ = (α
28, α18, α22, α14, α11, α21, 0).
Also,
fT ′ = (α
10, α3, α27, α5, α29, α30, 1), f ′T = (α, α
8, α19, α6, α14, α13, α16),
ξ = (α23, α2, α7, 1, α12, α19, α22).
The interpolation matrices are
w =

α23 α30 α5 α19 α2 α12 α22
α2 α19 α4 α11 α10 α25 α13
α24 α3 α29 α15 α7 α7 1
α11 α6 α25 α21 α23 α16 α25
α5 α5 α9 α29 α10 α13 α15
α26 α4 α13 α18 α23 α5 α17
α28 α29 α16 α26 α16 α22 α13

, w′ =

α7 α4 α17 α15 α24 α25 α12
α23 α30 α5 α19 α2 α12 α22
α2 α19 α4 α11 α10 α25 α13
α24 α3 α29 α15 α7 α7 1
α11 α6 α25 α21 α23 α16 α25
α5 α5 α9 α29 α10 α13 α15
α26 α4 α13 α18 α23 α5 α17

.
Therefore,
tT = (α
8, α2, α18, α22, α10, α15, α19) and qT = (α
9, α10, α6, α28, α24, α28, α4).
By change of LR from T → T ′ we have
q′T ′ = (α
24, α13, α11, α16, α22, α17, α30), such that r′T ′ = (α
23, α28, α8, α6, α22, α11, α21).
By change of LR from T ′ → T we have
rT = (α
23, α12, α4, α9, α19, α3, α22). (6.27)
By interpolating (6.27) at distinct points of T we have
r(x) = α30x4 + α26x3 + α28x2 + α24x + α22.
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Assume that an adversary induces faults into point P ∈ E/GF (25) by inducing faults into
one of 7 processors, by some physical set up, causing attacked processor to be faulty, such
that the erroneous output of the computation is, i.e., r = (α23, α12, α2, α9, α19, α3, α22).
Now, we select set of k = 5 indices K = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} such that by interpolating
r = (α23, α12, α2, α9, α19) at
(
α18, α20, α22, α24, α26
)
we get
r (x) = α7x4 + α18x3 + x + α23x2 + α30x + α3.
Given index selection K we evaluate r(x) at α5 = α
28, α6 = α
30, i.e., r(α28) = α14,
r(α30) = α12, such that S = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, α22, α16). Therefore, syndromes are S5 = α
22,
S6 = α
16. Now define the polynomial
g (x) =
(
x− α18) (x− α20) (x− α22) (x− α24) (x− α26) .
New interpolated data is given by α5 = α
28, α6 = α
30, and
y5 =
S5
g(α5)
= α, and y6 =
S6
g(α6)
= α8.
The problem is to determine polynomials d(x), h(x) from d (α5) y5 = h (x5) , d (α6) y6 =
h (α6). By rational interpolation at points (α
28, α) , (α30, α8) we obtain that d(x) = α26 +
xα4 and h (x) = α23. Therefore, the error locations are the roots of the polynomial d(x),
i.e., α2 = α
22, while the error values are obtained by
S (x) =
h (x) g (x)
d (x)
= α19x4 + α7x3 + α25x2 + α20x+ α14,
such that e2 = S2 − S (α22) = α7, so that r2 − e2 = α2 − α7 = α4. Therefore, the correct
output vector of computation is
r =
(
α23, α12, α4, α9, α19, α3, α22
)
,
which interpolated gives r(x) = α30x4 + α26x3 + α28x2 + α24x+ α22.
6.2.4 LR Inversion in GF(2k)
Here we adapt the inversion algorithm based on the extended Euclidean algorithm for
polynomials defined over optimal extension field GF (pk) in LR proposed by Bajard et
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al. in [9] to the binary extension field GF (2k). This algorithm is based on the Lehmer’s
Euclidean GCD algorithm ([57], [5], [93]) which computes q = l(U(x))/l(V (x)), R =
U(x) − qxtV (x) if deg(U(x)) > deg(V (x)) and t = deg(U(x)) − deg(V (x)), till zero
remainder is encountered.
Lemma 6.2.12. The LR inversion algorithm proposed over optimal extension field in [9]
can be used in the GF (2k) if and only if finite field is represented as in (6.7) and (6.8).
Proof. See proof of Lemma 6.2.1.
Algorithm 17 Leading term LT (U,m)
Input: A polynomial U(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > given in LR: (u(α1), . . . , u(αk)).
Precomputed: ξi,t =
(∏t
j=1
j 6=i
(αi − αj)
)−1
(mod 2)
Output: (d, c), d = deg(a(x)), c = l(a(x)), where a(x) = cxd + . . .
1. if m = 0 then
2. c← u(α1)
3. d← 0
4. else
5. t← m+ 1
6. c = 0
7. while c = 0 do
8. for i← 1 to t do
9. c← c+ u(αi)ξi,t(mod 2)
10. if c = 0 then
11. t← t− 1
12. return (t− 1, c)
Therefore, we consider the representation of a finite field GF (2k) as in (6.7) and (6.8).
Given input a(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > and irreducible polynomial f(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] in
LR representation, we compute a−1(x)mod f(x) in LR representation. More precisely, to
represent inputs in LR representation by using k values, is used as an input f(x)mod p(x),
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so that the computed output is (a−1(x)mod f(x))mod p(x), where p(x) is as in (6.11).
Bajard et al. [9] have proposed an Algorithm 17 which computes the degree and leading
coefficient of a polynomial given in the LR representation, to avoid ignorance of the degree
and coefficients of the polynomials while performing polynomial division in LR.
Remark 6.2.13. Let U(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]/ < f(x) > be given in Lagrange representation
(u(α1), . . . , u(αk)), αi ∈ T , T = {αj ∈ GF (2k) | j ∈ {1, . . . , k}}, then by Proposition 5.2.1
we have
U(x) =
k∑
i=1
u(αi)
k∏
j=1
j 6=i
(x− αj)(αi − αj)−1
=
k∑
i=1
u(αi)
 k∏
j=1
j 6=i
(αi − αj)

−1
k∏
j=1
j 6=i
(x− αj)
=
k∑
i=1
u(αi)
 k∏
j=1
j 6=i
(αi − αj)

−1
xk−1 + . . .
where leading coefficient of degree k − 1 of U(x) is:
l(U(x)) =
k∑
i=1
u(αi)
 k∏
j=1
j 6=i
(αi − αj)

−1
(mod 2).
In Algorithm 17, m is the largest possible degree of U(x), i.e., m ≤ k−1, which is decre-
mented by 1 each time coefficient is equal to 0. Values ξi,t =
(∏t
j=1
j 6=i
(αi − αj)
)−1
(mod 2),
1 ≤ i ≤ t ≤ k are precomputed and require storage of k(k + 1)/2 field elements from
GF (2k). The total number of operations of Algorithm 17 is mA + (m + 1)M , where A
stands for addition and M stands for multiplication. Complete complexity analysis of
Algorithm 18 is given in [9], but for the sake of completeness we will mention it here.
In Step 11, each iteration requires one multiplication and one inversion while computing
q. By polynomial Lehmer’s Euclidean GCD algorithm, number of divisions is at most
deg(f(x)mod p(x)) + deg(a(x)) = 2k− 2, while in Steps 12 and 13 for computation of U1
and U3 each iteration requires 3k multiplications and 2k additions. There are two calls of
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Algorithm 18 Inversion over GF (2k) in LR
Input: polynomial a(x) in LR, a = (a(α1), . . . , a(αk)), polynomial f(x)(mod p(x)) in LR,
f ′ = (f ′(α1), . . . , f ′(αk)), gcd(a(x), f(x)) = 1
Precomputed: polynomial Xt(x) = x
t, 0 ≤ t ≤ k in LR, Xt = (Xt(α1), . . . , Xt(αk))
Output: polynomial (a−1(x)mod f(x))mod p(x) in LR
1. (U1, U3)← ((1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
), (a1, . . . , ak))
2. (V1, V3)← ((0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
), (f ′(α1), . . . , f ′(αk))
3. (d(V3), l(V3))← (k, 1)
4. (d(U3), l(U3))← LT (U3, k − 1)
5. while U3 6= 0 do
6. t← d(U3)− d(V3)
7. if t < 0 then
8. (U1, U3)↔ (V1, V3)
9. (d(U3), l(U3))↔ (d(V3), l(V3))
10. t← −t
11. q ← l(U3)l(V3)−1mod 2
12. U1 ← U1 + qXtV1
13. U3 ← U3 + qXtV3
14. (d(U3), l(U3))← LT (U3, d(U3)− 1)
15. return U1
LT (U3, i), 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Total complexity is (2k − 2) inversions plus:
(2k − 2)M + (2k − 2)(3kM + 2kA) + 2
k−1∑
i=1
LT (U3, i) = (6k
2 − 4k − 2)M +
(4k2 − 4k)A+ 2
k−1∑
i=1
(i+ 1)M + 2
k−2∑
i=1
iA = (7k2 − 3k − 4)M + (5k2 − 5k)A,
which can be simplified to 2k − 2 inversions, plus 12k2 − 8k − 4 operations in GF (2k).
Example 6.2.14. Assume that we want to compute the inverse of an element in the
finite binary field GF (23) ∼= GF (2)[x]/ < x3 + x + 1 >, where α is a primitive root of
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U1 U3 V1 V3 d(U3) l(U3) t q
(1, 1, 1) (1, α5, α3) (0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) 2 1 -1
(0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1) (1, α5, α3) 1 1
(1, α, α2) (0, α6, α5) 2 1 0 1
(0, α3, α6) (1, α, α2) 1 1 −1
(1, 1, 1) (1, α5, α3) (0, α3, α6) (1, α, α2) 1 1
(1, α5, α3) (0, α3, α6) 1 1 0 1
(1, α2, α4) (1, 1, 1) 0 1 −1
(0, α3, α6) (1, α, α2) (1, α2, α4) (1, 1, 1) 1 1
(1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) 0 0
Table 6.1: Iterations of LR Inversion Algorithm
the primitive polynomial x3 + x + 1, i.e., α3 + α + 1 = 0. Let a(x) = x2 + x + 1 be an
element whose inverse modulo f(x), f(x) = x3 + x + 1, we want to compute in LR, and
let T = {1, α, α2} be the set of distinct points at which inputs are evaluated. Also, let
p(x) = (x− 1)(x− α)(x− α2), and f(x)mod p(x) = α5x2 + α2x+ α. Inputs are given in
LR representation, i.e.,
a(x)↔ a = (1, α5, α3),
f(x)mod p(x)↔ f ′ = (1, 0, 0).
We provide Table 6.1 with iterations of Algorithm 18. Inverse of a(x)mod f(x) is given
by U1 = (1, α
2, α4), which by Lagrange interpolation corresponds to polynomial x2.
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6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented techniques for the protection of elliptic curve compu-
tation in a “tamper-proof” device by protection of the finite field computation against
active side channel attacks, i.e., fault attacks. Our algorithms where field elements are
represented by the redundant residue representation/redundant lagrange representation
enables us to overcome the problem if one, or both coordinates x, y ∈ GF (2k) of the
point P ∈ E/GF (2k) are corrupted. Computation of the field elements is decomposed
into parallel, mutually independent, modular/identical channels, so that in case of fault
at one channel, errors will not distribute to others. Therefore, during each run of the
algorithm an adversary can use either RFM, or AFM, or SFM per channel. By assuming
these fault models our proposed algorithms provide protection against error propagation.
Arbitrarily powerful adversaries can create faults in enough channels and overwhelm the
system proposed here, but it is part of the design process to decide on how much security
is enough, since all security (i.e. extra channels) has a cost. Note that fault tolerant LR
modular multiplication algorithm is more efficient then fault tolerant RR modular multi-
plication since computation is done over identical channels, i.e., arithmetic performed is
modulo binomial of degree one. The downside of our proposed algorithms is that they can
have masked errors, and will not be immune against attacks which can create those kind
of errors. However, it is a difficult problem to counter masked errors since any anti-fault
attack scheme will have some masked errors.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis we have developed new algorithmic countermeasures that protect elliptic
curve computation by protecting computation of the finite binary extension field, against
fault attacks.
Firstly, we have proposed schemes, i.e., a Chinese Remainder Theorem based fault
tolerant computation in finite field for use in ECCs, as well as Lagrange Interpolation
based fault tolerant computation. Our approach is based on error correcting codes, i.e.,
redundant residue polynomial codes and the use of the first original approach of Reed-
Solomon codes. Computation of the field elements is decomposed into parallel, mutually
independent, modular/identical channels, so that in case of faults at one channel, errors
will not distribute to other channels.
Based on these schemes we have developed new algorithms, namely fault tolerant
residue representation modular multiplication algorithm and fault tolerant Lagrange repre-
sentation modular multiplication algorithm, which are immune against error propagation
under the fault models that we propose: Random Fault Model, Arbitrary Fault Model,
and Single Bit Fault Model. These algorithms provide fault tolerant computation in
GF (2k) for use in ECCs. Our new developed algorithms where inputs, i.e., field elements,
are represented by the redundant residue representation/redundant Lagrange representa-
tion enables us to overcome the problem if during computation one, or both coordinates
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x, y ∈ GF (2k) of the point P ∈ E/GF (2k) are corrupted. We assume that during each
run of an attacked algorithm, in one single attack, an adversary can apply any of the pro-
posed fault models, i.e., either Random Fault Model, or Arbitrary Fault Model, or Single
Bit Fault Model. In this way more channels can be targeted, i.e., different fault models
can be used on different channels. This is new, since no previous work has implied that
different fault models can be used during each run of an attacked algorithm, in one single
attack. Our fault models have been motivated by real devices and real physical world,
where power of an adversary is compared with power of the countermeasures present on
the smartcard. The single bit Fault Model is the strongest fault model, but for today’s
smartcards this fault model may sound unrealistic by looking at the countermeasures.
The more realistic fault models are Random Fault Model, and especially Arbitrary Fault
Model, since countermeasures of today’s smartcards ensure that they are immune against
really strong fault models such as Single bit Fault Model.
These fault models prove that our algorithmic countermeasures work, and that the
attacker can not break a system and recover secret key. Arbitrarily powerful adversaries
can simply create faults in enough channels and overwhelm the system proposed, but it
is part of the design process to decide on how much security is enough, since all security
(i.e. extra channels) has a cost. If fault effects are detected, they can be corrected by
applying error correction algorithms, i.e., Euclidean decoding algorithm/Welch-Berlekamp
decoding algorithm at the output vector of the corresponding computation. Moreover, if
the number of parallel, mutually independent, modular/identical, redundant channels is
d+ t (d ≥ t), then up to t faulty processors can be corrected, and up to d simultaneously
detected. By adding 2t redundant independent channels at most t faulty processors can
be corrected.
Also, our proposed algorithms can have masked errors and will not be immune against
attacks which can create those kind of errors, but it is a difficult problem to counter masked
errors, since any anti-fault attack scheme will have some masked errors. Moreover, we
have derived conditions that inflicted error needs to have in order to yield undetectable
faulty point on non-supersingular elliptic curve over GF (2k).
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Our algorithmic countermeasures can be applied to any public key cryptosystem which
performs computation over the finite field GF (2k).
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